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Why are Goods and Services more Expensive in Rich Countries? Demand 
Complementarities and Cross-Country Price Differences  
 
Abstract 
Empirical studies show that tradable consumption goods are more expensive in rich 
countries.  This paper proposes a simple yet novel explanation for this apparent failure of the law 
of one price: Consumers’ utility from tradable goods depends on their consumption of 
complementary goods and services.  Monopolistically competitive firms charge higher prices in 
countries with more complementary goods and services because consumer demand is less elastic 
there.  The paper embeds this explanation within a static Krugman (1980)-style model of 
international trade featuring differentiated tradable goods.  Extended versions of the model can 
account for the high prices of services in rich countries, as well as for several stylized facts 
regarding investment rates and relative prices of investment and consumption across countries.  
The paper provides direct evidence in support of this new explanation. Using free-alongside-ship 
prices of U.S. and Chinese exports, I demonstrate that prices of specific subsets of tradable goods 
are higher in countries with high consumption of relevant complementary goods, conditional on 
per capita income and other country-level determinants of consumer goods prices.    
 
1. Introduction 
There is abundant evidence that tradable goods are more expensive in countries with high per-
capita incomes.  In particular, recent studies of disaggregate data on tradable goods show a 
failure of the law of one price due to firms charging higher markups for goods sold to rich 
countries than for goods sold to poor countries.  For example, Alessandria and Kaboski (2011) 
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find that rich countries pay more for goods leaving U.S. docks, and Simonovska (2011) 
documents that an online apparel retailer charges higher markups to consumers in rich 
countries.1
 This paper proposes a simple explanation to account for this evidence:  The utility a 
consumer derives from tradable goods depends on his consumption of other goods and services 
that complement the tradable goods.  Higher utility from tradable goods lowers the price 
elasticity of demand for tradables, causing monopolistically competitive firms to charge higher 
markups in markets with high consumption of complementary goods and services.  Since 
consumers in rich countries can afford more complementary goods and services, they have a 
lower price-elasticity of demand for tradable consumer goods and are charged higher prices for 
tradables. 
 
 One example of such a complementary good is housing, which complements the demand 
for consumer tradables such as a home entertainment system.  In the U.S., consumers have 
relatively inelastic demand for home entertainment systems because they also have spacious TV 
rooms in their homes and a reliable supply of energy.  In Ecuador, in contrast, the average 
consumer has less space in his home and an unreliable power supply.  Firms can therefore charge 
a higher price in the U.S. than in Ecuador for identical entertainment systems. 
 Demand for new consumer goods also depends on public infrastructure, including roads 
and public safety.  The value of a car, for example, depends not only on features specific to the 
vehicle, but also on the environment in which the car is driven.  Paved roads increase the utility 
from owning a nice car, as does a safe environment with low probability of the car being stolen, 
while owning the same car may provide far less utility in an area with dirt roads or in an area that 
is insecure.   
 Many types of goods and services may complement demand for differentiated consumer 
goods (and differentiated consumer goods could complement demand for each other).  To 
distinguish the complementary goods from the consumer goods in the analysis below, I refer to 
these complementary goods and services as catalyst goods.  Often catalyst goods will be 
durables, such as housing or public infrastructure, but they may also be services or intangibles, 
                                                 
1 Additional empirical work corroborates this evidence of a failure of the law of one price for tradables. Gopinath, 
Gourinchas, Hsieh, and Li (2011) demonstrate that wholesalers charge different markups in the U.S. market than in 
the Canadian market. Fitzgerald and Haller (2012) and Burstein and Jaimovich (2008) also find that wholesale 
prices differ substantially across destinations, even when the products are made in the same plant.  Their evidence 
suggests that cross-country price differences are driven by characteristics specific to the destination countries. 
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such as public safety, or other consumer goods.  The concept of a catalyst captures the notion 
that some goods and services facilitate consumers’ derivation of utility from other final goods 
and services.  The notion of catalysts is similar to the notion of consumer demand proposed by 
Lancaster (1966), who suggests that goods and services are not direct objects of utility 
themselves but rather contain properties and characteristics that consumers combine to generate 
utility.   
This explanation based on demand complementarity and pricing-to-market is simple, but 
to my knowledge has not been explored to date. 2
Sections 4 and 5 extend the model to demonstrate that the mechanism responsible for the 
high tradable prices in rich countries can also account for a number of other stylized facts in the 
trade and growth literatures.  Section 4 incorporates nontraded services into a two-country model 
and shows that complementarities between catalyst goods and nontraded services also generate 
high prices of nontraded services.
  Below I embed this explanation within a 
general equilibrium model that builds on a class of utility functions developed in the trade 
literature that yield demand curves with nonconstant price elasticities of demand.  The baseline 
model features demand complementarity between catalyst goods and differentiated final 
consumption goods.  Specifically, the intercept of the demand curve for a differentiated final 
good depends on the level of consumption of catalyst goods.  Section 2 develops the basic 
intuition within a closed economy and demonstrates that as the country’s income increases, it 
consumers more catalyst goods and pays higher prices for differentiated consumer goods.  
Section 3 extends the analysis to two countries with the aim of explaining the relevant empirical 
facts with respect to prices of tradable goods across countries. In equilibrium, the rich country 
consumes more catalyst goods and pays more for tradable goods. 
3
                                                 
2 The term pricing-to-market refers to general price discrimination across countries.  Krugman (1987) defines 
pricing-to-market as price discrimination in response to nominal exchange rate movements.  A number of authors 
since then, including Alessandria and Kaboski  (2011), refer to the term more generally.   
  The typical explanation for the observed correlation between 
country per-capita income and nontradable prices is based on the theory developed by Harrod 
(1933), Balassa (1964), and Samuelson (1964), collectively referred to as HBS. The HBS model 
postulates that the law of one price holds in tradables, and that rich-country productivity is higher 
in the tradable sector than in the nontradable sector.  High productivity in the tradable sector 
3 The positive relationship between prices of nontradables and income is well documented.  See, for example, 
Balassa (1964), Samuelson (1964), Baghwati (1984), Summers and Heston (1991), Barro (1991), Hsieh and Klenow 
(2007), and Alessandria and Kaboski (2011). 
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drives up wages in rich countries, which causes higher prices in the sector with lower 
productivity (nontradables).   
As recently noted by Alessandria and Kaboski (2011), it is unlikely that HBS can fully 
explain the price-income relationship across countries because the difference between tradable-
sector productivity and nontradable-sector productivity within rich countries is too small to 
account for the strong relationship between prices and incomes across countries.  In contrast to 
HBS, the explanation proposed in Section 4 for the high price of nontradables in rich countries 
does not rely on sectoral productivity differentials.  Rather, the driving mechanism is 
complementarity between catalyst goods (e.g., housing, roads, public safety, or any other 
complementary good) and final goods and services, which causes monopolistically competitive 
firms in the tradable and nontradable sectors to charge higher markups when a country has more 
catalyst goods.   
 The model extensions in Sections 2 through 4 are static and thus abstract from differences 
in the durability of different goods, and from the accumulation of capital for production.  
Nonetheless, some of the goods that are considered catalysts (e.g. housing and roads) are, in 
reality, more durable than final goods (e.g. electronics).  Furthermore, while housing and roads 
are fixed assets that are not traded, they are produced using traded investment goods.  Sections 2 
through 4 abstract from these complications for the sake of simplicity and because doing so has 
no bearing on the basic mechanism driving the model.  Section 5 demonstrates that incorporating 
these additional dimensions of reality can help explain why real investment rates are low in poor 
countries. 
  Hsieh and Klenow (2007) show that (1) investment goods are no more expensive at 
international prices in poor countries, and (2) real investment as a fraction of GDP per capita is 
positively correlated with income per capita.  Based on these observations, and on the fact that 
consumption is more expensive in countries with high per capita income, Hsieh and Klenow 
conclude that poor countries must have lower productivity in their tradable consumption goods 
sector than in their nontraded goods sector.  This conclusion leads them to declare a 
“productivity puzzle”: Why are poor countries even worse at producing tradable consumption 
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goods than they are at producing consumption services?  Hsieh and Klenow challenge the 
literature to explain this apparent productivity differential in poor countries.4
 The extended model in Section 5 matches the empirical regularities highlighted by Hsieh 
and Klenow without relying on sectoral productivity differences in poor countries.  The 
mechanism driving the results, demand complementarity and pricing-to-market, is the same 
mechanism responsible for the high price of consumption goods in rich countries in Sections 3 
and 4.  Furthermore, in the same way that demand complementarity and pricing-to-market 
provides an alternative to the HBS-based conclusion that rich countries must have a sectoral 
productivity differential, it also provides an alternative to Hsieh and Klenow’s hypothesis of a 
poor country productivity differential. 
 
An important question is whether the explanation proposed in this paper fits the micro 
data.  Section 6 of the paper provides independent empirical evidence that prices of consumer 
goods depend on a country’s consumption of the relevant catalyst goods and services.  
Specifically, I use U.S. and Chinese export data to investigate whether certain consumer goods 
are sold at higher prices to countries with higher stocks of relevant catalysts.  I show that 
household goods and electronic goods are sold at higher prices to countries with more housing 
and electricity, conditional on per capita income and other country-level determinants of 
consumer goods prices.  Also, new cars are sold at higher prices to countries with higher 
percentages of paved roads.   
Simonovska (2011) is the most closely related paper that offers an explanation for high 
prices of tradables in rich countries.5
                                                 
4 Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011) suggest that one reason for the productivity differential in poor countries is that 
manufacturing requires economies of scale, which must be supported by a well-developed financial sector.  Poor 
countries face financial frictions which disproportionately lower manufacturing productivity (and hence productivity 
in the investment good sector). 
  In Simonovska’s model, high tradable prices in rich 
countries are due to low demand elasticities (and corresponding high markups) arising from 
consumption of larger varieties of imported goods. In the models above, high prices reflect high 
consumption of catalyst goods, rather than differences in the set of imported goods.  
Furthermore, demand complementarity and pricing-to-market causes high prices in a closed 
economy setting as well as in an open economy setting and can account for a number of 
empirical regularities in the trade and growth literatures.  Thus, while both the model in 
5 Hummels and Lugovsky (2009) and Alessandria and Kaboski (2011) also propose theoretical explanations for the 
positive correlation between markups and income per capita. 
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Simonovska (2011) and the model here employ forms of nonhomothetic preferences that permit 
price-dependent demand elasticities, the underlying mechanisms are different.  One implication 
of the demand-complementarities explanation is that the extent to which markups vary across 
countries should depend on the extent to which the tradable good in question is complementary 
to other goods and services.   
The demand-side explanation for high prices of tradable goods in rich countries explored 
here complements a burgeoning literature that examines demand-side explanations for the cross-
country relationship between income and quality of imports.6
  
  Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and 
Helpman (2011) develop a model featuring complementarity between a homogenous good and 
quality of vertically differentiated goods.  In their model, higher incomes are associated with 
more purchases of higher quality goods, but not with higher markups paid for those goods.  An 
interesting avenue for future research is to develop models in which high consumption of catalyst 
goods is associated with purchases of higher quality goods and higher markups for a good of any 
given quality. 
2. Closed Economy Model 
This section illustrates in a closed-economy setting how prices of consumer goods increase with 
a country’s wealth due to markups that rise with the country’s stock of catalyst goods.  The 
closed economy features a representative consumer with preferences over differentiated final 
goods, a homogenous catalyst good, and a homogenous numeraire good.  The final goods 
represent appliances, household items, and cars, among other consumer goods. The homogenous 
catalyst good represents housing and public infrastructure such as roads, energy supply, safety, 
and any other good that may complement demand for the final goods.   
 The catalyst is produced under perfect competition by a representative firm, while the 
consumer goods are produced by monopolistically competitive firms.  Both sectors use labor, 
which is supplied inelastically, as the only factor of production.  The numeraire is endowed to 
the economy and enters the consumer’s utility function linearly.  This particular setup is based on 
a variant of the linear demand system developed by Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002), and 
                                                 
6 This paper more broadly fits into work that explores the implications of nonhomothetic preferences for patterns of 
trade, including Bergstrand (1990), Hunter (1991), Matsuyama (2000), Mitra and Trindade (2005) and Fieler (2011), 
among many others.  Markusen (2010) reviews the literature and discusses a range of phenomena for which non-
homothetic preferences improve the correspondence between trade models and the data. 
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is chosen to demonstrate in the simplest possible setting how demand complementarities and 
pricing-to-market cause prices of final consumer goods to rise with a country’s wealth.  The 
Ottaviano et al (2002) demand system is analytically convenient, in part because the marginal 
utility of income is unity for all levels of income.  Appendix I.A demonstrates that the results of 
this section are robust to alternative specifications for which the marginal utility of income varies 
with income and the numeraire is produced with labor. 
 Model Setup. The representative agent’s utility function is defined over the catalyst good 
𝐶, the mass Ω of final goods, and a numeraire 𝑦:  







, (1)  
where 𝑓𝜔 is consumption of final good 𝜔 ∈ Ω.  The numeraire 𝑦 is endowed to the economy, and 
could represent any commodity, such as gold or wheat.  Agricultural commodities are perhaps 
the most intuitive interpretation of the numeraire because, among other reasons, agriculture is 
often considered to be endowed to the economy due to its heavy reliance on immobile factors of 
production.7
Equation 
    
(1) is a simplified version of the utility functions used in Ottaviano et al (2002), 
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), and Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008).    The utility 
function here differs from their utility functions in two ways.  First, the marginal utility from 
consuming any variety 𝜔 is independent of consumption of any other variety 𝜔′ ≠ 𝜔.  This is for 
analytical convenience only.  Second, equation (1) features a catalyst good 𝐶 that acts as a 
demand shifter for the consumption goods. 
 The agent inelastically supplies 𝐿 units of labor to the market.  The agent also owns the 
firms in the economy and receives profit income from the mass Ω of firms that produce 
differentiated consumption goods. The budget constraint is 
 𝑦 + 𝑤𝐿 + �Π𝜔𝑑𝜔
Ω
= 𝑦 + 𝑝𝐶𝐶 + �𝑝𝜔𝑓𝜔𝑑𝜔
Ω
, (2)  
where 𝑤 is the wage, 𝑝𝐶 is the price of the catalyst, and 𝑝𝜔 is the price of variety 𝜔.   




(𝐶𝛼 − 𝑝𝜔), (3)  
                                                 
7 See, for example Ottaviano et al (2002), and, more recently, Allen (2012) for models with an endowed agricultural 
commodity.   
8 
 
which is increasing in 𝐶. This simple linear demand function captures the notion that demand for 
consumption goods is less elastic when the economy has a higher stock of housing and public 
infrastructure.  For example, a consumer’s willingness to pay for a fancy new oven is higher (and 
his price-sensitivity lower) if he has a nice kitchen and house that can accommodate dinner 
guests.  








, (4)  
where 𝐹 ≡ ∫ 𝑓𝜔𝑑𝜔
Ω
0 .  The larger the mass of goods Ω, and the more of each good consumed, the 
higher is the demand for the catalyst.  For example, demand for a mansion is high if a consumer 
has access to artwork, furniture, and appliances with which to fill the mansion.  Otherwise a 
large, empty house is of little value.  
 Final Good Sector.  Final good firms employ labor in a linear production function to 
produce output according to 
 𝑓𝜔 = 𝐴𝐿𝜔 , (5)  
 where 𝐴 is labor productivity, which is identical across firms and across sectors, and 𝐿𝜔 is the 
amount of labor employed by firm 𝜔.  Each firm chooses its output price to maximize profits.  
Firm 𝜔’s profit function is 
 Π𝜔 = 𝑝𝜔𝑓𝜔 −
𝑤
𝐴
𝑓𝜔 . (6)  








�. (7)  
Prices are increasing in 𝐶 because demand is less elastic when 𝐶 is high.  Equation (7) captures 
the intuition that (a) monopolistically competitive firms charge a price that is proportional to 
consumer utility from consumption of firms’ output, and (b) catalyst goods increase utility from 
consumption of final goods. The two-country counterpart to (7) in Section 3 derives the central 
result that rich countries pay higher prices for identical goods.  Note that linearity of the demand 
curve (3) is sufficient but not necessary for the price elasticity of demand to be decreasing in the 
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catalyst.  Appendix I.B derives the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the price 
elasticity of demand is decreasing in 𝐶.   







�, (8)  










I permit profits to be positive because incorporating a zero-profit condition would simply 
complicate the model by adding an equilibrium equation and an extra endogenous variable (the 
mass of final goods firms).  Also, abstracting from fixed costs and increasing returns permits a 
clear comparison of productivity across sectors to demonstrate that demand complementarities, 
rather than productivity differentials, drive the price differences in the two-country models in 
sections 3 through 5.   Nonetheless, the positive relationship between final goods prices and 
economic wealth derived below is robust to incorporating zero profits as a long-run equilibrium 
condition. 
Since productivity is identical across firms, so are prices and quantities: 𝑓𝜔 = 𝑓 and 𝑝𝜔 =








�. (9)  
Given total demand for final goods, we can write demand for labor in the final good sector as 
𝐿𝑄 ≡ ∫ 𝐿𝜔𝑑𝜔
Ω




𝐹. (10)  
Catalyst Sector.  Catalysts are produced competitively using the technology 
 𝐶 = 𝐴𝐿𝐶 , (11)  
where 𝐿𝐶 is labor in the catalyst sector.  Cost minimization yields the price of catalysts, 𝑝𝐶 =
𝑤/𝐴. 
 Equilibrium.  Equilibrium is characterized by demand for catalysts (4), demand for 






(𝐹 + 𝐶). (12)  
The endogenous variables are 𝐹,𝐶, and 𝑤. 
 Comparative Statics. The central message of this section is that in general equilibrium, 
markups and prices of final goods are increasing in the economy’s wealth.  Figure I.1 shows how 
market outcomes vary with productivity under the following parameterization: 
 𝐿 = 1, 𝐴 = 1, Ω = 1, 𝛼 = 0.3, 𝛾 = 0.3. 8   (13)  
As 𝐴 increases, the price of the catalyst falls and the quantity of the catalyst increases.  The 
increase in 𝐶 shifts out the demand curve for final goods, lowering the price-elasticity of 
demand.  Firms charge a higher markup, causing a higher price of final goods.  The positive 
effect of 𝐶 on demand for final goods outweighs the counteracting effect of the increase in 𝑤 on 
the price, so overall demand for final goods increases.  Thus, even in this simple closed 
economy, prices and quantities of final goods rise with economy-wide productivity due to high 
demand from the consumption of more catalyst goods. 
 
3. Two-Country Model 
This section extends the model of Section 2 to incorporate trade between two countries 𝑁 
(North) and 𝑆 (South). The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate that demand 
complementarities and pricing-to-market can account for the evidence of higher prices of 
tradable goods in rich countries than in poor countries.  In the model, each country is endowed 
with the numeraire and inelastically supplies labor to produce catalyst goods and differentiated 
final goods.  Catalyst goods are not traded across countries.  This assumption is for simplicity 
(the qualitative results are robust to permitting the catalyst to be traded), and because some 
catalyst goods represent housing and public infrastructure, which are fixed immobile assets.  The 
numeraire is endowed to each country and is traded.  Following Krugman (1980), each country 
specializes in a unique set of differentiated final goods.  As in Section 2, final goods are 
produced by monopolistically competitive firms.  Firms can move final goods costlessly across 
international borders.  Consumers, however, face large costs of moving goods across 
international borders.  Therefore even though firms charge country-specific prices, consumers do 
                                                 
8 The qualitative results with respect to the markup are robust to all parameter values.  A proof based on total 
differentiation of the equilibrium equations is available from the author upon request.   
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not arbitrage because there are prohibitive costs associated with doing so.  These costs could 
represent the time required to travel across international borders, as suggested in Gopinath et al 
(2011), as well as other transportation costs and information rigidities. 
Model Setup.  Each country 𝑗 ∈ {𝑁, 𝑆} produces a mass Ω𝑗 of final goods which are 
consumed at home and abroad.  Goods produced in country 𝑗 are indexed by 𝜔𝑗 ∈ Ω𝑗.  The utility 
function of the representative consumer in country 𝑗 is 







, (14)  
where  𝑦𝑗 and 𝐶𝑗are consumption of the numeraire and catalyst by country 𝑗 and 𝑓𝑗(𝜔𝑖) is 
consumption  in country 𝑗 of variety 𝜔𝑖 from country 𝑖 ∈ {𝑁, 𝑆}.  As in the previous section, the 
numeraire good 𝑦 simplifies the analysis.   
 The budget constraint of the representative agent in country 𝑗 is  
 𝑦𝑗0 + 𝑤𝑗𝐿𝑗 + � � Π𝑖�𝜔𝑗�
𝜔𝑗∈Ω𝑗𝑖=𝑁,𝑆
= 𝑦𝑗 + 𝑝𝐶𝑗𝐶𝑗 + � � 𝑝𝑗(𝜔𝑖)𝑓𝑗(𝜔𝑖)
𝜔𝑖∈Ω𝑖𝑖=𝑁,𝑆
, (15)  
where 𝑦𝑗0 is the endowment of the numeraire in country 𝑗, Π𝑖�𝜔𝑗� is the profit from sales of 
variety 𝜔𝑗 to country 𝑖, 𝑦𝑗 is the amount of the numeraire consumed in country 𝑗, 𝑝𝐶𝑗 is the price 
of the catalyst in 𝑗, and 𝑝𝑗(𝜔𝑖) is the price of variety 𝜔𝑖 in 𝑗. 




�𝐶𝑗𝛼 − 𝑝𝑗(𝜔𝑖)�. (16)  








, (17)  
where 𝐹𝑗 ≡ ∑ ∫ 𝑓𝑗(𝜔𝑖)𝜔𝑖∈Ω𝑖𝑖=𝑁,𝑆  is the total quantity of final goods consumed in country 𝑗.   
 Consumption Good Sector.  Output in the final goods sector is produced using the 
technology  
 𝑓�𝜔𝑗� = 𝐴𝑗𝐿𝜔𝑗 , (18)  
where 𝑓�𝜔𝑗� ≡ 𝑓𝑁�𝜔𝑗� + 𝑓𝑆�𝜔𝑗�.  Each firm 𝜔𝑗 charges a country-specific price to maximize 
the profits Π𝑖�𝜔𝑗� from selling variety 𝜔𝑗 in country 𝑖 ∈ {𝑁, 𝑆}.  I assume that if  
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𝑝𝑆(𝜔𝑆) ≠ 𝑝𝑁(𝜔𝑆), the costs to consumers in country �𝑖: 𝑝𝑖(𝜔𝑆) < 𝑝𝑗(𝜔𝑆)� of purchasing good 
𝜔𝑆 in 𝑖 are sufficiently high to prevent arbitrage.  Likewise, costs to consumers of transporting 
good 𝜔𝑁 across international borders are sufficiently high to prevent arbitrage when 𝑝𝑆(𝜔𝑁) ≠
𝑝𝑁(𝜔𝑁). 
Profits from sales of 𝜔𝑗 in 𝑖 can be written 
 Π𝑖�𝜔𝑗� = 𝑝𝑖�𝜔𝑗�𝑓𝑖�𝜔𝑗� −
𝑤𝑗
𝐴𝑗
𝑓𝑖�𝜔𝑗�. (19)  








�. (20)  
Equation (20) states that the optimal price of an identical good varies across countries based on 
the stock of catalyst goods in each country.  This is the key result of the paper, and it explains 
why rich countries pay higher prices for tradable goods.  Of course, it remains to be seen that 
rich countries have more of the catalyst in equilibrium, a task to which we now turn. 








�, (21)  








�, (22)  










. (23)  
 Catalyst Sector. As in Section 2, the catalyst in country 𝑗 is produced competitively 
according to 𝐶𝑗 = 𝐴𝑗𝐿𝐶𝑗, where 𝐴𝑗 is productivity in country 𝑗 and 𝐿𝐶𝑗 is labor employed in 𝑗’s 
catalyst sector.  The price of the catalyst is 𝑝𝐶𝑗 = 𝑤𝑗/𝐴𝑗 , which is derived from cost 
minimization by the representative catalyst firm.  Since the catalyst is not traded across 
countries, there is no role for comparative advantage and each country will produce some of the 
catalyst in equilibrium.      
 Equilibrium. Since 𝑝𝑖�𝜔𝑗� and 𝑓𝑖�𝜔𝑗� are identical for any variety 𝜔𝑗 from country 𝑗, it 
will be helpful to omit variety indices by writing 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 𝑝𝑖�𝜔𝑗� ,  𝑓𝑖𝑗 = 𝑓𝑖�𝜔𝑗�, and Π𝑖𝑗 =
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Π𝑖�𝜔𝑗�   ∀ 𝜔𝑗 ∈ Ω𝑗.  Then 𝐹𝑗 becomes 𝐹𝑗 = Ω𝑗𝑓𝑗𝑗 + Ω𝑖𝑓𝑗𝑖 .  The budget constraint in country 𝑗 
simplifies to 
 𝑦𝑗0 + 𝑤𝑗𝐿𝑗 + Ω𝑗�Π𝑗𝑗 + Π𝑖𝑗� = 𝑦𝑗 + 𝑝𝐶𝑗𝐶𝑗 + Ω𝑗𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑓𝑗𝑗 + Ω𝑖𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑓𝑗𝑖  (24)  
Labor market clearing in 𝑗 is 𝐿𝑗 = 𝐿𝑄𝑗 + 𝐿𝐶𝑗, where 𝐿𝑄𝑗 ≡ ∫ 𝐿𝜔𝑗𝑑𝜔𝑗𝜔𝑗∈Ω𝑗  is total labor used in 
the final goods sector.  By substituting in the production functions for final goods and the 




�Ω𝑗�𝑓𝑗𝑗 + 𝑓𝑖𝑗� + 𝐶𝑗�. (25)  
Market clearing for the numeraire is  
 𝑦𝑁0 + 𝑦𝑆0 = 𝑦𝑁 + 𝑦𝑆. (26)  
 Equilibrium is characterized by demand for the catalyst in each country (17), demand for 
final goods (21), labor market clearing in each country (25), market clearing for the numeraire 
(26), and the budget constraints (24).  By Walras’ Law, one of these equations is redundant. For 











































[Ω𝑁(𝑓𝑁𝑁 + 𝑓𝑆𝑁) + 𝐶𝑁], 𝐿𝑆 =
1
𝐴𝑆
[Ω𝑆(𝑓𝑆𝑆 + 𝑓𝑁𝑆) + 𝐶𝑆], 
𝑦𝑁0 + 𝑦𝑆0 = 𝑦𝑁 + 𝑦𝑆, 
𝑦𝑁0 − 𝑦𝑁 + Ω𝑁𝑝𝑆𝑁𝑓𝑆𝑁 = Ω𝑆𝑝𝑁𝑆𝑓𝑁𝑆, 
where the last equilibrium equation is a simplified version of the budget constraint for country 𝑁 
(see equation 24).  The ten equations above yield a unique solution for the endogenous variables 
𝑤𝑁 ,𝑤𝑆,𝑦𝑁 ,𝑦𝑆,𝐶𝑁, 𝐶𝑆,𝑓𝑁𝑁 ,𝑓𝑁𝑆,𝑓𝑆𝑆 ,  and 𝑓𝑆𝑁. 
Results.  Figure I.2 shows relative prices in 𝑁 and 𝑆 of identical goods under the 
following baseline parameterization:  
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𝐴𝑁 ,𝐴𝑆 = 3, 𝐿𝑁 ,𝐿𝑆 ,𝑦𝑁0 ,𝑦𝑆0 = 1, Ω𝑆,Ω𝑁 = 0.5, 𝛼, 𝛾 = 0.39 
The left-hand graph shows the ratio of prices relative to the numeraire, while the graph on the 
right shows the ratio of PPP-adjusted prices.10
Figure I.3 shows how market outcomes vary with productivity in 𝑁.  As 𝐴𝑁 rises, 𝑁 
produces and consumes more of the catalyst.  Higher catalyst consumption shifts out the demand 
curves of final goods, which causes firms from both countries to charge higher markups for 
goods sold in 𝑁.  The resulting quantities of final goods demanded by 𝑁 increase because the 
outward shift of the demand curves caused by higher catalyst consumption outweighs the 
movement along the demand curves caused by higher prices.  Therefore a rise in 𝐴𝑁 causes 
higher catalyst and final good consumption in 𝑁, as well as higher prices of final goods. 
  According to Figure I.2, the model predicts that 
as a country gets richer, it pays higher prices for identical goods than does its poorer counterpart, 
consistent with the evidence across countries cited in the introduction.  Specifically, goods 
produced in 𝑁 are more expensive in 𝑁, and goods produced in 𝑆 are more expensive in 𝑁. 
The rise in 𝑓𝑁𝑆 requires 𝑆 to devote more labor resources to its export sector and less 
resources to production for domestic consumption, causing a fall in 𝑓𝑆𝑆 and 𝐶𝑆.  How is this 
optimal for 𝑆?  Since exports from 𝑆 are sold at a higher markup, the value of exports 𝑓𝑁𝑆 
increase relative to the value of the numeraire. 𝑆 therefore reallocates labor to the export sector 
to exchange for the numeraire and for consumer goods produced in 𝑁, leading to an increase in 
trade and an increase in welfare in 𝑆.  Figure I.4 shows that welfare in both countries increases 
with 𝐴𝑁. 
 Summary of the Two-Country Model.  As productivity in 𝑁 increases, 𝑁 can afford to 
produce more catalyst goods, which shifts out its demand for final goods by increasing the price-
                                                 
9 Baseline productivity is set to 3 to ensure that utility from consumption of final goods and catalyst goods is 
sufficiently high to ensure positive demand for imports from 𝑁 and 𝑆. In other words, the productivity parameters 
are chosen such that the equilibrium is at an interior solution given by the ten equilibrium equations above.   
10 In Figure I.4, 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑅 ≡ 𝑝𝑖𝑗/𝑃𝑖 , where 𝑃𝑖  is the consumer price index.  𝑃𝑖  is normalized to unity under the initial 
calibration in which productivity is equal across countries.  Note that PPP holds when 𝑁 and 𝑆 are equal because the 
exact same bundles are purchased at identical costs in each country.  When productivity is not equal across countries 
(e.g. at any point in Figure I.4 to the right of the y-axis), 𝑃𝑖  is the current price in country 𝑖 of the bundle of goods 
consumed when PPP held (the Laspeyres Index):  
𝑃𝑖 =
𝑦𝑖0 + 𝑝𝐶𝑖𝐶𝑖0 + 𝑝𝑖𝑗Ω𝑗𝑓𝑖𝑗0 + 𝑝𝑖𝑖Ω𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑖0
𝑦𝑖0 + 𝑝𝐶𝑖0 𝐶𝑖0 + 𝑝𝑖𝑗0 Ω𝑗𝑓𝑖𝑗0 + 𝑝𝑖𝑖0Ω𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑖0
, 




intercept of the demand curve.  𝑁’s resulting lower price elasticity of demand causes firms to 
charge a higher markup in 𝑁 than in 𝑆, which increases relative prices in 𝑁.   
 As we will see in Section 4 below, this simple explanation of demand complementarity 
and pricing-to-market can explain not only high prices of traded consumer goods in rich 
countries, but also high prices of nontradables in rich countries. 
 
4. Two-Country Model with Nontradables 
This section extends the model of Section 3 to incorporate nontradables that are produced and 
sold domestically by monopolistically competitive firms.  The purpose of this simple extension is 
to demonstrate that the mechanism emphasized above to account for the comparatively high 
prices of tradables in rich countries can also account for the comparatively high prices of 
nontradables in rich countries.11
The typical explanation for the observed correlation between country income per capita 
and nontradable prices is based on the theory developed by Harrod (1933), Balassa (1964), and 
Samuelson (1964). The HBS model assumes that the law of one price (LOP) holds in tradables, 
and that rich-country productivity is higher in the tradable sector than in the nontradable sector.  
High productivity in the tradable sector drives up wages in rich countries, which causes higher 
prices in the sector with lower productivity (nontradables).   
   
As recently noted by Alessandria and Kaboski (2011), there are at least two strong 
reasons to doubt HBS as a full explanation of the price-income correlation across countries.  
First, the LOP does not hold for tradables, violating a key assumption of HBS.  Second, the rise 
in relative productivity of tradables within rich countries appears too small to account for the 
strong relationship between prices and incomes across countries.  
 The model extension below provides an alternative explanation to account for 
comparatively high prices of nontradables in Rich countries (as well as comparatively high 
tradable prices).  In contrast to HBS, the new explanation does not rely on sectoral productivity 
differentials.  Rather, the driving mechanism is complementarity between catalyst goods and 
final goods, as in Section 3.  Rich countries can afford to produce more catalyst goods, which in 
turn increases demand for nontradable goods and services. 
                                                 
11 This high price of nontradables in rich countries is well-documented.  See, for example, Alessandria and Kaboski 
(2011,  p.92).  
16 
 
Consider, for example, purchasing car rental services in Ecuador, which has unpaved 
roads and a generally unsafe environment for driving. Even if a car rental agency can provide a 
vehicle to rent at low cost, customers will have low preference for this service simply because 
there are characteristics specific to Ecuador (poor driving conditions) which may not affect the 
cost to the firm of providing the service, but which reduce customers’ utility from the service.  
Likewise, consumers may require a haircut once a month, but the utility from a haircut at a 
barber shop relative to cutting one’s own hair depends on the convenience of traveling to the 
barber, which in turn depends on public infrastructure such as roads, safety, and reliable energy 
supply to ensure the barber shop will be open for business.  It may also depend on the prevalence 
of other goods and services for which one might need a haircut to fully enjoy.  Salon services are 
more valuable, for example, when consumers attend formal events in which a certain style of 
appearance is the cultural norm.  Notice that in this last example, the complementary catalyst is 
itself a service.   
Utility from nontradable services also depends on durables, such as housing.  For 
example, the value of services such as window-washing, carpet-cleaning, and lawn mowing all 
depend on whether consumers have homes that can accommodate windows, carpets, and lawns.  
In Quito, Ecuador, these services are of little value because few homes there are suitable for 
windows and nice carpets, and few households own lawns.   
The model below captures this intuition by incorporating nontradable services into the 
model from Section 3.  As we will see, high service prices will rely on demand 
complementarities, rather than on sectoral productivity differentials.   
 
 Model Setup. The representative consumer in country 𝑗 has utility over the numeraire, 
tradable goods, and a mass Ψ𝑗 of nontradable services: 
















where 𝜓𝑗 indexes the services in country 𝑗 and 𝑓𝑗�𝜓𝑗� is consumption of variety 𝜓𝑗 in 𝑗.  Unless 
otherwise stated, the notation and variable names are the same as in Section 3 above.   
Country 𝑗’s budget constraint is 
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 𝑦𝑗0 + 𝑤𝑗𝐿𝑗 + � Πj�𝜓𝑗�
𝜓𝑗∈Ψ𝑗
+ � � Π𝑖�𝜔𝑗�
𝜔𝑗∈Ω𝑗𝑖=𝑁,𝑆
= 𝑦𝑗 + 𝑝𝐶𝑗𝐶𝑗 + � 𝑝𝑗�𝜓𝑗�𝑓𝑗�𝜓𝑗�
𝜓𝑗∈Ψ𝑗




where Πj�𝜓𝑗� are profits from sales of service 𝜓𝑗 at price 𝑝𝑗�𝜓𝑗� and quantity 𝑓𝑗�𝜓𝑗�. Consumer 




�𝐶𝑗𝛼 − 𝑝𝑗�𝜓𝑗��. (29)  
Demand for tradable goods is given by (16) above, and demand for catalyst goods is given by 
(17), where total consumption of final goods and services in country 𝑗 is  
𝐹𝑗 ≡ � 𝑓𝑗�𝜓𝑗�
𝜓𝑗∈Ψ𝑗
+ � � 𝑓𝑗(𝜔𝑖)
𝜔𝑖∈Ω𝑖𝑖=𝑁,𝑆
. 
 Final Goods Firms. Optimization by firms in the tradable sector is identical to that in 














�, (31)  
where 𝑝𝑗𝑖 and 𝑓𝑗𝑖 are the price and quantity of any variety produced in country 𝑖 ∈ {𝑁, 𝑆} and 
sold in 𝑗 ∈ {𝑁, 𝑆}.   
 Service Sector Firms.  Services are produced using the same technology as that used by 
consumer goods: 
 𝑓𝑗�𝜓𝑗� = 𝐴𝑗𝐿𝜓𝑗 , (32)  
where 𝐿𝜓𝑗  is labor used to produce service variety 𝜓𝑗.  Profits of firm 𝜓𝑗 are 
 Πj�𝜓𝑗� = 𝑝𝑗�𝜓𝑗�𝑓𝑗�𝜓𝑗� −
𝑤𝑗
𝐴𝑗
𝑓𝑗�𝜓𝑗�. (33)  








�. (34)  








�. (35)  
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Catalyst Sector. The production function for catalyst goods is 𝐶𝑗 = 𝐴𝑗𝐿𝐶𝑗.  As in Sections 
2 and 3, the catalyst sector is perfectly competitive.  The price of the catalyst is 𝑝𝐶𝑗 = 𝑤𝑗/𝐴𝑗 , 
which is derived from cost minimization by the representative catalyst firm.  Also, as in Sections 
2 and 3, the catalyst is not traded across countries.  
 Equilibrium. Since 𝑝𝑗�𝜓𝑗� and 𝑓𝑗�𝜓𝑗� are identical for any variety 𝜓𝑗 from country 𝑗, it 
is helpful to omit variety indices by writing 𝑝𝑗 = 𝑝𝑗�𝜓𝑗� and  𝑓𝑗 = 𝑓𝑗�𝜓𝑗�  ∀ 𝜓𝑗 ∈ Ψ𝑗.  Total 
consumption of goods and services in country 𝑗 can be written 𝐹𝑗 = Ψ𝑗𝑓𝑗 + Ω𝑗𝑓𝑗𝑗 + Ω𝑖𝑓𝑗𝑖 .   
 Equilibrium is characterized by demand for the catalyst in each country (17), demand for 
final goods in each country (31), demand for nontradables in each country (29),  labor market 








[Ψ𝑆𝑓𝑆 + Ω𝑆(𝑓𝑁𝑆 + 𝑓𝑆𝑆)  + 𝐶𝑆], 
numeraire market clearing  
𝑦𝑁0 + 𝑦𝑆0 = 𝑦𝑁 + 𝑦𝑆, 
and the budget constraint for 𝑁, which simplifies to 
𝑦𝑁0 + Ω𝑁𝑝𝑆𝑁𝑓𝑆𝑁 = 𝑦𝑁 + Ω𝑆𝑝𝑁𝑆𝑓𝑁𝑆. 
By Walras’ Law, the budget constraint in 𝑆 is redundant.   
 
 Results.  The initial parameter values are 𝛼 = 0.3, 𝛾 = 0.3; the initial productivity 
paramaters are set to unity, and the mass of goods and services in each country is unity (Ψ𝑗 +
Ω𝑗 + Ω𝑖 = 1).  Figure I.5 shows market outcomes as productivity in 𝑁 increases.  The results are 
very similar to those from Section 3:  𝑁’s production and consumption of catalyst and final 
goods increases, as does the price of tradables in 𝑁.  In addition, the relative price of services is 
higher in 𝑁 because the increase in 𝐶𝑁 lowers the price elasticity of demand for services, causing 
service-sector firms in 𝑁 to charge a higher markup than service-sector firms in 𝑆. 
Summary of Two-Country Model with Services. The value of services within a country 
rises with that country’s stock of catalyst goods.  A rich country can afford to produce more of 
the catalyst, which lowers the price elasticity of demand for tradable final goods and nontradable 
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services within the country.  As a result, monopolistically competitive firms in the final good and 
service sectors charge a higher markup, causing higher prices of tradable goods and nontradable 
services in the rich country.   
 Note that the simple mechanism of demand complementarity and pricing-to-market was 
initially proposed in Sections 2 and 3 to account for the high prices of tradable goods in rich 
countries.  Section 4 showed how the same mechanisms can account for another stylized fact in 
international trade (the high prices of services in rich countries) by adding a degree of realism to 
the baseline model.  Of course, even the extended model of Section 4 abstracts from many 
dimensions of reality.  One of the most obvious abstractions is the absence of traded investment 
goods.  As we will see in Section 5, incorporating traded investment goods and capital as a factor 
of production permits the model to explain additional stylized facts in the trade and growth 
literatures. 
  
Section 5: Incorporating Capital and Tradable Investment.    
Hsieh and Klenow (2007) highlight the following empirical regularities in the growth literature:  
1) The price of consumption is high when income per capita is high. 
2) Prices of investment goods are no higher in poor countries. 
3) Real investment rates are positively correlated with income.    
The first fact, which is typically attributed to HBS, has already been discussed at length.  Fact (3) 
dates back to Barro (1991) and is often attributed to policies in poor countries that distort savings 
and investment decisions.  Hsieh and Klenow provide evidence in support of fact (2) and search 
for a unified explanation of the facts.  They conclude, 
“Poor countries appear to have low investment rates in PPP terms primarily because they 
have either low productivity in producing investment goods or low productivity in producing 
tradables to exchange for investment goods…Our results thus imply…a deeper productivity 
puzzle. The challenge is to explain not only low overall productivity in poor countries, but 
also low productivity in investment goods (or in providing consumption goods to trade for 
investment goods) relative to consumption goods” (p. 564, emphasis mine). 
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The reader is referred to Hsieh and Klenow (2007) for why they infer a productivity 
puzzle based on the three empirical regularities.12
 More concretely, in the model below goods are produced using labor, which is 
inelastically supplied, and capital, which is accumulated through investment.  Rich countries 
have a high stock of catalyst goods, which causes the value of final consumer goods to be higher 
in rich countries than in poor countries and causes higher markups for goods sold to Rich 
countries (fact 1).  
  This section provides an alternative unified 
explanation for these stylized facts that does not rely on poor countries having low productivity 
in the investment goods sector relative to productivity in the consumption goods sector.   My 
explanation instead builds on the mechanisms developed above under a framework that features 
pricing-to-market in the final goods sector and complementarity between catalyst goods and final 
goods. 
 Fact (2) is an immediate consequence of any assumption on the market structure for 
investment goods such that prices of investment goods equalize across countries.  In the simplest 
case, investment goods are produced under perfect competition (as in Hsieh and Klenow 2007) 
and are traded costlessly.  An alternative assumption is that differentiated investment goods are 
produced by monopolistically competitive firms.  If the differentiated goods are aggregated into 
the investment good through a CES aggregator, then firms will charge the same markup over 
marginal cost in each country for their investment good and the price of the final investment 
good will equalize across countries.   
 Hsieh and Klenow note that under some empirical specifications, investment goods are 
slightly more expensive in rich countries.  A model in which the investment aggregator function 
gives rise to price-dependent investment demand curves can generate a positive relationship 
between investment prices and income, as demonstrated in Appendix I.D.  The properties of such 
a model are more complicated than is necessary to demonstrate that the focal mechanism, 
demand complementarity and pricing-to-market, can resolve Hsieh and Klenow’s productivity 
puzzle.   The model in this section presents the simplest case of perfect competition in the 
investment goods sector, consistent with the analysis in Hsieh and Klenow (2007).  Appendix I.C 
                                                 
12 Recently, Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2012) estimate that developing countries’ TFP in tradable manufactured 
goods is about equal to average TFP, which suggests that an explanation other than productivity differentials is 
required to explain facts (1) through (3). 
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demonstrates the case in which a final investment good is produced from differentiated 
intermediate investment goods using a CES aggregator. 
In the two-country model below, the homogenous investment good is traded costlessly, 
causing the price of the investment good to equalize across countries.  This implies that the rental 
rate of capital also equalizes across countries, consistent with the evidence in Caselli and Feyrer 
(2007) that marginal products of capital are similar across countries.  The equalization of capital 
prices across countries causes the capital price-to-wage ratio to be high in poor countries relative 
to the ratio in rich countries.  In response to the difference in factor prices, firms in poor 
countries demand a lower capital/labor ratio than do rich countries, which lowers real investment 
in poor countries relative to investment in rich countries (fact 3).    
 All goods are produced using a Cobb-Douglas technology that employs labor and capital 
as factor inputs.  The homogenous investment good is traded, as are differentiated final goods.  
The catalyst (e.g. housing and infrastructure) is not traded.  Since the catalyst represents durables 
such as housing and roads, as well as nondurables that may complement consumer goods, the 
catalyst is permitted to be long-lived in the model.   
The price of investment is equalized across both countries, so the country with a 
comparative advantage in the investment sector will produce the investment good, while the 
other country will trade final consumer goods for the investment good.  The homogenous capital 
investment good is not produced in 𝑆 because economy-wide productivity in 𝑆 is assumed to be 
low enough that 𝑆 is better off exchanging consumption goods for investment goods.13
 
   This 
assumption approximates reality:  Eaton and Kortum (2001) show that poor countries import 
most of their capital equipment. Finally, the model abstracts from production of nontradable final 
goods and services for the sake of simplicity only. 





subject to  
                                                 
13 To rule out the possibility of a within-country productivity differential, I assume that the South has access to the 
technology to produce investment goods using the same total factor productivity as in other sectors and verify that in 
equilibrium they are better off producing consumption goods to exchange for investment goods.  
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𝐾𝑗,𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑗𝑡 + 𝐼𝑗𝑡, 
𝐶𝑗,𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝛿)𝐶𝑗𝑡 + 𝑋𝑗𝑡, 
𝑦𝑗𝑡0 + 𝑅𝑗𝑡𝐾𝑗𝑡 + 𝑤𝑗𝑡𝐿𝑗𝑡 + � � Π𝑖𝑡�𝜔𝑗�
𝜔𝑗∈Ω𝑗𝑖=𝑁,𝑆
= 𝑝𝐼𝑗𝑡𝐼𝑗𝑡 + 𝑦𝑗𝑡 + 𝑝𝑋𝑗𝑡𝑋𝑗𝑡 + � � 𝑝𝑗𝑡(𝜔𝑖)𝑓𝑗𝑡(𝜔𝑖)
𝜔𝑖∈Ω𝑖𝑖=𝑁,𝑆
, 
where 𝑈𝑗𝑡 is the within-period utility function given by (14), 𝐾𝑗𝑡 is the capital stock in period 
𝑡 ∈ {0,1,2, … }, 𝑅𝑗𝑡 is the rental price of capital, 𝐼𝑗𝑡 is capital investment by 𝑗 in period 𝑡, 𝑝𝐼𝑗𝑡 is 
the price of capital investment, 𝑋𝑗𝑡 is the addition to 𝑗’s catalyst stock in period 𝑡, 𝑝𝑋𝑗𝑡 is the 
price of 𝑋𝑗𝑡, and 𝛿 is depreciation of capital and the catalyst.  The remaining variables are as 
defined in Section 3.   
 The analysis carried out here is in steady state, so from now on time subscripts will be 
omitted.  Consumer optimization with respect to 𝐾 yields the steady-state rental price of capital: 
 𝑅 = 𝑝𝐼(𝑟 + 𝛿), (36)  
where 𝑟 = 1−𝛽
𝛽
 is the real interest rate.  Since investment is traded at no cost, its price equalizes 
across countries (𝑝𝐼𝑗 = 𝑝𝐼), as does the rental price of capital. 








, (37)  
where  
𝐹𝑗 ≡ � � 𝑓𝑗(𝜔𝑖)
𝜔𝑖∈Ω𝑖𝑖=𝑁,𝑆
. 
Demand for consumer good variety 𝜔𝑖 in country 𝑗 is given by (16).   
 Consumption Good Sector.  Output in the consumption goods sector is produced using 
the technology  
 𝑓�𝜔𝑗� = 𝐴𝑗𝐿𝜔𝑗
𝜂 𝐾𝜔𝑗
1−𝜂 , (38)  
where 𝑓�𝜔𝑗� ≡ 𝑓𝑁�𝜔𝑗� + 𝑓𝑆�𝜔𝑗� an 𝐴𝑗 is total factor productivity in each sector in country 𝑗.  As 
in the baseline model, each firm 𝜔𝑗 charges a country-specific price to maximize the profits 
Π𝑖�𝜔𝑗� from selling variety 𝜔𝑗 in country 𝑖 ∈ {𝑁, 𝑆}.   
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Also, costs to consumers of transporting goods across international borders are sufficiently high 
to prevent arbitrage. 















is the cost-minimizing price of a unit of output at unit total factor productivity.   
Equation (39) is the Section 5 counterpart to equation (20), and it accounts for the high price of 
consumer goods in rich countries. 








�. (40)  
Catalyst Investment Sector.  Catalyst investment in country 𝑗 is produced under perfect 
competition according to  
 𝑋𝑗 = 𝐴𝑗𝐿𝑋𝑗
𝜂 𝐾𝑋𝑗
1−𝜂 . (41)  
The price of catalyst investment is 𝑝𝑋𝑗 = 𝑐𝑗/𝐴𝑗 .  Since the catalyst investment good is not traded 
across countries, there is no role for comparative advantage and each country will produce some 
catalyst investment in equilibrium.      
Capital Investment Sector. Capital investment is produced in country 𝑁 under perfect 
competition according to  
 𝐼 = 𝐴𝑁𝐿𝐼
𝜂𝐾𝐼
1−𝜂 . (42)  
The price of capital investment is 𝑝𝐼 = 𝑐𝑁/𝐴𝑁.  Country 𝑁 purchases some of the investment 
good and exports the rest.  Market clearing implies  
 𝐼 = 𝐼𝑁 + 𝐼𝑆. (43)  
 Equilibrium.  I solve for fifteen unknowns, 
𝑤𝑁 ,𝑤𝑆,𝑦𝑁 ,𝑦𝑆,𝐶𝑁 ,𝐶𝑆,𝑓𝑁𝑁 ,𝑓𝑁𝑆,𝑓𝑆𝑆, 𝑓𝑆𝑁 ,𝑝𝑁𝑆,𝑝𝑆𝑁 ,𝑅,𝐾𝑁 ,𝐾𝑆, 
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𝑦𝑁0 − 𝑦𝑁 +
𝑐𝑁
𝐴𝑁
𝐼𝑆 + Ω𝑁𝑝𝑆𝑁𝑓𝑆𝑁 = Ω𝑆𝑝𝑁𝑆𝑓𝑁𝑆 
𝑦𝑁0 + 𝑦𝑆0 = 𝑦𝑁 + 𝑦𝑆 






































































𝐼𝑁 = 𝛿𝐾𝑁         𝐼𝑆 = 𝛿𝐾𝑆. 
 Results. Figure I.6 shows relative prices and investment under the following initial 
parameter values: 
𝐴𝑁 = 4, 𝐴𝑆 = 2, 𝑦𝑁0 ,𝑦𝑆0 = 3, 𝐿𝑁 , 𝐿𝑆,Ω𝑁 ,ΩS = 1, 𝛼, 𝛾 = 0.3,   
𝛽 = 0.99, 𝛿 = 0.3. 
Recall that productivity in 𝑆 is identical across sectors, which excludes the possibility discussed 
in Hsieh and Klenow (2007) of productivity differentials in 𝑆 driving the results.  Even though 𝑆 
does not produce the investment good in equilibrium, it is assumed to have access to the 
technology to produce the investment good using the same total factor productivity as prevails in 
the other sectors.   
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As in the Section 3, the rich country, 𝑁, pays more for final goods due to a lower price 
elasticity of demand stemming from higher consumption of the catalyst.  𝑁 also purchases more 
of the investment good because its ratio of the capital price to the wage is lower than the 
corresponding ratio in 𝑆.  This is because high productivity in 𝑁 causes 𝑤𝑁 to be high relative to 





, demand for capital (and investment goods) is higher in 𝑁.  As shown in 
Figure I.6, actual investment and the real investment rate are higher in 𝑁 than in 𝑆.   
Summary of Model with Investment. Hsieh and Klenow (2007) infer from facts (1) 
through (3) above that poor countries must be worse at producing investment goods (which are 
primarily tradable) than at producing consumption goods (which include a substantial nontraded 
component).  Their hypothesis of a productivity differential in poor countries is a corollary of the 
Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis in the sense that, under their proposed explanation, poor 
countries have lower productivity in a primarily tradable sector (investment) than in a primarily 
nontraded sector (consumption).   
This section proposes an alternative explanation for the facts based on demand 
complementarities and pricing-to-market: High levels of catalysts in the rich country cause a 
high real wage and high consumption prices there. Since investment prices equalize across 
countries (due either to perfect competition, constant markups in a monopolistically competitive 
investment sector, or complete cross-country capital markets), the rental rate on capital also 
equalizes across countries.  The high wage-to-rent ratio in the rich country causes high demand 
for capital goods there.    
Implications. A shortcoming that is shared by the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis 
and the Hsieh-Klenow hypothesis is that it is not intuitively clear why productivity should differ 
across sectors within a country to the extent required to explain the observed price patterns.  The 
mechanism I propose, demand complementarities and pricing-to-market, is based on intuitive 
consumption patterns and the realistic assumption that firms have market power.  That a single 
intuitive mechanism can provide a unified explanation for a number of puzzles in the trade and 
growth literatures is attractive from a modeling point of view, but we also need to ask how 
compatible this mechanism is with the micro data.  The next section provides independent 




6. Empirical Evidence 
So far I have emphasized the ability of a single mechanism, demand complementarity and 
pricing-to-market, to account for a number of cross-country stylized facts. Here I test the 
dependence of consumer prices on countries’ consumption of catalyst goods using data on U.S. 
and Chinese exports.  The challenge in the empirical work is to distinguish the effect of demand 
complementarities from other mechanisms that may cause a positive correlation between 
consumer prices and income per capita across countries.  Indeed, income and catalyst 
consumption are perfectly correlated in the theoretical models above, and if the same were true 
of reality it would be impossible to distinguish between demand complementarities and other 
potential explanations for the price-income relationship.  In reality, however, catalyst 
consumption is imperfectly correlated with income per capita, which permits me to test the 
dependence of prices on the component of catalyst consumption that is not correlated with 
income.14
The analysis in this section examines three catalyst goods in particular: electricity, housing, 
and roads.  Each of these catalyst goods is an imperfect correlate with GDP per capita, and each 
is expected to be a strong complement for a different subset of consumer goods.  Electricity 
complements demand for electric goods, houses complement demand for household goods (e.g. 
televisions and furniture), and roads complement demand for new cars.  Therefore, the model 
predicts the following, conditional on country-level fixed effects:  
   
1) Electric goods are sold at higher prices in countries with a more reliable power supply (or 
superior energy infrastructure). 
2) Household goods are sold at higher prices in countries with more housing per capita. 
3) New cars are more expensive in countries with better roads. 
To explore these predictions, I obtain prices of goods sold to different countries from 
disaggregated data on U.S. and Chinese exports.  The U.S. Exports Harmonized System data, 
available on Robert Feenstra’s webpage, contains unit values and quantities of bilateral exports 
leaving US docks for each Harmonized System (HS)-10 product category.  As discussed by 
Alessandria and Kaboski (2011), there are two advantages of using this data to study the extent 
of pricing-to-market for tradable goods.  First, the disaggregated nature of the data mitigates 
                                                 
14 There are many potential reasons for the imperfect correlation between catalyst consumption and income.  I do not 
suggest any particular reason, but assume that these reasons are exogenous to prices of consumer imports. 
27 
 
potential concerns that different unit values may reflect differences in quality.  Second, the unit 
values are free-alongside-ship values, which exclude transportation costs, tariffs, and additional 
costs incurred in the importing country.   
To test the three hypotheses it is necessary to identify ‘household goods’, ‘electric 
goods’, and ‘new cars’ separately from other consumer goods.  This task is fairly straightforward 
for new cars, which I classify as any good for which its HS-10 description indicates that it is a 
new passenger vehicle.  Identification of electric goods is also fairly straightforward, although 
some goods are not identified as electric but require electricity to use (such as a television).  I 
classify as ‘electric’ any consumer good (end-use code 40000-50000) that is labeled as electric 
and not battery-powered, as well as a number of clearly electric goods, including TVs, stereos, 
and associated parts.    
Classifying household goods is more difficult because most consumer goods are stored in 
homes.  Nonetheless, some goods are more directly complementary to housing than others.  
Consider a house with an extra bedroom and bathroom.  The extra space is likely to complement 
demand for furniture, bedding, towels, and similar goods.  Also, a country with more homes per 
capita will have more need for kitchen items.  Therefore I classify all furniture, glassware, 
chinaware, cookware, cutlery, tools, rugs, TVs, VCRs, and stereo equipment (end-use codes 
41000, 41010, 41020, 41040, 41200, and 41210) as household goods.  I also classify appliances 
(end-use 14030) as household goods, with the exception of air conditioners and radiators, the 
demand for which I assume depends more on weather than on housing. Other goods such as 
clothing and personal care items are excluded from the list of household goods because they are 
not directly complementary to housing.  Table I.1 lists the subset of consumer goods that I 
classify as household goods. 
To corroborate the evidence from U.S. export data, I test hypotheses 1 and 2 using 
Chinese Customs export data, which contain free-alongside-ship values and quantities of goods 
at the HS-8 level of disaggregation.15
                                                 
15 I am incredibly grateful to Jagadeesh Sivadasan and Michael Olabisi for sharing the Chinese Export data.  I do not 
test the third hypothesis using the Chinese data because the dataset does not include and exports of new passenger 
vehicles in 2005. 
 Despite the lower level of disaggregation, the Chinese 
dataset has a number of advantages over the U.S. export data.  First, the dataset contains 
identifiers for firms and firm locations, which help control for quality variation within a product 
category.  Second, China exports far more consumer goods to a broader range of countries.  The 
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Chinese dataset does not have end use codes or descriptions, so I identify consumer, household, 
and electronic good HS-8 categories as those categories that contain only consumer goods, only 
household goods, and only electronic goods as HS-10 subcategories. 
Country-level data on the catalyst goods are from the International Comparison Program 
(ICP) and the World Development Indicators at the World Bank. Heston (2011) provides the 
ICP’s measures of the dwelling services for Europe in 2005.  The measure of the dwelling 
services in Europe is based on a survey of rental rates, from which the ICP assigned countries an 
index of their per capita housing volume. Measures of housing volume in other regions are either 
unreliable, or are not comparable to the measure of housing in Europe (see Heston 2011 for a 
discussion). 
I use electricity consumption as a proxy for a country’s energy infrastructure.  Country-
level data on electricity consumption per capita are from the World Development Indicators at 
the World Bank.  The measure of a country’s road quality is the percent of roads that are paved, 
also available from the World Development Indicators.  Most countries do not have data on road 
quality for more than a single year between 2002 through 2006, so I pick the most recent year for 
which data is available as a country’s measure of road quality. 
I test the three hypotheses outlined earlier separately in the following subsections.   
 
6.1 Electricity Infrastructure and Prices of Electric Goods 
First, I assess whether prices of exports of electric goods depend on countries’ access to 
electricity.  As a proxy for a country’s electricity access, I use data on electricity consumption 
per capita, provided by the World Development Indicators.  This proxy is most appropriate in 
underdeveloped countries with low average electricity consumption per capita. In developed 
countries, differences in electricity consumption are more likely to reflect differences in factors 
other than the population’s access to electricity, such as weather.  Therefore I limit my attention 
to countries that consumed less than 5 mega-watt-hours of electricity per person in 2005. This 
restriction removes most European countries from the sample, as well as other wealthy countries 
such as Japan and Qatar, and leaves 72 countries in the sample.  Portugal, South Africa, and 
Malta are the remaining countries with the highest per capita electricity consumption. 
I test the following empirical specification: 
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 𝑝𝑐ℎ = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛾ℎ + 𝜓𝑞𝑐ℎ + 𝛽MWHpercap𝑐Egoodℎ + 𝜖𝑐ℎ, (45)  
where 𝑝𝑐ℎ is the log of the unit value of good ℎ exported to country 𝑐, normalized by its within-
good standard deviation.16 The coefficient 𝛼𝑐 represents country fixed effects, 𝛾ℎ represents 
fixed effects for each good category, and  𝑞𝑐ℎ is the log quantity of good ℎ sold to country 𝑐, 
normalized by its within-good standard deviation. MWHpercapc is the per capita electricity 
consumption in country 𝑐, Egoodh indicates whether good ℎ is electric, and 𝜖𝑐ℎ denotes the 
regression error.  Unit values and quantities for each country-product pair in the U.S. data are 
averages of the values between 2004 and 2006 (the three most recent years available).17
The coefficient 𝛽 captures the extent to which the markup for electric goods depends on 
electricity access.  𝛽 can be interpreted as representing a causal relationship if electricity 
consumption is exogenous to the product price.  Electricity consumption is indeed likely to be 
exogenous with respect to the price of a single imported product.  If there is any endogenous 
response to electric prices, equations 
  The 
Chinese data are only available in 2005. To prevent nonrepresentative products from driving the 
results, the samples are limited to country-product pairs with over 100 units sold and to products 
that are exported to at least 10 countries.   
(16) and (17) imply electricity consumption should respond 
negatively to high import prices.  In this case, high electricity consumption is associated with 
low prices of electric goods, and 𝛽 will underestimate the causal effect of access to electricity on 
electric goods prices.  In other words, the estimate of 𝛽 is biased downward in the presence of 
endogenous electricity consumption.18
I include quantity as a regressor in 
   
(45) to capture the dependence of firms’ costs on the 
quantity they sell to a given destination.  A negative estimate for 𝜓 may reflect bulk discounts, or 
other cost savings from repeated transactions between U.S. sellers and foreign buyers.  Omitting 
                                                 
16 When the regression is run on Chinese data, the price is normalized by its standard deviation within a firm-
product pair.  This normalization prevents goods with large price dispersion from driving the results, and mitigates 
potential concerns that the regression results may be driven by differences in quality.  Manova and Zhang (2012), 
for example, document that Chinese firms that charge a wide range of prices for their exports also pay a wide range 
of prices for imported inputs.  They infer on the basis of this evidence that these firms sell goods of varying quality.  
17 Averaging unit values across time has the advantage of averaging out the noise in the yearly data while preserving 
the ability to identify 𝛽 based on the cross-sectional variation across destination countries.  When the regression is 
run on yearly data (rather than averaged data), the results are similar but with slightly larger standard errors. 
18 As a robustness check, I used 2002 values of electricity consumption as an instrument and obtained nearly 
identical results to those presented below.  This is unsurprising given that electricity consumption in 2005 is nearly 
perfectly correlated with electricity consumption in prior years. 
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quantity would bias downward 𝛽 to the extent that higher electricity-related demand for electric 
goods is associated with higher quantities sold and lower marginal costs. 
More generally, conditioning on quantity controls for demand parameters and cost 
parameters that may vary across country-product pairs.  Monopolistically competitive firms 
charge a price that depends on catalyst consumption as well as other demand and cost 
parameters.  Since these parameters may vary across countries in a way that is correlated with 
catalyst consumption, conditioning on quantity controls for these parameters and permits an 
interpretation of 𝛽 as the partial effect on the price of an increase in catalyst consumption, 
conditional on a country’s position on its demand curve.19
 Table I.2 shows the estimates from the U.S. export data.  According to column (1), a 
megawatt-hour increase in per capita electricity consumption is associated with a 6.0% increase 
in the price of electric goods, where a megawatt-hour is approximately the difference in per 
capita electricity consumption between Zimbabwe and Turkey.  This estimate is statistically 
significant at the 1% level of significance.  
  
A typical concern in empirical work studying the determinants of export prices is that 
high prices reflect higher-quality goods.  While the disaggregate nature of the data and the 
normalization of prices by their within-good standard deviation mitigate this concern to some 
extent, there may still remain scope for quality variation within an HS-10 category. To address 
this concern, Subsample 2 in Table I.2 drops from the sample all electric goods with long quality 
ladders.  Specifically, I use the quality ladder estimates from Khandelwal (2010), and I drop all 
electric goods with ladder estimates above the median estimate.20  The sample retains other 
consumer goods with long ladder estimates.  Therefore, the regression will, if anything, 
understate the dependence of prices of electric goods on electricity access.  This is because, to 
the extent that high export prices reflect high quality consumer goods sold to rich countries, the 
regression will estimate a high value of the country fixed effect for rich countries.21
                                                 
19 The qualitative results below are generally robust to omitting quantity from the regression.   
  Since 
20 Approximately half of the HS-10 categories have nonmissing ladder estimates.  Those with missing ladder 
estimates are kept in the sample.  Note that long quality ladder estimates for a final good may reflect strong 
complementarity with catalyst goods, rather than high quality.  This is because the estimates of ladder length in 
Khandelwal (2010) are based on the assumption that high market share (conditional on price) reflects high quality.  
In the models above, goods with high degrees of complementarity also have high market share.  Thus dropping 
goods with long estimated quality ladders may remove some goods that are strong complements with catalyst goods, 
thus biasing downward the estimated relationship between catalysts and the prices of final goods. 
21 For a model predicting a relationship between quality of imports and income, see Hallak (2006). 
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electricity consumption is positively correlated with per capita income, some of the dependence 
of prices on housing will be captured by the high fixed effect estimates in rich countries.  The 
estimates in column (2) are similar to those in column (1), suggesting that the results are driven 
by pricing-to-market rather than by quality differences. 
The results in columns (1) and (2) of Table I.2 strongly support the hypothesis that prices 
of electric goods across countries depend on electricity access.  However, the correlation 
between GDP per capita and MwH per capita for the sample of destination countries is 0.75 and 
the possibility remains that the estimate of 𝛽 captures the dependence of prices of electric goods 
on a component of income that is not fully captured by the country level fixed effects.  In other 
words, it is possible that electric good prices have an above average dependence on income per 
capita, and that the estimate of 𝛽 is capturing this dependence.  To verify that this positive 
estimate of 𝛽 is driven by electricity access as a catalyst, rather than by other mechanisms 
associated with high incomes, column (3) reports the results from a modified version of 
specification (45) in which electricity consumption is interacted with log GDP per capita: 
 𝑝𝑐ℎ = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛾ℎ + 𝜓𝑞𝑐ℎ + 𝛽MWHpercap𝑐Egoodℎ + 𝛽2GDPpercap𝑐Egoodℎ + 𝜖𝑐ℎ. (46)  
𝛽2 captures the extent to which electric goods are associated with high incomes per capita, 
conditional on country-specific determinants of consumer goods prices and conditional on the 
dependence of prices of electric goods on electricity access. According to column (3), the 
estimate of 𝛽2 is not significantly different from zero, while the new estimate of 𝛽 is lower and 
less significant. These results suggest that specification (46) lacks the power to distinguish the 
relative importance of electricity consumption per capita and income on the prices of electric 
goods.  As we will see, the empirical test using Chinese export data is more powerful and 
indicates that there is a statistically and economically significant dependence of prices of electric 
goods on electricity access, even when conditioning on income per capita. 
 The results from the Chinese export data are qualitatively similar to the results from U.S. 
export data.  Table I.3 shows that a MwH per capita increase in electricity consumption is 
associated with a statistically significant 2% to 3% increase in prices of electric goods.  To the 
extent that the product-firm-firm×location dummies effectively condition on quality, the positive 
estimate of 𝛽 from the Chinese data can be interpreted as evidence of pricing-to-market.  
Column (2) of Table I.3 shows that the estimate of 𝛽2 is negative and insignificant, while the 
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estimate of 𝛽 is large and strongly significant.  This suggests that any dependence of electric 
good prices on income is similar to the dependence of consumer goods prices on income as 
captured by the country-level fixed effects.  Thus, the U.S. and Chinese export data appear to 
support the hypothesis that electricity access is a catalyst for demand for electric goods, and that 
electric goods are more expensive in countries with superior access to electricity.22
 
 
6.2 Housing Volume and Prices of Household Goods 
Next, I assess whether prices of exports of households goods depend on European countries’ 
stock of housing.  Europe is an especially suitable region for such an investigation because its 
countries have low levels of within-country inequality, mitigating potential concerns that housing 
volume of the average resident may differ from housing volume of the consumer driving demand 
for household goods.  Furthermore, housing volume is generally high in Europe, so a marginal 
increase in volume, such as an additional room, is likely to increase demand for furnishings of 
those rooms.23
  The empirical specification is  
   
 𝑝𝑐ℎ = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛾ℎ + 𝜓𝑞𝑐ℎ + 𝛽Vol𝑐HHgoodℎ + 𝜖𝑐ℎ, (47)  
where Volc is the measure of the housing stock in country 𝑐, HHgoodh indicates whether the 
good is classified as a household good, and 𝜖𝑐ℎ denotes the regression error.  The remaining 
variables are defined as above.  All data are 2005 values, the only year for which data on 
Europe’s housing stock is available.  The baseline sample excludes all HS-10 products sold to 
less than 10 countries, and all product-country pairs for which less than 100 units were sold. 
The coefficient 𝛽 captures the extent to which the markup for household goods depends 
on housing volume.  According to Column 1 in Table I.4, a standard deviation increase in a 
European country’s housing volume index is associated with a 5.7% increase in the price of 
household goods.  This estimate is significant at the 1% level of significance and is robust to 
dropping household goods with long quality ladders from the sample (column 2).  This suggests 
                                                 
22 Falsification exercises verify that other subsets of consumer goods (e.g. clothing, battery-powered goods, luxury 
goods, etc) do not have an above-average dependence on electricity consumption, which suggests that the positive 
dependence of electric goods prices on electricity consumption is indeed due to demand complementarity. 
23 In less developed regions, differences in volume are less likely to translate into marginal increases in demand for 
household goods; rather, in less developed countries, higher volume may imply an increase in personal space but not 
an increase in demand for furnishing.   
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that the estimated relationship between prices of household goods and a country’s housing stock 
does not reflect high quality consumer goods being sold to countries with high housing volumes.  
Rather, the relationship reflects primarily a failure of the law of one price for household goods 
such that identical household goods are more expensive in countries with more housing per 
capita.   
Column 3 shows the results from a modified version of equation (47) in which the 
interaction between log GDP per capita and an indicator for household goods is included as a 
regressor: 
 𝑝𝑐ℎ = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛾ℎ + 𝜓𝑞𝑐ℎ + 𝛽Vol𝑐HHgoodℎ + 𝛽2GDPpercap𝑐HHgoodℎ + 𝜖𝑐ℎ. (48)  
The estimate of 𝛽2 is not significantly different from zero, and the estimate of 𝛽 remains large 
and significant, suggesting that housing is a catalyst that is associated with high prices of 
household goods and that the dependence of household goods prices on income is captured by 
the country-level fixed effects.  
To determine which goods are driving this strong relationship, I reclassify goods into 
subcategories of household goods (e.g. dishwashers, kitchen appliances, etc.), and rerun the 
Subsample 2 regression by interacting housing volume with each subcategory.  Television-
related goods (e.g. antennas and satellite dishes) and refrigerators are the most important 
contributors to the observed relationship between a country’s housing stock and the price it pays 
for household goods, followed closely by household furnishings.  This result does not imply that 
housing does not complement demand for other household goods; rather, it is a reflection of the 
relatively high quantity of U.S. exports of television and refrigerator-related goods.  Housing 
may complement demand for dishwashers, but U.S. exports of dishwashers to Europe are 
insufficient to provide a precise estimate of this relationship. 
 The results from specification (47) on Chinese export data correspond to those from the 
U.S. data.  According to Column 1 in Table I.5, a standard deviation increase in housing volume 
is associated with a 1.6% increase in the prices of Chinese exports of household goods.  
However, the dependence of household goods prices on housing disappears under regression 
(48) in which GDPpercap𝑐HHgoodℎ is included as a regressor.  This may be due to the high 
correlation between GDP and housing across European countries in the sample (0.9), or it may 
be a consequence of the way in which housing volume is calculated.  The ICP’s measure of 
housing volume includes the service flow from the quality of the house (age of the house, 
34 
 
heating quality, etc).  If housing volume is more important than housing quality for demand for 
household goods, then the ICP measure will misrepresent the amount of housing catalyst across 
countries. 
The ICP provides an alternative measure of housing volume based on the Consumption 
Equivalent Method (CEM), which assumes that housing volume is proportional to private 
consumption expenditures.  The reader is referred to Heston (2011) for a more detailed 
comparison of the two measures.  The two measures are very different for some countries, 
reflecting in part differences in the different weights placed on housing quality.  Columns (3) and 
(4) of Table I.5 show that the dependence of prices of household goods on the CEM measure of 
housing volume is much higher than is predicted by the baseline measure.   
Which housing measure is a more accurate measure of housing as a catalyst?  One way to 
distinguish between the two measures is to see which predicts a higher dependence of prices of 
luxury goods on income per capita.  Luxury goods are assumed to have an above-average 
dependence on income per capita, and an ambiguous (but likely average) dependence on 
housing.    I identify luxury goods as those related to water sports, tennis, golf, skiing, and 
adventure sports.  According to Columns (5) and (6), the baseline housing measure predicts an 
above-average dependence of luxury prices on housing, while the CEM measure predicts an 
above-average dependence of luxury prices on income per capita.  By this criterion, therefore, it 
appears that the alternative CEM housing measure is the more accurate measure of housing 
volume, and that prices of household goods have an above-average dependence on housing 
volume. 
Using the CEM measure in place of the baseline volume measure on the U.S. data is less 
conclusive.  The coefficients on the CEM measure and on GDP per capita are both positive but 
statistically insignificant (not shown).  The dependence of luxury goods prices on the CEM 
measure is negative but insignificant.  Thus it’s not clear that the CEM measure more accurately 
captures the aspect of housing that is the relevant catalyst for household goods produced in the 
U.S.   
It is possible that the CEM measure, which may be a better measure of volume, more 
accurately captures the catalyst for Chinese-produced household goods, while the baseline 
measure, which is perhaps a better measure of quality, more accurately captures the catalyst for 
U.S.-produced household goods.  This would be the case if, for example, housing quality is a 
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catalyst for higher-quality household goods, and the U.S. produces higher-quality household 
goods than does China. 
 
6.3 Paved Roads and Prices of New Cars 
Data on the percent of paved roads are available across regions for different years between 2003 
and 2006.  I take the most recent year for which data are available in a country as that country’s 
measure of road quality and estimate the following specification: 
 𝑝𝑐ℎ = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝛾ℎ + 𝜓𝑞𝑐ℎ + 𝛽RoadcNewcarh+𝜖𝑐ℎ, (49)  
where Roadc is the percent of roads that are paved in country 𝑐 and Newcarh indicates whether 
good ℎ is a new car.  The remaining variables are defined as above.  Specification (49) is tested 
only on U.S. data since the Chinese Customs data do not include sales of new cars in 2005. Unit 
values and quantities for each country-product pair are averages of the values between 2004 and 
2006 (the three most recent years of data).  The sample excludes all HS-10 products sold to less 
than 10 countries, and all product-country pairs for which less than $10,000 worth of goods were 
sold. 24
 Table I.6 shows the results from specification 
   
(49).  In columns (1) and (2), the sample 
includes all exported non-military goods (end use classification 0 through 4). Column (1) states 
that a percentage point increase in the fraction of roads that are paved is associated with a 0.6 
percent increase in the price of new cars.  This relationship is statistically significant. While 
prices of new cars depend on road quality, column (2) suggests that the paved roads are not 
associated with high prices of other automobiles or auto parts.  To corroborate the evidence in 
column (2), columns (3) and (4) restrict the sample to auto-related exports so that country-level 
fixed effects are determined by the relationship of prices of auto-related goods across countries. 
Consistent with the evidence in regression (1), regressions (3) and (4) show that road quality is 
associated with high prices of new cars, even conditional on country-level determinants of prices 
of auto-related goods.  The relationship between road quality and prices of new cars is 
statistically significant and is robust to the inclusion of log GDP per capita interacted with an 
                                                 
24 The sample does not restrict observations based on the quantity of goods because cars are assumed to be sold in 
lower quantities on average than are consumer goods.  Indeed, using the same cutoff threshold of 100 units in 
Sections 6.1 and 6.2 would remove almost two-thirds of the new car observations from the sample.   
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indicator variable for new cars as a regressor, suggesting that road quality is associated with high 
prices of  new cars conditional on any price association due to destination-country income.25
 The evidence in Table I.6 suggests that road quality complements demand for new cars 
but not demand for automobiles generally and auto parts.  One possible explanation for this 
result is that demand for automobiles (used or new) is driven primarily by the need for 
transportation, regardless of the quality of the roads.  Demand for new cars relative to used cars, 
however, depends on the enjoyment of driving, in addition to efficient travel. A new Cadillac is 
not much more effective than an old jeep at transporting an individual over a mile of dirt road.  
However, a luxury Cadillac may be more effective at transporting someone on paved roads, and 
it is likely to be a more comfortable experience.  
   
 An additional explanation for the insignificant relationship between auto parts in general 
and paved roads is that demand for auto parts may be high when roads are in poor condition. Not 
only are consumers less likely to purchase new cars (for which new parts are not immediately 
necessary) when roads are poor, but bad roads cause car damage and thus necessitate constant 
repair and frequent need for replacement parts. 
 The general message from Table I.6 is consistent with the model’s predictions based on 
demand complementarity and pricing-to-market: road quality is associated with higher prices of 
new cars.  The main caveat is that the results may simply reflect the fact that higher quality cars 
are sold to countries with higher quality roads.  Since new cars have long quality ladders, this 
concern cannot be addressed as in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 by dropping products with short quality 
ladders. 
In reality, high prices of new cars are likely a result of both sales of high-quality cars and 
pricing to market for identical models.  The standard assumption in the literature has been that 
price differences reflect quality differences, but recent evidence has demonstrated a strong role 
for price discrimination across countries for a range of products.26
 
 Thus it seems reasonable to 
infer price discrimination in the auto market as well.  Precisely identifying the relative 
importance of pricing-to-market in the auto industry will require price data on identical models. 
                                                 
25 It is not surprising that the estimate of 𝛽 remains significant even with the inclusion of GDP on the right-hand-
side of (53) since GDP per capita and road quality have a relatively low correlation across countries of 0.58. 
26 See, for example, Alessandria and Kaboski (2011) for evidence across a range of goods and countries and 
Simonovska (2011) for evidence across a specific category of goods within Europe. 
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7. Discussion of Catalyst Goods 
According to the empirical results, catalyst consumption is associated with higher prices of 
relevant tradables.  One advantage of the empirical specification is that the strong estimated 
relationship is conditional on the association between catalyst consumption and prices that is 
captured by the country-level fixed effects, and thus provides lower bound on the dependence of 
prices on catalyst goods.  Since catalyst consumption is strongly correlated with income per 
capita, the results also provide a lower bound on the dependence of consumer prices on income 
per capita driven by demand complementarities.  A limitation of this approach is that I can 
neither rule out other mechanisms nor quantify their roles because the country fixed effects 
capture the average dependence of prices on income per capita without distinguishing precise 
mechanisms.  Thus it seems reasonable to infer that demand complementarities are an important 
source of price variation, but it is left for future work to determine precisely how important 
relative to other causes of the price-income relationship.         
The catalyst goods examined in the empirical section are durables such as housing and 
public infrastructure.  These goods are readily identified as catalysts for specific subsets of 
tradable goods and are thus amenable to an empirical investigation of the role of catalysts in 
generating high consumer goods prices in rich countries.  However, the notion of a catalyst 
applies broadly to any good or service that may complement demand for other goods and 
services.  This includes nondurable goods and services, as well as amenities for which there is 
not an explicit market price.  Customers do not always directly pay for amenities associated with 
the services they purchase, but the amenities complement their demand for services.  For 
example, customers may have higher utility from food at a restaurant if the restaurant has nice 
artwork, good service, and comfortable chairs.  The more efficiently a restaurant can produce 
these complementary goods and services, the more it can charge for food of a given cost.   
Likewise, the availability of retail stores, and the quality of service at those stores, can 
complement demand for retail goods.  Demand complementarities at the retail level can explain, 
for example, the finding in Crucini, Telmer, and Zachariadis (2005) that nontraded retail inputs 
account for much of the price dispersion for goods and services in the European Union.   
Finally, one can think of marketing and related sales activity as catalyst services.  A 
number of recent papers, including Arkolakis (2010) and Gourio and Rudanko (2011), 
investigate the implications of marketing and sales activity on firm outcomes.  The analysis 
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above suggests that such activity may also contribute to the cross-country differences in prices 
and real investment rates if such activity increases consumers’ demand. 
 
8. Conclusion 
A well-established empirical regularity is that tradable consumption goods are more expensive in 
countries with high per-capita incomes.  This paper proposes a simple explanation for this 
relationship based on demand complementarities and pricing-to-market by monopolistically 
competitive firms:  The utility consumers derive from tradable goods depends on their 
consumption of complementary goods.  Rich countries can afford more complementary goods, 
which generates high (and inelastic) demand for tradables.  As a result, monopolistically 
competitive firms charge higher markups in rich countries.   
 The paper provides direct empirical evidence that the phenomenon of demand 
complementarities and pricing-to-market is responsible for high prices of specific subsets of 
tradable goods in countries with high consumption of relevant complementary goods, conditional 
on income per capita and on other destination country-level determinants of prices.  Specifically, 
household goods are sold at higher prices to countries with more housing volume per capita; 
electronic goods are sold at higher prices to countries with superior electricity infrastructure (as 
proxied by electricity consumption per capita); and new cars are sold at higher prices to countries 
with a higher percentage of paved roads.   
 The theoretical models developed in the paper demonstrate that evidence of demand 
complementarity and pricing-to-market also strongly supports the notion that nontradable 
consumer goods are more expensive in rich countries because demand is higher (and less elastic) 
there, thus offering an explanation to a longstanding puzzle in the trade literature. In addition, the 
evidence lends support to the notion that real investment rates are higher in rich countries due to 
high demand arising from higher wage-to-rental ratios in rich countries. Understanding why rich 
countries have higher rates of investment is important for understanding why income disparities 
persist between rich and poor countries. Economists have typically attributed differences in 
investment rates to market distortions (e.g. high taxes and corruption) in poor countries.  Hsieh 
and Klenow (2007) argue that distortionary taxes cannot account for the relationship between 
investment rates and income per capita and instead prefer an explanation based on sectoral 
productivity differences.  While much work remains to be done to quantify the precise role of 
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demand complementarities in accounting for differences in prices and real investment rates 
across countries, my results suggest that low investment rates in poor countries may be due to 
low consumption of complementary goods and services rather than to distortionary taxes or 






The models presented above feature an endowed numeraire that enters the utility function 
linearly.  This setup is chosen for its tractability and because it permits a focus on demand 
complementarities, rather than the marginal utility of income, as the determinant of consumers’ 
price elasticity of demand for final goods.   Here I present an alternative closed-economy setup 
in which the numeraire is produced by labor, rather than endowed.  The utility function is also 
altered to permit the marginal utility of income to vary with income.27
The representative agent’s utility function is defined over the catalyst 𝐶, the mass Ω of 
final goods, and a numeraire 𝑌:  
 
 









, (50)  
where 𝑓𝜔 is consumption of final good 𝜔 ∈ Ω.  This utility function is similar to that in Chaney 
(2008) in that it features Cobb-Douglass preferences over a homogenous numeraire and 
differentiated consumer goods. 
 The budget constraint is 
 𝑤𝐿 + �Π𝜔𝑑𝜔
Ω
= 𝑌 + 𝑝𝐶𝐶 + �𝑝𝜔𝑓𝜔𝑑𝜔
Ω
, (51)  
Consumer optimization with respect to 𝑓𝜔 yields the implicit demand for final good of variety 𝜔: 
𝑌𝜂  (1 − 𝜂)𝐵−𝜂(𝐶𝛼 − 𝛾𝑓𝜔) = 𝜆𝑝𝜔 , 







0  is 
the bundle of final and catalyst goods.  We can obtain an expression for 𝜆 from the first order 
condition with respect to 𝑌: 
𝜂𝑌𝜂−1𝐵1−𝜂 = 𝜆. 









𝐵𝑝𝜔�.  (52)  
                                                 
27 If the model were to feature a numeraire produced by labor and a baseline utility function given by (1), the model 
solution would be at a corner in which the numeraire is the only good produced and consumed.  A derivation of the 
corner solution to this alternative setup is available upon request. 
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Production of final goods, catalyst goods, and the numeraire good are linear in labor using labor 
productivity 𝐴, which is assumed to be identical across sectors.  The final goods sector is 
monopolistically competitive, while the catalyst and numeraire sectors are perfectly competitive. 
Firm 𝜔 maximizes Π𝜔 = �𝑝𝜔 −
𝑤
𝐴










�. (53)  
The price increases with 𝐶𝛼, as in Section 2.  It also increases as the marginal utility of income 
falls. Since 𝜆 is decreasing in 𝑌, the price of final goods is increasing in 𝑌.   
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Equilibrium is characterized by demand for catalysts, demand for consumer goods, and 




(Ω𝑓 + 𝐶 + 𝑌) (56)  




























(Ω𝑓 + 𝐶 + 𝑌), 
where I’ve substituted in 𝑤 = 𝐴 and 𝑝𝐶 = 𝑤/𝐴.  Figure I.A1 shows market responses to an 
increase in productivity 𝐴.  As in the baseline model in Section 2, prices of final goods are 






Appendix I.B   
The models in this paper use a simple linear demand curve to illustrate how an increase in 
complementary goods (catalysts) reduces the price-elasticity of demand for final consumer goods 
by shifting out the demand curve.  Linearity of the demand curve is sufficient for a decrease in 
the price elasticity of demand in response to an increase in the complementary good, but it is not 
a necessary condition.  This appendix derives the necessary and sufficient conditions on the 
demand curve under which an increase in complementary goods leads to higher markups for 
consumer goods. 
 A generic demand curve can be written 𝑞 = 𝑞(𝐶,𝑝), where 𝐶 is the complementary 
catalyst and 𝑝 is the price of the good.  The price-elasticity of demand is decreasing in 𝐶 if and 
only if  𝜕𝜖
𝜕𝐶




�.  We can write 𝜕𝜖
𝜕𝐶






𝑞1, in which case 
the necessary and sufficient condition simplifies to 
 𝑞𝑞21 > 𝑞2𝑞1. (57)  
Condition (57) states that any slope-increasing effects of an increase in 𝐶 on the demand curve 
must be more than compensated by a shift out of the demand curve.  In the commonly used case 
of a constant elasticity demand curve, 𝑞 = 𝐶𝑝−𝜖, these two effects exactly cancel out so that  
𝑞𝑞21 = 𝑞2𝑞1.  As discussed in Nakamura and Zerom (2010), price-independent demand 
elasticities are difficult to reconcile with the data.  Their estimates on coffee demand suggest that 






This appendix alters the model in Section 6 by assuming that differentiated investments goods 
are produced under monopolistic competition and aggregated into a final investment good 
through a CES aggregator.  Each country 𝑗 ∈ {𝑁, 𝑆} produces a mass Ψj of differentiated 
investment goods.  Each good 𝜓𝑗 ∈ Ψj is exported and sold domestically.  Countries 𝑁 and 𝑆 
purchase investment goods and costlessly aggregate them into a final investment good.  
Equation (42) changes to 
 







, (58)  
where 𝑞𝑗(𝜓𝑖) is country 𝑗’s quantity of the differentiated intermediate investment variety 𝜓𝑖 











𝑐𝑖. (59)  
Note that the price is a constant markup over marginal costs, so each differentiated 
investment good is sold at the same price in both countries.  Therefore the cost of final 
investment goods equalizes across countries, as does the rental rate of capital.  As in Section 6, 
the wage is higher in the rich country (𝑁), which causes higher demand for capital in 𝑁.  
 The equilibrium conditions are altered only slightly relative to those in Section 6.  The 
trade balance condition now accounts for the fact that both countries produce investment goods: 
 𝑦𝑁0 − 𝑦𝑁 + ΨN𝑝𝑞𝑆𝑁𝑞𝑆𝑁 + Ω𝑁𝑝𝑆𝑁𝑓𝑆𝑁 = Ω𝑆𝑝𝑁𝑆𝑓𝑁𝑆 + ψN𝑝𝑞𝑁𝑆𝑞𝑁𝑆, (60)  
where 𝑝𝑞𝑖𝑗 and 𝑞𝑖𝑗 are defined analogously to 𝑝𝑖𝑗 and 𝑓𝑖𝑗 for 𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ {𝑁, 𝑆}.  Demand for labor also 
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Figure I.C1 shows how relative final goods prices, real investment, and investment prices depend 







This appendix departs from the model in Section 5 by postulating that final investment goods are 
produced from differentiated investment goods using a quadratic aggregator similar to the utility 
function, thus permitting price-dependent markups for differentiated investment goods.  
Specifically, equation (58) is now 







, (61)  
where 𝐿𝐼𝑗 is labor in country 𝑗 that is allocated to the aggregation of investment goods.  Before 
proceeding, a couple of remarks must be made regarding this particular aggregator function.  
First, there is a bliss point after which additional units of a given differentiated investment good 
are actually counterproductive.  In the utility function, the bliss point represents the fact that 
more consumer goods eventually becomes undesirable (consider eating a hundred cheeseburgers 
in a day).  It is less clear what a bliss point represents in the aggregation of investment goods. 
Thus the CES aggregator may actually be more realistic than the quadratic investment 
aggregator.  Nonetheless, this section presents the quadratic aggregator for completeness.  
 Second, equation (61) features labor as a substitute for intermediate investment goods.  
This assumption captures the notion that with sufficient labor input, the aggregate investment 
good could be produced without any intermediate investment goods.  It also simplifies the 
analysis. 












�𝜃𝑤𝑗 + 𝑐𝑖�, 








The price of the final investment good in country  𝑗 is equal to the wage in 𝑗, and investment 
demand in 𝑗 is proportional to demand for capital in 𝑗. 
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 In contrast to the prior models with investment, the price of investment does not equalize 






















































  To determine relative prices, we must 
solve for the equilibrium.  There are 20 unknowns, 𝑤𝑁 ,𝑤𝑆, 𝑦𝑁 ,𝑦𝑆,𝐶𝑁 ,𝐶𝑆,𝑓𝑁𝑁 , 𝑓𝑁𝑆,𝑓𝑆𝑆,𝑓𝑆𝑁 , 𝑝𝑁𝑆, 
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𝑦𝑁0 − 𝑦𝑁 + ΨN𝑝𝑞𝑆𝑁𝑞𝑆𝑁 + Ω𝑁𝑝𝑆𝑁𝑓𝑆𝑁 = Ω𝑆𝑝𝑁𝑆𝑓𝑁𝑆 + ΨS𝑝𝑞𝑁𝑆𝑞𝑁𝑆 
𝑦𝑁0 + 𝑦𝑆0 = 𝑦𝑁 + 𝑦𝑆 
𝑅𝑁 = 𝑝𝐼𝑁(𝑟 + 𝛿)       𝑅𝑆 = 𝑝𝐼𝑆(𝑟 + 𝛿) 
                                                 
28 The differences in rental rates across countries hinges on the implicit assumption that markets for capital assets 
are separate across countries.  Permitting cross-country capital ownership would cause rental rates and investment 
prices to equalize across countries, thus defeating the purpose of the exercise in this section of demonstrating that 
simple model extensions can generate a positive relationship between investment prices and income per capita.  As 
discussed in Hsieh and Klenow (2007), the evidence of a positive relationship between investment prices and 
income per capita is limited primarily to prices of investment structures, which are highly nontraded.  Thus the 

































[𝜃𝑤𝑁 + 𝑐𝑁]         𝑝𝑞𝑁𝑆 =
1
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[𝜃𝑤𝑆 + 𝑐𝑆]         𝑝𝑞𝑆𝑁 =
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Figure I.D1 shows how market outcomes depend on productivity in country 𝑁.  Relative prices 
in 𝑁 are increasing in productivity in 𝑁, and purchases of intermediate investment goods are 






End Use code End Use Household Good?
40000  Apparel, household goods - textile \ Include towels, bed linens, curtains
40030  Apparel,household goods-nontextile \ Include towels, bed linens, curtains
40050  Sports apparel and gear
40100  Pharmaceutical preparations
40110  Books, printed matter
40120  Toiletries and cosmetics
40130  Tobacco, manufactured
40140  Writing and art supplies
41000  Furniture, household goods, etc. X
41010  Glassware, chinaware X
41020  Cookware, cutlery, tools X
41030  Household appliances \ Exclude Radiators, Air Conditioners
41040  Rugs X
41050  Other household goods \ Exclude shavers, hair dryers, cellular phones
41110  Pleasure boats and motors
41120  Toys/games/sporting goods
41140  Musical instruments
41200  TV's, VCR's, etc. X
41210  Stereo equipment, etc. X
41220  Records, tapes, and disks
41300  Numismatic coins
Table I.1: Consumer Goods and Household Goods by End Use
Note: The table shows consumer goods by end use classification.   X indicates that all goods in an end use category are 





Regressors (1) (2) (3)
MWh per capita X Electric good 0.060*** 0.066*** 0.041
(0.018) (0.022) (0.028)
log(GDP per capita) X Electric good 0.045
(0.035)
Log(quantity)/SD(Log(quantity)) -0.613*** -0.614*** -0.614***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Product FEs YES YES YES
Country FEs YES YES YES
R-squared 0.29 0.29 0.29
# observations 24,061 23,632 23,632
# products 1,309 1,281 1,281
Table I.2-Coefficient Estimates from Fixed-Effects Regressions of Log Unit Values of U.S. Exports on PerCapita 
Electricity Consumption
Notes: Prices and quantities are normalized by their within-product standard deviation.  Data source: World Bank 
Development Indicators and U.S. Exports by HS-10 classification.  Subsample 1 includes all consumer goods which are 
sold to at least 10 countries, and all product-country observations with at least 100 units sold.  Subsample 2 drops from 
Subsample 1 all electric goods with quality ladder estimates greater than the median, where the quality ladder 
estimates are obtained from Khandelwal (2011).  Robust standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses.  




   
Dependent Variable: Log(price)/SD(Log(price))
Regressors (1) (2)
MWh per capita X Electric good 0.027** 0.037**
(0.011) (0.015)




Product Firm City Zip FEs YES YES
Country FEs YES YES
R-squared 0.06 0.06
# observations 158,400 158,168
# product-firm-firmXlocations 26,276 26,276
Table I.3-Coefficient Estimates from Fixed-Effects Regressions of Log Unit Values of Chinese 
exports on PerCapita Electricity Consumption
Notes: Prices and quantities are normalized by their within-product standard deviation.  Data 
source: World Bank Development Indicators and Chinese Exports by HS-8 classification.  Robust 
standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate significance 











Regressors (1) (2) (3)
Housing volume X Household good 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.059*
(0.022) (0.024) (0.033)
log(GDP per capita) X Household good -0.008
(0.067)
Log(quantity)/SD(Log(quantity)) -0.508*** -0.507*** -0.507***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
Product FEs YES YES YES
Country FEs YES YES YES
R-squared 0.18 0.17 0.17
# observations 9,646 9,125 9,125
# products 1,124 1,049 1,049
Table I.4-Coefficient Estimates from Fixed-Effects Regressions of Log Unit Values of U.S. Exports on Housing Volume 
in European Countries
Subsample 1 Subsample 2
Notes: Prices and quantities are normalized by their within-product standard deviation.  Data source: World Bank 
Development Indicators, and U.S. Exports by HS classification.  Subsample 1 includes all consumer goods which are sold to at 
least 10 countries, and all product-country observations with at least 100 units sold.  Subsample 2 drops from Subsample 1 
all electric goods with quality ladder estimates greater than the median, where the quality ladder estimates are obtained 
from Khandelwal (2011).  Robust standard errors clustered at the product level in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate 




Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Housing volume X Household good 0.016* -0.017
(0.009) (0.014)
Housing volume (alternative measure) X Household good 0.036*** 0.027
(0.011) (0.020)
log(GDP per capita) X Household good 0.067*** 0.015
(0.024) (0.027)
Housing volume X Luxury good 0.062**
(0.030)
Housing volume (alternative measure) X Luxury good -0.085
(0.057)
log(GDP per capita) X Luxury good 0.113 0.284***
(0.075) (0.067)
Log(quantity)/SD(Log(quantity)) -0.237*** -0.237*** -0.237*** -0.237*** -0.236*** -0.236***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Product Firm City Zip FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country FEs YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
# observations 181,170 181,170 181,170 181,170 181,170 181,170
# product-firm-firmXlocations 27,250 27,250 27,250 27,250 27,250 27,250
Table I.5-Coefficient Estimates from Fixed-Effects Regressions of Log Unit Values of Chinese Exports on Housing Volume in European Countries
Notes: Prices and quantities are normalized by their within-product standard deviation.  Data source: World Bank Development Indicators, and Chinese Exports by HS-8 classification.    





Percent of roads paved X New car 0.005*** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)




Product FEs YES YES
Country FEs YES YES
R-squared 0.24 0.24
# observations 8,155 8,155
# products 136 136
Table I.6-Coefficient Estimates from Fixed-Effects Regressions of Log Unit Values of U.S. 
Exports on Percent of Paved Roads
Sample: Auto Vehicles, Parts, and 
Engines
Note: Prices and quantities are normalized by their within-product standard deviation. Data 
source: World Bank Development Indicators and U.S. Exports by HS-10 classification.   The 
sample auto-related goods which are sold to at least 10 countries, and all product-country 
observations with at least $10,000 in value.  Robust standard errors clustered at the product 














p (price of final consumer goods)
w (wage)
pC (price of catalyst)
















































































Note: The graph on the left shows the ratio of prices relative to the numeraire, while the graph on the right shows the 
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Figure I.5:  Effect of Productivity in 𝑁 on Market Outcomes in Two-Country Model with 
















































































Note: The real investment rate in country 𝑗 is given by 
𝑖𝑗 =
𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑗
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Figure I.C.1: Relative Prices and Real Investment in Alternative Model with Investment 



























































Figure I.D.1:  Relative Prices and Purchases of Intermediate Investment Goods in Alternative 
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Does a Rising Tide Lift All Boats? Welfare Consequences of Asymmetric Growth 
 
Abstract 
A common presumption in macroeconomics and development economics is that 
increased growth in the aggregate enhances welfare for everyone in the economy.  I show that 
instead, if the underlying growth is a productivity increase in the sector consumed primarily by 
one group, the welfare of a second group may fall.  I demonstrate this effect in two cases. In the 
first case, skill-biased technological change in sectors consumed by the skilled rich increases 
their income beyond the increase in economic wealth, causing a decline in the consumption and 
welfare of the low-skilled poor.  This result stands in contrast to the standard model of skill-
biased technological change.  The second case examines trade between two countries, and 
demonstrates circumstances under which an increase in productivity in the nontradable sector of 
one country causes a welfare decline for the other country.  The paper discusses evidence in 
support of the effects in both cases. This analysis demonstrates that a rising tide need not lift all 
boats and that the precise nature of consumption patterns is important for welfare. 
 
1. Introduction 
Welfare is inherently difficult to measure, but evidence suggests that well-being of the poor has 
in fact fallen or stagnated in the face of economic growth.  In the U.S., real GDP per capita 
increased 73% between 1970 and 2000, while the real wages of the lowest quintile earners 
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decreased by over 20%.1  Likewise, Brazilian GDP per capita increased over 46% during the 
same period, yet the living conditions of the poorest residents have not improved.2
Recent evidence also suggests that the “falling tide” of the recent economic crisis may 
have “lifted some boats”.  According to the World Bank Development Research Group, in 2008 
(the year of the global financial crisis) the number and share of the population living on less than 
$1.25 a day fell in every part of the world for the first time on record.  Preliminary estimates 
from 2010 suggest the decline has continued.
  Thus the 
“rising tide” of economic growth did not by necessity “lift all boats”, as JFK famously predicted 
in 1963.   
3  Similarly, data from the Gallup World Poll show 
that 132 million people became more food secure between between 2005 and 2008.4
Indeed, an implicit assumption of standard economic models is that economic growth 
increases the welfare of everyone in the economy, even if growth is accompanied by increases in 
inequality.  My analysis formally demonstrates circumstances under which growth actually 
lowers welfare for some.  This paper examines two cases in which “rising tides”  lead to “falling 
boats”:  First, sector-biased, skill-biased technological change in a closed economy, and second, 
service-sector productivity growth in a two-country model of international trade.   In each case, a 
productivity increase complements labor supplied by a subset of people, and is biased toward the 
good consumed by that subset of people.  As a result, the income of that subset rises more than 
the increase in aggregate economic wealth, causing a redistribution of productive resources away 
from goods consumed by others in the economy. 
  This 
evidence is seemingly difficult to reconcile with the fact that global output fell so substantially in 
2008. 
 The analysis differs from earlier studies that have examined circumstances in which 
economic growth may reduce welfare.  Examples include models of the Dutch Disease, as 
discussed in Corden and Neary (1982) and Krugman (1987), and of Immiserising Growth (see 
Baghwati 1958).  Both Dutch Disease and Immiserising Growth rely on specific conditions that 
need not hold in general.  In contrast, the explanation I provide in this paper focuses on 
                                                 
1 More direct measures of welfare have also demonstrated stagnating well-being for America’s poor during times of 
economic growth.  For example, the United States Department of Agriculture documents that food security rates did 
not improve between 1995 (when they started reporting data) and the mid-2000s.  
2According to the World Bank Development Research Group, in 2000, over 10% of the population continued to live 
on less than $1.25 a day.  
3 See The Economist, March 3rd-12th 2012, p. 81. 
4 See Headey (2012). 
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alternative conditions that apply to labor markets in a closed economy and to a two-country 
international trade setting.  Furthermore, the models presented below directly address the “trickle 
down phenomenon” often heard in policy debates.   
 The first part of this paper examines the effects of skill-biased technological change in a 
closed economy.  There is a growing consensus that new technologies complement skill, either 
directly or through productivity growth in the production of skill-complementing capital.  
Existing models of skill-biased technological change and capital-skill complementarity offer 
explanations for the rising skill premium in the latter half of the twentieth century and predict 
that wage inequality is likely to continue to increase.  The analysis below expands these models 
to incorporate an additional insight, that new technologies appear to be directed not only toward 
factors of production (skilled labor and capital), but also toward goods consumed predominantly 
by the rich.  The result of this asymmetric growth is a fall in the welfare of the low-skilled poor 
in addition to rising wage inequality.  This finding is in contrast with the implications of the 
canonical one-sector model of skill-biased technological change, in which welfare increases 
despite rising wage inequality.5
 An extensive literature has documented the failure of U.S. economic growth to “trickle 
down” to the lowest quintile of wage earners.  Beaudry and Green (2003), for example, propose 
a model of organizational change that can generate falling real wages.  However, their model 
relies on a counterfactual increase in the price of capital.
    
6
 The proposed model of sector-specific, skill-biased technological change extends the 
one-sector, two-factor model in Acemoglu (1998) to an economy with two sectors producing 
  In contrast to the model in Beaudry 
and Green, the welfare implications of the model presented below do not rely on any 
assumptions about the existence or price of capital.  Furthermore, the proposed model with 
sector-specific, skill-biased technological change is consistent with several features of the 
macroeconomy during the last half of the Twentieth Century, including 1) increasing expenditure 
shares of high-end services, 2) an increasing skill premium, 3) increasing skill intensity in high-
end service sectors, and 4) a fall in the price of capital.    
                                                 
5 See Acemoglu (1998, 2003) 
6 Similarly, in Caselli (1999), new machines that complement skilled workers replace old machines that complement 
unskilled workers.  See Acemoglu (2002) for a survey. 
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Yachts and Potatoes and two types of agents (Rich and Poor).7  Yachts represent goods or 
services consumed primarily by the Rich, while Potatoes represent goods and services consumed 
by the Poor.  The Rich agents own an endowment of high-skilled labor, while the Poor own an 
endowment of low-skilled labor.8
 The model feature that technological growth has been biased toward the goods that the 
Rich consume has some empirical support in the macroeconomic literature.   Buera and Kaboski 
(2011) document that as income has grown in the latter half of the twentieth century, there has 
been a substantial increase in the expenditure share of skill-intensive services such as finance, 
insurance, real estate, and architectural services.  This evidence suggests that demand for these 
services depends on wealth:  as wealth increases, consumers shift toward consumption of skill-
intensive services (“Yachts”).  Furthermore, Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) argue that the majority 
of TFP growth has been in the production of computers and IT, and Bosworth and Triplett 
(2000) show that the most intensive users of computer technology have included high-skill 
services such as finance, insurance, and communications.   
 The key assumptions are, first, demand for Yachts is 
increasing in income; second, skill-biased technological improvements are sector specific; and 
third, the elasticity of substitution between high skilled labor and low skilled labor is greater than 
unity.  If technology improves in the Yacht sector, the wage of the skilled Rich increases. The 
Rich in turn use their increased income to demand more Yachts, which requires skilled labor to 
flow out of the Potato sector and into the Yacht sector. The result is a fall in the supply of 
Potatoes.  If preferences are strongly nonhomothetic such that the Poor consume only Potatoes, 
their welfare will decline.    
 This supporting empirical evidence is consistent with arguments in Acemoglu (1998, 
2003) that technological change responds to market forces.  As the rich demand more financial 
services, for example, the returns to the inputs in financial service production increase, which in 
turn increases the incentive to create software for the finance industry.  The implication of this 
form of asymmetric growth, according to the model presented below, is a bifurcation of the 
                                                 
7 Appendix C extends the capital-skill complementarity model in Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000), 
which has three factors of production, and derives the same welfare implications.  This paper considers capital-skill 
complementarity to be consistent with skill-biased technological change and therefore refers to the two 
interchangeably.  In contrast to Beaudry and Green (2003), the results here are consistent with a fall in the price of 
capital over time. 
8 I use the terms ‘high-skilled’ and ‘low-skilled’ in accordance with the literature on skill-biased technological 
change.  However, the model’s mechanism is relevant when technological change is biased toward any factor (e.g. 
capital) that is not equally owned across groups. 
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economy:  skilled labor flows from sectors consumed by the Poor to those consumed by the 
Rich, depriving the Poor of goods and services. 
 This pattern of bifurcation is equally salient among goods or services within the same 
sector.  Broda and Romalis (2009) document that low-income households consume a basket of 
goods that is entirely different from the basket of high-income individuals, even though the 
goods are similarly classified.  Their evidence is based on scanner data for consumer goods such 
as Maxwell House coffee and Starbucks, but a similar pattern is likely to hold for the service 
sector as well.  For example, low-income households use basic medical services at local clinics 
while the wealthy undergo plastic surgeries.  If we reinterpret Yachts to be high-end services 
such as cosmetic plastic surgeries, the model offers insights into the implications of a plastic 
surgeon’s office obtaining state-of-the-art operating equipment: Skilled nurses leave the clinic in 
the poor neighborhood to earn a higher wage at the plastic surgeon’s office in the wealthy 
neighborhood, driving up prices or reducing quality at the clinic. 
 This phenomenon also is consistent with the chronic underdevelopment of the poorest 
neighborhoods in America, South Africa, and elsewhere.  If technological improvements have 
been biased toward investments in products for the wealthy, skilled labor and capital will flow 
into the provision of goods and services for the wealthy, leaving fewer productive inputs to 
provide for the poor.  In the poorest neighborhoods, where goods and services are consumed 
exclusively by the low-skilled residents, only low-quality services provided by primarily low-
skilled workers will remain.  Imagine a state-of-the-art auto repair shop built near a gated 
community in Cape Town, South Africa.  Skilled mechanics will earn a high return using the 
new equipment, leaving the low-skilled auto workers to repair cars for the poor out of shacks in 
the townships.  Since the low-skilled mechanics work with inferior capital equipment their 
marginal product remains low, as does their income.  Low income implies that demand for goods 
and services in low-income neighborhoods remains insufficient to attract new investments that 
would, in turn, increase wages and wealth. 
 Sector-specific, skill-biased technological change is not the only source of asymmetric 
growth that has implications for income, demand patterns, and welfare.  The second part of the 
paper examines welfare effects of asymmetric growth in the context of international trade 
between two countries. Section 4 extends the basic framework from Balassa (1964) and 
Samuelson (1964) to permit imperfect substitutability between two countries’ tradable goods.  
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The analysis demonstrates that productivity growth in the nontradable sector of one country may 
increase the price of tradables in another country, causing a fall the other country’s welfare. 
In the model below, country 𝐴 and country 𝐵 each produce a nontradable good and a 
tradable good that is an imperfect substitute for the other country’s tradable.  Productivity growth 
in 𝐴’s nontradable sector causes a fall in welfare in 𝐵 when the fall in the price of nontradables 
in 𝐴 causes a shift in 𝐴’s demand toward domestically produced tradables.   This occurs 
whenever the elasticity of substitution between tradables and nontradables is greater than unity.9
As in the model of sector-specific, skill-biased technological change, welfare falls in the 
two-country model due to a reallocation of factor inputs toward a sector (the service sector in 
country 𝐴) that is disproportionately consumed by one group (country 𝐴).  This simple 
mechanism has interesting implications for prices and patterns of trade. For example, if China’s 
demand shifts toward domestically produced goods as its productivity increases, U.S. imports 
from China will become more expensive, causing a fall in welfare in the U.S.  
  
As the nontradable in 𝐴 becomes cheaper due to increased productivity, the consumer in 𝐴 
substitutes toward nontradables and away from tradables.  The increase in demand for 𝐴’s 
nontradables lowers the value of tradables produced in 𝐵, causing a fall in 𝐵’s terms of trade. 
The two-country model may also help explain recent trends in global poverty.  As 
mentioned at the beginning of the Introduction, in 2008 the number and share of the population 
living on less than $1.25 a day fell in every part of the world for the first time on record.  
Similarly, 132 million people became more food secure between between 2005 and 2008.  This 
evidence is seemingly difficult to reconcile with the fact that global output fell so substantially in 
2008.  However, it is fully consistent with the model’s prediction that, as demand for resources 
falls in rich countries, certain goods may become more accessible to the poor.  In other words, a 
“falling tide” may have “lifted some boats”. 
The two-country model builds on the framework in Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) 
in that it allows for differences in productivity between a country’s service sector and its tradable 
sector.  Balassa and Samuelson observe that services tend to be more expensive in rich countries 
                                                 
9 This assumption on the elasticity of substitution is a sufficient condition for the welfare effects mentioned above.  
Alternative assumptions may cause a decline in welfare, but I focus on the case of an above-unity elasticity of 
substitution because this is the implicit assumption in the new trade literature that focuses on differentiated goods 
under monopolistic competition.  
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than in poor countries.  The Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis suggests that this correlation is 
because rich-country productivity is higher in the tradable sector than in the nontradable sector. 
 While Balassa-Samuelson is concerned with persistent differences in sectoral 
productivity, the model below examines the effects of a change in productivity in a country’s 
service sector.  When service-sector productivity increases in the rich country, the price of 
services in that country falls, consistent with Balassa-Samuelson.  There is an additional effect in 
the model below, which is the increase in tradable prices in the poor country.  This is due to the 
above-unity elasticity of substitution between tradables and nontradables and the imperfect 
substitutability between countries’ tradable goods.  The assumption of an above-unity elasticity 
of substitution is fully consistent with q-complementarity (as defined by Hicks 1970), and 
therefore is also consistent with notions that the marginal utility of services should increase with 
an increase in consumption of consumer goods, and vice-versa.  
  The models below do not incorporate endogenous technology.  However, in reality 
technological improvements are likely to respond to market forces.  For example, the arguments 
in Acemoglu (1998, 2003) imply that, in the closed-economy model of Section 3, technology 
should flow to the high-end sectors as demand for these products increases.  If this endogenous 
technology response is skill-biased, then the welfare decrease for the Poor may be persistent and 
self-reinforcing in the absence of countervailing forces in the economy (such as Hicks-neutral 
growth and technology spillovers).  Similarly, in the two-country model, as demand for services 
within a country increases (due, for example, to nonhomothetic preferences that place more 
weight on services as the economy grows), technology should flow to the service sector and 
prices of tradables should increase for other countries that do not experience service-sector 
technology improvements. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows:  Sections 2 and 3 constitute the first part 
of the paper and are concerned with the closed-economy model of sector-specific, skill-biased 
technological change. Section 2 reports the evidence that technological improvements have been 
biased toward goods predominantly consumed by the wealthy.  Section 3 details the baseline 
model and illustrates the welfare effects of sector-specific skill-biased technological change.  





2.  Macroeconomic Evidence of Sector-Biased Technological Change 
A near consensus has emerged that U.S. economic growth, especially in the 1990s, has primarily 
been due to productivity growth in the production and the use of information technology (IT) 
equipment.10
 Triplett and Bosworth (2000) note that IT use has, indeed, been concentrated in a handful 
of industries.   The 1992 capital flow tables show that five industries (financial services, 
wholesale trade, business services, insurance, and communications) alone accounted for over 
half of new purchases of computers.  If the measure of IT includes communications equipment in 
addition to computers and peripheral equipment, the air transportation industry also is included 
as a primary user of IT.  The pattern based on the 1997 capital flow table is remarkably similar:  
At a more aggregated industry level, the three primary users of computers, software, and 
communications equipment are information, finance and insurance, and professional and 
technical services. 
  To the extent that IT use is unevenly distributed across sectors, technological 
progress will be asymmetric.  The questions I address in this section are first, whether there has 
been substantial asymmetry in the use of IT equipment (and therefore economic growth), and 
second, whether this asymmetry is related to consumption demand patterns. 
 Of the IT-intensive industries mentioned above, four can be linked to NIPA consumption 
categories:  finance, insurance, professional services, and air transportation.  The expenditure 
share of each of these categories has increased in the latter part of the Twentieth Century; their 
combined share increased by over 57% between 1970 and 2000.    As Buera and Kaboski (2011) 
document, each of these is a relatively skill-intensive service industry, and consumption 
categories that experienced increasing expenditure shares are almost exclusively skill-intensive 
services.  Other categories, such as food, clothing, and low-skill services, have fallen or 
stagnated as a share of personal consumption expenditures.  I interpret this evidence as indicative 
of nonhomothetic preferences:  As income rises, demand shifts toward skill-intensive services, 
including those that are the most intensive users of IT.11
 In this paper I therefore interpret evidence of productivity growth in the use and 
production of IT capital as technological change that is biased toward goods consumed by the 
Rich.  Technological change is also assumed to be skill-biased based on the overwhelming 
   
                                                 
10 See Stiroh (2002), Jorgensen (2001), Jorgensen and Stiroh (2000) 
11 The fact that the services demanded by the Rich are skill-intensive is irrelevant for the theoretical results presented 
below.  The relevant fact is that new technology complements skilled labor.   
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evidence in support of skill-biased technological change (including capital-skill 
complementarity) in the latter part of the Twentieth Century.12
  
  Section 3 models skill-biased 
technological change in the simplest form by allowing IT technology to augment skill in 
production functions with two factors (skilled and unskilled labor).  Appendix II.C treats IT 
equipment as an additional factor in production functions in which IT capital and skill are 
relative complements. 
3.    Baseline Model 
The baseline model consists of two factors (high-skilled labor 𝐻 and low-skilled labor 𝐿), two 
agent types (Rich and Poor), and two goods (Yachts and Potatoes) in a static economy.  𝐻 Rich 
agents each inelastically supply one unit of high-skilled labor and 𝐿 Poor agents each supply a 
unit of low-skilled labor.   Here technology is taken as exogenous, and all markets are 
competitive.   
 
3.1 Consumer Preferences 
Rich (𝑅) and Poor (𝑃) consumers have identical nonhomothetic preferences over Yachts and 
Potatoes of the form 
𝑈𝑖(𝐹𝑖,𝑌𝑖) = max(𝑎 × 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐹𝑖 + 𝑏) ,𝑌𝑖) 
where 𝑖 ∈ 𝑅,𝑃 and 𝑌𝑖 is consumption of Yachts by consumer type 𝑖.  I use 𝐹𝑖 to denote 
consumption of Potatoes by consumer 𝑖 (𝑃 already refers to Poor agents). This form of 
preferences has the useful property that consumption switches from exclusively Potatoes to 
exclusively Yachts as wealth crosses a certain threshold determined by the scale parameters 𝑎 
and 𝑏. 13
                                                 
12 See, for example, Bound and Johnson (1992), Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003), and Autor, Katz, and Kearney 
(2008) 
  It captures the fact documented in Broda and Romalis (2009) that low-income 
households consume a basket of goods that is entirely different from the basket of high-income 
individuals, even though the goods may be similarly classified.   For example, the Rich consume 
high-quality Starbucks coffee while the Poor consume Maxwell House instant coffee.  The 
13 A more common form of preferences in the structural change literature takes the form   
 𝑈𝑖(𝐹𝑖,𝑌𝑖) = �
𝐹𝑖  𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝑖 < 𝐹�
𝐹� + 𝑌𝑖  𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝑖 > 𝐹�
   , in which the wealthy consume both Potatoes and Yachts but only once they’ve 
satiated their demand for Potatoes.  The welfare implications are robust to this form of preferences, but these 
preferences are analytically inconvenient. 
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evidence in Broda and Romalis is based primarily on scanner data and applies mainly to different 
brands of goods within a sector, but I make the additional assumption that the Yacht bundle 
includes skill-intensive service sectors that are not included in the Potato bundle, such as 
financial planning services and architectural services.  Since the skill-intensive services have 
experienced the majority of technological improvements in the form of IT use, I will assume that 
technological growth occurs primarily in the Yacht sector (see section 3.4). 
An interesting quality of the consumer preferences is that if the wealth of the Poor were 
to increase, they would initially consume more Maxwell House coffee and Mickey’s Malt Liquor 
(referred to collectively as Potatoes).  At some point their wealth may be high enough that they 
instead purchase fine wines, airline tickets, and financial services (Yachts).  I assume that 
endowments and technologies are such that the low-skilled Poor remain low-income and thus 
consume only Potatoes, while the high-skilled rich consume only Yachts. We can thus rewrite 
preferences as  
𝑈𝑅(∙) = 𝑌𝑅        𝑈𝑃(∙) = 𝑎 × log(𝐹𝑃 + 𝑏). 
 If the Rich were handed a Potato, it would not increase their utility.  This seems 
reasonable; wealthy households likely have little use for malt liquor since it would take up 
cabinet space reserved for higher quality alcoholic beverages.  Similarly, if the Poor were handed 
a Yacht their utility would not increase.   This is clearly a less palatable assumption but may be 
appropriate in some contexts.  If the low-income poor were given a claim on architectural 
services they could not use it without owning a home (which they may not be able to afford).  
Rather than actually use the service they would exchange it for a good or service that will 
provide them with utility. 
 
3.2 Production 
Potatoes (𝐹) and Yachts (𝑌) are competitively produced with a constant-returns-to-scale 
technology using high-skilled labor and low-skilled labor:   
𝐹 = 𝐹(𝑧𝐹𝐻𝐹 , 𝐿𝐹) 
and 
   𝑌 = 𝑌(𝑧𝑌𝐻𝑌,𝐿𝑌) 
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where 𝐻𝑗 and 𝐿𝑗 are high-skilled labor and low-skilled labor employed in sector 𝑗 ∈ 𝐹,𝑌 and 𝑧𝑗 is 
the skill-augmenting technology parameter in sector 𝑗.  Here I assume that production has the 











   𝑌 = �𝜇(𝑧𝑌𝐻𝑌)
𝜎𝑌−1






Appendix II.B examines equilibrium effects when production functional forms are not specified, 
and Appendix II.C incorporates IT capital into a nested CES functional form similar to that used 
in Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000).   
 
3.3 Equilibrium and the Effects of Asymmetric Growth 
In the static competitive equilibrium consumers maximize utility subject to their budget 
constraints; firms maximize profits, and labor markets clear. The 𝐻 Rich agents’ collective 
budget constraint is  
𝐻𝑤𝐻 ≥ 𝐹𝑅𝑝𝑅 + 𝑌𝑅𝑝𝑌 
 where 𝑤𝐻 is the wage for high-skilled labor, 𝑝𝑗 is the price of good 𝑗, and 𝑗𝑅 is consumption of 
good 𝑗 by Rich agents.  Since endowments and technology are such that the Rich have enough 
wealth to exclusively purchase Yachts, their budget constraint can be written as 
𝐻𝑤𝐻 ≥ 𝑌𝑝𝑌. 
Furthermore, since production is competitive and exhibits constant returns to scale, 𝑝𝑌 will equal 
the cost-minimizing bundle of inputs necessary to produce one Yacht.  Thus 
𝑌𝑝𝑌 = 𝐻𝑌𝑤𝐻 + 𝐿𝑌𝑤𝐿 
and we can rewrite a representative Rich agent’s problem as  
max  �𝜇(𝑧𝑌𝐻𝑌)
𝜎𝑌−1






s.t.      𝐻𝑤𝐻 ≥ 𝐻𝑌𝑤𝐻 + 𝐿𝑌𝑤𝐿 . (1) 
Likewise, the representative Poor agent’s problem is  
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max   . 5 × log��𝜂(𝑧𝐹𝐻𝐹)
𝜎𝐹−1






s.t.       𝐿𝑤𝐿 ≥ 𝐻𝐹𝑤𝐻 + 𝐿𝐹𝑤𝐿 . (2) 
Viewing the consumers’ problem as a choice over consumption of the two labor types is helpful 
for understanding the comparative static effects of an increase in 𝑧𝑌, which in equilibrium will 
depend on the substitution elasticities 𝜎𝑌 and 𝜎𝐹.  Equilibrium is fully characterized by the 






























and market clearing: 
𝐿𝐹 + 𝐿𝑌 = 𝐿, (5) 
𝐻𝐹 + 𝐻𝑌 = 𝐻. (6) 
As noted above, technological improvements have been biased toward high-end services, which 
are modeled here as Yachts.  Therefore the object of interest is skill-biased technology in the 
Yacht sector, 𝑧𝑌. 
 
Proposition 1:    If high-skill labor and low-skilled labor are substitutes in the production of 
Yachts (𝜎𝑌 > 1), then an increase in skill biased technology in the Yacht sector (𝑧𝑌) will cause a 
decrease in the amount of Potatoes produced and therefore a decline the welfare of the Poor.  If 
labor types are substitutes in the production of Potatoes (𝜎𝐹 > 1) the decline will be due to an 
outflow of high-skill labor from the Potato sector to the Yacht sector.  If labor types are 
complements (𝜎𝐹 < 1) in the production of Potatoes the decline will be due to an outflow of both 
inputs from the Potato sector. 
Proof: See Appendix II.A.   
 
According to Katz and Murphy (1992), Angrist (1995), and Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, 
and Violante (2000), the empirically relevant case is when labor types are substitutes (𝜎𝑌 > 1 
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and 𝜎𝐹 > 1), although the crucial assumption for a fall in the welfare of the Poor is simply 
𝜎𝑌 > 1.  An increase in 𝑧𝑌 drives up the wage premium, increasing the income of the Rich.  Rich 
agents use their income to effectively purchase bundles of high-skill labor and low-skill labor.  
Since the 𝑧𝑌𝐻𝑌 bundle is a substitute for 𝐿𝑌 in the Rich’s utility function, the increase in 𝑧𝑌 
increases 𝑧𝑌𝐻𝑌, causing the Rich to desire a substitution of 𝐻𝑌 for 𝐿𝑌.  Since the increase in 𝑧𝑌 
also increases the return to skilled labor and therefore the wealth of the Rich, the Rich are able to 
meet their desire for more skilled labor by purchasing skilled labor from the Poor.  Skilled labor 
therefore flows from the Poor to the Rich (from the Potato sector to the Yacht sector).   
The effect on the allocation of low-skilled labor, 𝐿, depends on the elasticity of 
substitution in the Potato sector.  If 𝜎𝐹 < 1, labor types are complements for the Poor and the 𝑧𝑌-
induced decline in 𝐻𝐹 lowers the value of 𝐿𝐹, which in turn diminishes the income of the Poor 
relative to the income of the Rich.  In this case, the Rich have enough wealth to purchase more 
low-skilled labor in addition to high-skilled labor.  If 𝜎𝐹 > 1, which is likely the empirically 
relevant case, the outflow of 𝐻 from the Poor’s consumption bundle causes a desire to substitute 
𝐿 for 𝐻, which increases the value of 𝐿 relative to the case of complements.  The Poor then are 
able to retain enough wealth to purchase low-skilled labor from the consumption bundle of the 
Rich. 
When inputs are substitutes in each sector, the net effect is a fall in the utility of the Poor.  
This is because the effect of the outflow of high-skilled labor from the Potato sector outweighs 
the effect of the inflow of low-skilled labor (see Appendix II.A).   Figures II.1 through II.3 
illustrate the net effect of an increase in 𝑧𝑌 using an Edgeworth Box in which the representative 
agents trade high-skilled labor and low-skilled labor.  Figure II.1 shows the initial equilibrium.  
The isoutility lines are identical to isoquants in the production of Potatoes for the Poor and 
Yachts for the Rich. Note that the original endowment of (𝐿,𝐻) to the Rich is (0,1). The point 
labeled “Equilibrium” is the point of tangency between the isoutility lines of the Rich and the 
Poor, and the price vector is the line (not shown) between the “Endowment” point and the 








































Note: The ratio of H to L is the same as the skill ratio in 2000 where high-skilled labor equals hours worked 
by college graduates.   
 
Figure II.2 shows the effects of an increase in 𝑧𝑌.  The dashed lines are the new isoutility 
lines, and the point of tangency between the dashed lines is the new equilibrium.  Note that the 
isoutility line of the Poor (the concave line) has shifted toward the point of zero consumption for 
the Poor, indicating that the utility of the Poor unambiguously falls when 𝑧𝑌 increases.   The 
welfare decline of the Poor is due to the fact that 𝑧𝑌 complements the endowment of the Rich.  
The increased value of skilled labor, along with the substitution away from unskilled labor in the 
production of Yachts, allows the Rich to use their increased wealth to purchase additional skilled 
labor for the production of Yachts.  Valuable skilled labor flows from Potato production to Yacht 









































Note: The increase in 𝑧𝑌 is five-fold to illustrate the effects.   
 
Figure 3 decomposes the change in allocations into what are labeled a substitution effect 
and an income effect.  The substitution effect is defined as the change in allocations induced by 
an increase in 𝑧𝑌 when the economy’s endowment point is assumed to be the original 
equilibrium (rather than (0,1)).  The remaining distance from the original equilibrium to the 
actual new equilibrium is the income effect.   
Figure 3 shows that the income effect, rather than the substitution effect, drives down the 
utility of the Poor.  In fact, the substitution effect places both the Poor and the Rich on slightly 
higher isoutility lines (the thin solid lines). The income effect captures the fact the Rich are 
endowed with high-skilled labor, which has increased in value.  The Rich are able to use their 











































An alternative way to understand the mechanism driving down the welfare of the Poor is 
through prices.  If we normalize the price of low-skilled labor to unity, then the price of a Potato 
is  









and the price of a Yacht is 









When 𝑧𝑌 increases the marginal product of skilled labor increases, driving up 𝑤𝐻.  The price of 
Yachts falls because the increase in 𝑧𝑌 is greater than the increase in 𝑤𝐻 (𝑑𝑤𝐻/𝑑𝑧 < 1).  
Potatoes, meanwhile, do not benefit from price-reducing technological change, and thus the price 
of Potatoes increases because of the increase in 𝑤𝐻.  Therefore the Poor do not benefit from 
higher wages but must pay a higher price for their consumption good.   
The Poor would benefit if technological change augments either factor in the Potato 
sector or augments low-skilled labor in the Yacht sector.  For example, technological change 
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biased toward low-skilled labor in the Yacht sector pulls down 𝑤𝐻 and the price of Potatoes 
relative to the return on low-skilled labor, thus improving the welfare of the Poor.  The Poor 
likewise benefit from skill-biased technological change in the Potato sector:  An increase in 𝑧𝐹 
increases 𝑤𝐻 relative to 𝑤𝐿, but the overall effect is a fall in the price of Potatoes. 
The greater is the elasticity of substitution in the Yacht sector, the greater is the 
consumption loss for the Poor in response to an increase in 𝑧𝑌.  Define 𝐹� = 𝑑𝐹/𝐹 and     
?̂?𝑌 = 𝑑𝑧𝑌/𝑧𝑌 .  Then total differentiation of equations 1 through 6 yields the response of Potato 
production to a small change in skill-biased technology in the Yacht sector: 
𝐹�  = −𝐹−
𝛽
𝛽−1 �
𝜎𝑌𝐻𝑌𝐿(𝜎𝑌 − 1)(1 − 𝜂)𝐿𝐹
− 1𝜎𝐹𝐿𝑌
(𝜎𝐹𝐻𝐹 + 𝜎𝑌𝐻𝑌)  𝐿𝐹 (𝜎𝑌  − 1) + (𝜎𝐹𝐿𝐹 + 𝜎𝑌𝐿𝑌)(𝐻𝐹 + 𝜎𝑌𝐻𝑌)
�× ?̂?𝑌, 
the magnitude of which is increasing in 𝜎𝑌 when 𝜎𝑌 > 1.  Most estimates of the elasticity of 
substitution between skilled labor and low-skilled labor are between 1.4 and 2, implying that an 
increase in skill-biased technology in the Yacht sector drives down the supply of Potatoes.14  
Note that the direction of the change in the supply of Potatoes does not depend on factor 
intensities in the two sectors.15
 
   
3.4 Calibration 
 To get a sense of the magnitude of the consumption loss for the Poor I calibrate the model by 
choosing 𝜎𝑌 = 𝜎𝐹 = 1.4, which is at the lower end of the empirical estimates of the elasticity of 
substitution between skilled and low-skilled labor.  I set the skill ratio, 𝐻
𝐿
,  equal to 0.7, which is 
close to the 2000 relative supply in Buera and Kaboski (2011) and the 1996 relative supply in 
Acemoglu (2002).  The starting values for 𝑧𝑌 and 𝑧𝐹 are equal to one.  Finally, I choose  𝜂 = 𝜇 =
0.62 to match the wage premium in 2000, which is approximately 2.1 (see Acemoglu and Autor 
2010).  With these parameter values, a percent increase in 𝑧 from a starting value of 1 causes a 
change in the supply of Potatoes of  -0.1%.   
Acemoglu (2002) postulates that skill biased technology increased almost tenfold in the 
U.S. between 1970 and 1990, based on a one-sector model with an elasticity of substitution equal 
                                                 
14 See Katz and Murphy (1992), Angrist (1995), and Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and Violante (2000). 
15 Also note that the model is not related to the Rybcszynski Theorem, which applies to changes in the amount of a 
factor that is available to both sectors. 
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to 1.4.  The model here shows that if the full extent of technological improvements had been 
specific to sectors exclusively consumed by wealthy college graduates, the consumption loss for 
low-skilled workers would have been around a magnitude of 22% in the absence of hicks-neutral 
technological improvements, increases in the relative supply of high-skilled labor, technology 
spillovers, and other sources of economic growth.   
The assumption that technological improvements are confined to the Yacht sector is 
illustrative but not realistic.  If technological improvements occur in both sectors, the net effect 
on the supply of Potatoes will depend on the relative magnitude of skill-biased technological 
change in the Yacht sector.  Table II.1 shows different combinations of increases in 𝑧𝑌 and 𝑧𝐹 
that achieve the same increase in the wage premium, along with the percent change in Potatoes 
per low-skilled worker.  With an elasticity of substitution equal to 1.4 in both sectors, an 85% 
increase in 𝑧𝑌 requires a 13% increase in 𝑧𝐹 to ensure that the supply of Potatoes does not fall.  
When the elasticity is 2, a 75% increase in 𝑧𝑌 will depress the Poor’s consumption of Potatoes 
even if 𝑧𝐹 increases by 22%.  When growth is more symmetric, the consumption and welfare of 
the Poor improves.   
  
Table II.1: Response of Consumption of the Poor to Skill Biased Technological 
Improvements 
 𝜎𝑌 = 𝜎𝐹 = 1.4 
 










































































































60%   43%   15.4%   60%   41%   8.2% 
Note: Each row generates an equivalent increase in the skill premium for a given value 
of the elasticity of substitution. 
 
As in the canonical one-sector model in Acemoglu (1998), inequality increases in all 
cases.  For example, when 𝑧𝑌 doubles the skill premium increases by 23.5%.  Furthermore, the 
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expenditure share of Yachts increases by over 15%.  The model therefore matches both the 
increasing trend in the skill premium and the trend documented in Buera and Kaboski (2009) of 
an increasing expenditure share of high-end services over time.    Finally, the model predicts that 
the skill intensity of the Yacht sector should increase in response to the increase in 𝑧𝑌 due to the 
inflow of skilled labor.  This is exactly the pattern observed in the high-end sectors mentioned in 
Section 2.  Between 1940 and 2000, the average skill intensity over all sectors increased almost 
70%, while the average skill intensity in the high-end service sectors increased over 250%.16
High-end services are not the only goods consumed predominantly by the Rich. For 
example, the Rich may consume different auto repair and personal care services than do the Poor 
based on the geographic location of these services relative to where the Rich live.  The model 
above predicts that if an auto repair shop in a Rich neighborhood experiences an increase in skill-
intensive technology (or capital, as demonstrated in the Appendix), then the availability of repair 
services in Poor neighborhoods will fall Such a phenomenon may help explain the chronic 
underdevelopment of neighborhoods in South Africa during periods of aggregate economic 
growth, and the prevalence of retail deserts in poor American neighborhoods (see Schuetz, 
Kolko, and Meltzer 2012).  
    
For a concrete example of how asymmetric growth contributes to retail deserts, consider 
the recent experience of North Park Hill, a poor neighborhood that is almost entirely lacking in 
grocery stores.  In 2009, during the depths of the Great Recession, the healthy-food grocer 
Sunflower Markets planned to open a store in North Park Hill.17  In 2010, during the economic 
recovery, Sunflower withdrew its plans for a Park Hill store and began looking for locations in 
wealthier communities.18
 
  While Sunflower executives have not explicitly stated that increasing 
wealth in other parts of the city (and hence higher demand) were responsible for retracting their 
plans for a Park Hill store, their decision to do so is consistent with the predictions of the model 
above.  It is also consistent with the experiences of other poor American neighborhoods, many of 
which rely on tax transfers in the form of grants to community development organizations to 
finance local grocery stores (see the bottom of the article cited in Footnote 16). 
                                                 
16 Based on IPUMS data used in Buera and Kaboski (2011).  The high-end industries include Security and 
commodity brokerage and investment companies, Banking and credit, Legal services, Engineering and architectural 
services, Real estate, Insurance, and Air transportation. 
17 The Denver Post, March 9, 2009 Front Page  http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_11867922?source=bb 
18 The Denver Post, March 10, 2010 http://www.denverpost.com/ci_14644222 
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4. Rising Tides in International Trade 
This section examines the effects of biased technological change in the form of a productivity 
increase in a country’s service sector.  As in Section 3, growth is asymmetric in the sense that the 
productivity increase (1) complements labor supplied by a subset of people, and (2) is exclusive 
to a sector consumed by that subset of people.  In the case of international trade, the subset of 
people who benefit from the asymmetric growth is the residents of the country with an increase 
in its service-sector productivity. 
 The model below features two countries, 𝐴 and 𝐵, each with a representative consumer 
who has utility over a nontraded service and a bundle of traded consumer goods.  Each country 
produces a unique traded good that is an imperfect substitute for the traded good of the other 
country.   There are no barriers to trade, and all goods are produced under perfect competition.  
The production technology for all goods is linear in labor, and labor is inelastically supplied in 
both countries. 
 
4.1 Consumer Preferences 









Where 𝑆𝑗 is the agent 𝑗’s consumption of the service produced in country 𝑗.  The aggregate good 









where 𝑋𝑗 is consumption in 𝑗 of the tradable good produced in country 𝐴 and 𝑌𝑗 is consumption 
in 𝑗 of the tradable good produced in country 𝐵.  The elasticity of substitution between the 
service and the aggregate consumer good is 𝜎, and the elasticity of substitution between the 
tradable goods is 𝛾.  
The budget constraint of agent 𝑗 is  
𝑤𝑗𝐿𝑗 = 𝑝𝑆𝑗𝑆𝑗 + 𝑝𝑋𝑋𝑗 + 𝑝𝑌𝑌𝑗 , (8) 
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where 𝑝𝑆𝑗 is the price of 𝑆𝑗, 𝑝𝑋 is the price of the tradable good 𝑋 produced in 𝐴 and 𝑝𝐵 is the 
price of the tradable good 𝑌 produced in country  𝐵.  Market clearing for the tradable goods 
implies 𝑋 = 𝑋𝐴 + 𝑋𝐵 and 𝑌 = 𝑌𝐴 + 𝑌𝐵. 
























Note that both countries face the same prices 𝑝𝑋 and 𝑝𝑌 for tradable goods, so the price 𝑝𝐶 of the 
aggregate consumer good is also equal in both countries. 
 
4.2 Production 
 The technologies in 𝑗 for production of services and tradables are 
𝑆𝐴 = 𝑧𝐿𝑆𝐴, 𝑆𝐵 = 𝐿𝑆𝐵, 𝑋 = 𝐿𝑋𝐴, 𝑌 = 𝐿𝑌𝐵, 
where  𝐿𝑆𝐴 and 𝐿𝑋𝐴 are 𝐴’s labor allocations to its service and tradable sectors, and 𝐿𝑆𝐵 and 𝐿𝑌𝐵 
are 𝐵’s labor allocations to its service and tradable sectors.  Without loss of generality, labor 
supply is assumed to be equal to 𝐿 in both countries.  𝑆𝐵,𝑋, and 𝑌 are produced at unit labor cost, 
while 𝑆𝐴 is produced at labor cost 1/𝑧.  Country 𝐴’s service sector is permitted to have non-unity 
labor productivity because the comparative static of interest is a change in 𝑧.   
   All sectors are perfectly competitive, so prices equal marginal costs.  The wage in 𝐵 is 




, 𝑝𝑋 = 𝑤, 𝑝𝑆𝐵 = 1, 𝑝𝑌 = 1. (9) 
where 𝑤 is the wage in country 𝐴.  
 
4.3 Equilibrium 







+ 𝑋𝐴 + 𝑋𝐵,              𝐿 = 𝑆𝐵 + 𝑌𝐴 + 𝑌𝐵, (10) 
and the trade balance condition 
𝑤𝑋𝐵 = 𝑌𝐴, (11) 
where equation (11) follows from substituting the labor market clearing conditions into each 
country’s budget constraint. 
 
4.3 Welfare Effects of Asymmetric Growth 
Proposition 2: Welfare in 𝐵 is falling in 𝑧 when tradable goods are imperfect substitutes and the 
elasticity of substitution between the nontradable and the tradable bundle, 𝜎, is greater than 
unity. 
Proof: Appendix II.D. 
 
 If the elasticity of substitution between tradables is less than unity, it is still possible for 
welfare to fall in 𝐵.  I focus on the case of substitutability because it is consistent with the 
implicit assumption in the macro and trade literatures that focus on the effects of monopolistic 
competition. 
 Intuitively, the result in Proposition 2 is a result of a fall in 𝐵’s terms of trade when 𝐴’s 
service-sector productivity increases.  An increase in 𝑧 lowers the price of nontradable services 
in 𝐴.  Since the elasticity of substitution between services and tradables is greater than unity, 
country 𝐴 responds to the price decrease by demanding more services and fewer tradables.  This 
lowers the value of tradables relative to the value of labor in 𝐴, causing 𝐴 to devote labor 
resources to the production of services.  Therefore, resources are reallocated away from 
provision of tradables for trade with 𝐵 to the provision of nontradable services for 𝐴. 
 An alternative way to conceptualize the result in Proposition 2 is through price effects.  
The consumer price index in 𝐵 can be written 







which is increasing in 𝑤.  Therefore, if the value of labor in 𝐴 increases relative to the value of 
labor in 𝐵, the consumer price index in 𝐵 will increase and 𝐵’s welfare will fall.  Under the 
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conditions stipulated in Proposition 2, the increase in 𝑧 causes an increase in 𝑤 because country 
𝐴 indirectly demands more of its labor relative to the labor of country 𝐵.    
 
4.4 Discussion of the Two-Country Model. 
The analysis in Section 4 suggests that productivity growth in any country’s service sector may 
increase prices in other countries, reducing their welfare.  This result is fairly general in that the 
conditions leading to this result are imperfect substitutability between traded goods and an 
above-unity elasticity of substitution between nontraded services and tradables.  Indeed, these 
assumptions are implicit in most macro and trade models that incorporate monopolistic 
competition. 
 The model presented above offers a solution to what appears to be a puzzling decline in 
abject poverty in all parts of the world following the global economic crisis in 2008:  A fall in 
productivity in sectors (such as financial sectors) that do not serve the world’s poorest members 
may have freed up economic resources to provide goods and services to the poor by lowering the 
price of these goods and services.   
 One implication is that an increase in global economic activity may have adverse 
consequences for the poorest people in the world.  An additional implication of the model is that 
as service-sector productivity increases in developing countries, developed countries will 
experience higher prices and lower welfare in the absence of other forms of economic growth. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has presented two cases in which productivity gains not only fail to “trickle down” to 
everyone in the economy, but actually lower the welfare of a group of people.  In each case, the 
paper presents evidence in support of the assumptions underlying the models, as well as 
anecdotal evidence that lend support to the models’ welfare implications. 
 The key mechanism driving the result in the models above is an increase in the income of 
a subset of people that supersedes the increase in aggregate wealth in response to economic 
growth. This mechanism does not operate in standard models that explain rising inequality. In 
the canonical model of skill-biased technological change, for example, economic gains are 
disproportionately directed to a subset of people but nonetheless improve everyone’s welfare. 
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The primary difference between the models presented above and models of inequality is that the 
models presented above assume that consumption bundles not identical across the population.   
 In the case of sector-biased, skill-biased technological change, the difference in 
consumption bundles between the skilled Rich and the unskilled Poor is due to nonhomothetic 
preferences.  The welfare decline of the low-skilled Poor is greater the more biased is growth 
toward high-end goods and services, or toward services in wealthy neighborhoods.  The welfare 
loss is also greater the less important are high-end goods and services in the consumption bundle 
of the Poor. In the extreme, the Poor do not consume any goods that experience productivity 
gains, and their consumption/welfare loss is substantial.   
 In the case of international trade, consumption bundles differ across countries due to 
nontraded services, as in Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964). Under the assumptions that 
tradable goods are imperfect substitutes, and that the elasticity of substitution between services 
and tradables is greater than unity, the country without the service-sector productivity increase 
experiences a decline in its terms of trade and in its welfare.   
The focus of this paper is on illustrating mechanisms that are likely to apply in a number 
of contexts rather than on developing methods to test these models empirically.  A rigorous 
empirical test of the models would require matching consumption of disaggregated goods and 
services to the inputs used in production of the specific goods and services. Existing data clearly 
are inadequate for such an analysis.  The development of suitable datasets for testing this 
proposition is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 An interesting avenue for empirical research would be to document productivity gains 
and the adoption of new technology by service establishments at the neighborhood level.  If 
service establishments in high-income neighborhoods experience skill-biased technology 
improvements or utilize more high-tech capital than their counterparts in low-income areas, then 
the model in this paper may help explain the chronic underdevelopment of some of the poorest 






Proof of Proposition 1:  Total differentiation of equations (1) through (6) yields 
𝐻𝐹� = −
(𝜎𝑌 − 1)(𝜎𝐹𝐿𝐹 + 𝐿𝑌)𝐻𝑌




(𝜎𝐹 − 1)(𝜎𝑌 − 1)𝜎𝑌𝐻𝑌𝐿𝑌 
(𝜎𝐹𝐻𝐹 + 𝜎𝑌𝐻𝑌)  𝐿𝐹 (𝜎𝑌 − 1) + (𝜎𝐹𝐿𝐹 + 𝜎𝑌𝐿𝑌)(𝐻𝐹 + 𝜎𝑌𝐻𝑌)
𝑧𝑌�, (A2) 
where 𝑥� = 𝑑𝑥/𝑥 for any variable 𝑥.  Equation (A1) implies that 𝑑𝐻𝐹/𝑑𝑧 is negative if and only 
if 𝜎𝑌 > 1.  Assuming this is the case, (A2) implies that 𝑑𝐿𝐹/𝑑𝑧 is negative if and only if 𝜎𝐹 < 1.  
If we assume that the elasticity of substitution is greater than unity in both sectors, then an 
increase in 𝑧 will cause an outflow of skilled labor from the Potato sector and an inflow of 
unskilled labor.  We can determine the net effect on the supply of Potatoes by total 






− 1𝜎𝐹𝑑𝐾𝐹 + (1 − 𝜂)𝐿𝐹
− 1𝜎𝐹𝑑𝐿𝐹 . 
Substituting in (A1) and (A2) yields 
𝐹�  = −𝐹−
𝜎𝐹
𝜎𝐹−1 �
𝜎𝑌𝐻𝑌𝐿(𝜎𝑌 − 1)(1 − 𝜂)𝐿𝐹
− 1𝜎𝐹𝐿𝑌
(𝜎𝐹𝐻𝐹 + 𝜎𝑌𝐻𝑌)  𝐿𝐹 (𝜎𝑌  − 1) + (𝜎𝐹𝐿𝐹 + 𝜎𝑌𝐿𝑌)(𝐻𝐹 + 𝜎𝑌𝐻𝑌)
�× ?̂?, 
which states that if 𝜎𝑌 > 1 the supply of Potatoes decreases whenever there is an improvement in 





Here I alter the model in Section 3 to allow production of Yachts and Potatoes to use a general 
constant-returns-to-scale functional form.  In the static competitive equilibrium consumers 
maximize utility subject to their budget constraints; firms maximize profits, and labor markets 
clear. The H Rich agents solve  
max  𝑌𝑅              
s.t.  𝐻𝑤𝐻 = 𝑌𝑝𝑌 (B1) 
 Likewise, the Poor agents solve  
max 1.5 × log(𝐹𝑃 + 1) 
s.t.    𝐿𝑤𝐿 = 𝐹𝑝𝐹 (B2) 
Prices of Potatoes and Yachts are equal to unit costs 𝑐𝐹 and 𝑐𝑌: 




,𝑤𝐿� = 𝑝𝑌. (B4) 
Market clearing implies  
𝐻𝐹 + 𝐻𝑌 = 𝐻 (B5) 
𝐿𝐹 + 𝐿𝑌 = 𝐿. (B6) 














and relative factor demands in the Yacht sector are derived setting marginal rates of technical 










Equations A1 through A9 characterize the equilibrium.  We can log-linearize the equilibrium 
equations to determine the effects of an increase in 𝑧 on all endogenous variables: 
𝑤𝐻� = 𝑌� + 𝑝𝑌� (B11) 
𝑤𝐿� = 𝐹� + 𝑝𝐹� (B12) 
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𝜙𝐻𝑤𝐻� + 𝜙𝐿𝑤𝐿� = 𝑝𝐹� (B13) 
𝜃𝐻𝑤𝐻� + 𝜃𝐿𝑤𝐿� = 𝜃𝑍?̂? + 𝑝𝑌� (B14) 
𝜆𝐻𝐹𝐻𝐹� + 𝜆𝐻𝑌𝐻𝑌� = 0 (B15) 
𝜆𝐿𝐹𝐿𝐹� + 𝜆𝐿𝑌𝐿𝑌� = 0 (B16) 
𝐻𝐹� = 𝐹� + 𝜙𝐻𝜎𝐹(𝑤𝐿� −𝑤𝐻� ) (B17) 
𝐿𝐹� = 𝐹� + 𝜙𝐿𝜎𝐹(𝑤𝐻� −𝑤𝐿�) (B18) 
𝐿𝑌� − 𝐻𝑌� + (𝜎𝑌 − 1)?̂? = 𝜎𝑌(𝑤𝐻� −𝑤𝐿�) (B19) 
For any variable 𝑥 above, 𝑥� = 𝑑𝑥
𝑥
.  I denote cost shares of labor in the Potato sector as 𝜙𝐻 ≡
𝑤𝐻𝐻𝐹/𝐹𝑝𝐹 and 𝜙𝐿 ≡ 𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐹/𝐹𝑝𝐹.  Likewise in the Yacht sector 𝜃𝐻 ≡ 𝑤𝐻𝐻𝑌/𝑌𝑝𝑌 and 𝜃𝐿 ≡













.  The elasticity of substitution between the labor types is 𝜎𝐹 in the Potato sector.  In the 
Yacht sector 𝜎𝑌 in the elasticity of substitution between 𝑧𝐻 and 𝐿.  Solving the above system of 
equations yields the percentage change in Potatoes in response to a percentage increase in Yacht-
specific, skill-biased technological change: 
𝐹� = −
(𝜎𝑌 − 1)𝜆𝐻𝑌

















 − 1� > 0.  This latter condition will hold when production functions are of the 






Here I extend the model in Section 3 to include equipment capital, 𝐾.  Production of Potatoes 
and Yachts takes the nested CES form: 
𝐹 = �𝜂 �𝜆 𝐾𝐹
𝜎𝐹−1












      
𝑌 = �𝜇 �𝜆 (𝑧𝐾𝑌)
𝜎𝑌−1












,   
which is similar to the production function estimated by Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, and 
Violante (2000).  The technology parameter, 𝑧, augments capital in the Yacht sector only.  
Alternatively, we could assume that capital is sector-specific, and that productivity 
improvements are unique to the production of capital used in the yacht sector.  With competitive 
markets the effects on factor demands and prices will be the same; the only difference is that 
capital in the Yacht sector would be measured as 𝑧𝐾𝑌instead of 𝐾𝑌.  Krusell et al. implicitly 
assume that the unit of measurement of capital is 𝑧𝐾 (theirs is a one-sector model) in order to 
account for the fall in the price of equipment capital during the latter part of the Twentieth 
Century.  However, this assumption is not necessary: in the calibrated general equilibrium model 
the price of 𝐾 (and the price of 𝑧𝐾𝑌) can fall in response to an increase in 𝑧, as we demonstrate 
below.   
Preferences are the same as in the baseline model, and we assume that the Rich own the 
economy’s endowment of capital 𝐾 in addition to high-skilled labor 𝐻.  The representative Rich 
agent therefore solves  
max  𝑌 
s.t.     𝑟𝐾 + 𝑤𝐻𝐻 ≥ 𝑟𝐾𝑌 + 𝑤𝐻𝐻𝑌 + 𝑤𝐿𝐿𝑌  (C1) 
and the Poor agent solves 
max   . 5 × log(𝐹) 
s.t.       𝑤𝐿𝐿 ≥ 𝑟𝐾𝐹 + 𝑤𝐻𝐻𝐹 + 𝑤𝐿𝐿𝐹, (C2) 
where 𝑟 is the price of capital. 
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 In the competitive equilibrium the marginal rates of technical substitution must equal 





























































(1 − 𝜆)�𝜆 𝐾𝐹
𝜎𝐹−1












Equations (C1) through (C6), in addition to market clearing conditions 
𝐾 = 𝐾𝐹 + 𝐾𝑌, 𝐻 = 𝐻𝐹 + 𝐻𝑌,      𝐿 = 𝐿𝐹 + 𝐿𝑌 , (C7-C9) 
fully characterize the competitive equilibrium. 
 I calibrate the model using the parameter estimates in Krusell et al (2000): 
𝛽 = 𝛾 = 1.67, 𝜎𝑌 = 𝜎𝐹 = 0.67, 𝜆 = 0.553,     𝜂 = 0.587. 
  As in section 3, I set 𝐻
𝐿
= .7 to match its value in 2000.  I set 𝜇 = 0.65 instead of 0.587 to help 
match the 2000 skill premium, 𝑤𝐻
𝑤𝐿
= 2.1, and because a higher value of 𝜇 increases the relative 
skill intensity in the Yacht sector, consistent with the evidence in Buera and Kaboski (2009).  
The capital stock, 𝐾 = 7, is chosen to match the skill premium.  The starting value for 𝑧 is 1.   
Table II.C1 shows the response of endogenous variables to a 10% increase in 𝑧.  The 
supply of Potatoes, 𝐹, falls by 0.43%, due entirely to an outflow of skilled labor.  Unskilled labor 
and capital actually flow into the Potato sector.  When 𝑧 increases, the technology-capital bundle 
𝑧𝐾𝑌 increases in the Yacht sector. Since 𝑧𝐾𝑌 and 𝐻𝑌 are relative complements (determined by 
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the magnitude of 𝜎𝑌 relative to 𝛾), the Rich demand more skilled labor in the Yacht sector, which 
increases 𝑤𝐻 and 𝐻𝑌.  The Rich also demand less capital because the level of 𝑧𝐾𝑌 is high relative 
to 𝐻𝑌, which lowers the price of capital. The result is an outflow of capital from the Yacht sector 
and into the Potato sector.  The stronger the relative complementarity between capital and skill, 
the stronger is the fall in 𝑟 and in inflow of capital to the Potato sector.  If baseline calibration is 
changed slightly to decrease the relative complementarity (through either an increase in 𝜎𝑌 or a 
decrease in 𝛾), the sign of the change in 𝑟 ,𝐾𝐹 , or both can reverse.  All other variable changes 
are robust to a wide range of parameter values. 
 














1.59%  -1.70%  0.51%  -1.45%  0.29%  -0.43%  2.07% 






This section derives the result in Proposition 2 from Section 5.  A sufficient statistic for welfare 
in 𝐵 is given by the consumer price index (11).  Therefore the comparative static of interest is 
𝑑𝑤/𝑑𝑧.  If 𝑑𝑤/𝑑𝑧 > 0, then the productivity increase causes an increase in 𝐵’s consumption 
basket and a fall in its welfare.  To determine 𝑑𝑤/𝑑𝑧, I first simplify some of the equilibrium 
conditions. 
Substitute the prices (9) into the tradable demand ratios (8), to yield 
 𝑌𝑗 = 𝑋𝑗𝑤𝛾, (D1)  
 𝐶𝑗 = 𝑋𝑗(1 + 𝑤𝛾−1)
𝛾
𝛾−1 (D2)  
for 𝑗 = {𝐴,𝐵}.  The optimal demands of services in 𝐴 and 𝐵 from (8) are  







, (D3)  
 𝑆𝐵 = 𝐶𝐵 (𝑤1−𝛾 + 1)
𝜎
1−𝛾.  (D4)  
Solve the labor market clearing conditions (10) for 𝑆𝐴 and 𝑆𝐵 and substitute into (D3) and (D4).  
Also substitute (D2) for 𝐶𝐴 and 𝐶𝐵: 









, (D5)  
 𝐿 − 𝑌𝐴 − 𝑌𝐵 = 𝑋𝐵(1 + 𝑤𝛾−1)
𝛾
𝛾−1 (𝑤1−𝛾 + 1)
𝜎
1−𝛾.  (D6)  
Substitute the demand ratios (D1) for 𝑌𝐵:  









, (D7)  
 𝐿 − 𝑌𝐴 − 𝑋𝐵𝑤𝛾 = 𝑋𝐵(1 + 𝑤𝛾−1)
𝛾
𝛾−1 (𝑤1−𝛾 + 1)
𝜎
1−𝛾.  (D8)  
Finally, substitute out 𝑋𝐵 using the trade balance condition (11), and substitute out 𝑌𝐴 using 
(D1): 









, (D9)  
 𝐿 − 𝑋𝐴𝑤𝛾(1 − 𝑤𝛾−1) = 𝑋𝐴𝑤𝛾−1(1 + 𝑤𝛾−1)
𝛾
𝛾−1 (𝑤1−𝛾 + 1)
𝛾
1−𝛾.  (D10)  
 Equations (D9) and (D10) fully characterize the equilibrium.  There are two equations 
and two unknowns (𝑤 and 𝑋𝐴).  To obtain 𝑑𝑤/𝑑𝑧, totally differentiate (D9) and (D10), solve for 
𝑑𝑋𝐴, and substitute the second totally differentiated equation into the first.  The total derivative is 









𝛾−1𝛾 + 3𝜎 + 𝛾2 − 1
, 
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The Role of Inventories and Speculative Trading in the Global Market for Crude Oil 
 
Abstract 
We develop a structural model of the global market for crude oil that for the first time 
explicitly allows for shocks to the speculative demand for oil as well as shocks to flow demand 
and flow supply. The speculative component of the real price of oil is identified with the help of 
data on oil inventories. Our estimates rule out explanations of the 2003-08 oil price surge based 
on unexpectedly diminishing oil supplies and based on speculative trading. Instead, this surge 
was caused by unexpected increases in world oil consumption driven by the global business 
cycle. There is evidence, however, that speculative demand shifts played an important role 
during earlier oil price shock episodes including 1979, 1986, and 1990. Our analysis implies that 
additional regulation of oil markets would not have prevented the 2003-08 oil price surge. We 
also show that, even after accounting for the role of inventories in smoothing oil consumption, 
our estimate of the short-run price elasticity of oil demand is much higher than traditional 
estimates from dynamic models that do not account for price endogeneity. 
 
1.  Introduction 
There is no consensus in the academic literature on how to model the global market for crude oil. 
One strand of the literature suggests that the price of oil is determined by desired stocks. In this 
interpretation, shifts in the expectations of forward-looking traders are reflected in changes in the 
real price of oil and changes in oil inventories. Another strand of the literature views the price of 
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oil as being determined by shocks to the amount of oil coming out of the ground (“flow supply of 
oil”) and the amount of oil being consumed (“flow demand for oil”) with little attention to the 
role of inventories. Much of the early literature on oil supply shocks is in that tradition, as are 
more recent economic models linking the real price of oil to fluctuations in the global business 
cycle.1
 Constructing such an econometric model is nontrivial because the potential presence of a 
forward-looking component in the real price of oil considerably complicates the identification of 
the structural shocks. Traditional oil market VAR models implicitly equate market expectations 
with the econometric expectations formed on the basis of past data on oil production, global real 
activity, and the real price of oil. If traders respond to information about future demand and 
supply conditions not contained in the past data available to the econometrician, however, 
market expectations will differ from the expectations constructed by the econometrician, 
rendering traditional models of flow supply and flow demand invalid. For example, the 
desirability of holding oil stocks may change in response to news about oil discoveries or as 
traders anticipate wars in the Middle East or global recessions, or as traders respond to increased 
uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls. None of these expectations shifts can be captured 
using standard models of flow demand and flow supply. In sections 2 and 3, we show that this 
problem can be overcome with the help of data on above-ground crude oil inventories. The 
intuition is that – unless the price elasticity of oil demand is zero – any expectation of a shortfall 
of future oil supply relative to future oil demand not already captured by flow demand and flow 
supply shocks necessarily causes an increase in the demand for above-ground oil inventories and 
 Recently, there has been increasing recognition that both stock demand and flow demand 
for oil matter in modeling the real price of oil (see, e.g., Dvir and Rogoff 2010; Hamilton 
2009a,b; Kilian 2009a; Alquist and Kilian 2010). In this paper, we propose a structural vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model of the global market for crude oil that explicitly nests these two 
explanations of the determination of the real price of oil and allows us to quantify the effects of 
different oil demand and supply shocks. Drawing on insights from the economic theory for 
storable commodities, we design a set of identifying assumptions that allows us to estimate 
jointly the expectations-driven component of the real price of oil and the components driven by 
flow demand and flow supply. 
                                                          




hence in the real price of oil (see, e.g., Alquist and Kilian 2010; Hamilton 2009a). We refer to 
such a shock as a speculative demand shock in the spot market for crude oil. It is this type of 
shock that many researchers and policymakers explicitly or implicitly appeal to when attributing 
higher spot prices to speculation. We stress that such speculative demand shocks cannot be 
inferred directly from observables and can only be identified within the context of a structural 
econometric model. 
 Our definition of speculation in this paper is general in that we treat anyone buying crude 
oil not for current consumption, but for future use as a speculator from an economic point of 
view. Speculative purchases of oil usually occur because the buyer is anticipating rising oil 
prices. This anticipation may arise because of changes in expected fundamentals, for example, or 
because the buyer is anticipating other market participants’ actions. Speculative purchases may 
also be precautionary in that they reflect increased uncertainty about future demand or supply 
conditions (see Alquist and Kilian 2010).  
We do not take a stand on whether such speculative behavior is desirable from a social 
point of view. In particular, we do not attempt to distinguish between normal and excessive 
levels of speculation nor do we define speculation on the basis of who is trading or what 
positions these traders take. As discussed in Fattouh et al. (2012), there is no operational 
definition of excessive speculation in the literature. Rather we will show in section 4 that all 
speculative trading in the spot market for crude oil combined had little effect on the real price of 
oil between 2003 and mid-2008, making the distinction between normal and excessive levels of 
speculation moot at least for this episode. 
 Our analysis allows new insights into the genesis of historical oil price fluctuations. It is 
of particular relevance for recent policy discussions about the potential role of speculation in oil 
markets after 2003. First, as discussed in section 4, our estimates rule out speculation as a cause 
of the surge in the real price of oil between 2003 and mid-2008. Furthermore, under the 
maintained assumption of arbitrage between spot and futures markets, the absence of speculative 
pressures in the spot market implies that there cannot have been speculative pressures in the oil 
futures market either. This implication is fully consistent with other, more direct evidence on the 
impact of financial investors on oil futures prices (see Fattouh et al. 2012). Instead our model 
implies that both spot and futures prices during 2003-08 were driven by unexpected increases in 
world oil consumption. From this result we infer that additional regulation of oil futures markets 
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would not have prevented the increase in the real price of oil in the spot market, which is the 
ultimate concern of policymakers.2
 Second, although speculative trading does not explain the recent surge in the real price of 
oil, we show that it played an important role in several earlier oil price shock episodes. For 
example, it was a central feature of the oil price surge of 1979, following the Iranian Revolution, 
consistent with the narrative evidence in Barsky and Kilian (2002), and it helps explain the sharp 
decline in the real price of oil in early 1986 after the collapse of OPEC. It also played a central 
role in 1990, following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Although neither negative flow supply shocks 
nor positive speculative demand shocks alone can explain the oil price spike and oil inventory 
behavior of 1990/91, their combined effects do. 
 
 Third, our analysis sheds new light on the evolution of the real price of oil since 1978. 
We document that unexpected fluctuations in global real activity explain nearly the entire surge 
in the real price of oil between 2003 and mid-2008, even acknowledging that negative flow 
supply shocks raised the real price of oil slightly. Business cycle factors were also responsible 
for the bulk of the 1979/80 oil price increase in conjunction with sharply rising speculative 
demand in the second half of 1979. In contrast, flow supply shocks played only a minor role in 
1979. The continued rise in the real price of oil in 1980 reflected negative flow supply shocks 
(caused in part by the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War) as much as continued (if slowing) global 
growth, amidst declining speculative demand. Finally, there is evidence that the recovery of the 
real price of oil starting in 1999, following an all-time low in post-war history, was aided by 
coordinated supply cuts. Although our analysis assigns more importance to oil supply shocks 
than some previous studies, we conclude that, with the exception of 1990, the major oil price 
shocks were driven primarily by oil demand shocks. 
Much of the prima facie case against an important role for speculation in oil markets rests  
on the fact that there has been no noticeable increase in the rate of inventory accumulation in 
recent years. Our model suggests that even after controlling for the effect of other shocks on 
crude oil inventories there is no evidence of rising speculative demand after 2003. Recently, 
Hamilton (2009a) pointed out that, as a matter of theory, speculative trading in oil futures 
markets may cause a surge in the real price of oil without any change in oil inventory holdings if 
                                                          
2 It is important to note that our conclusion regarding the determinants of the spot price of oil would remain equally 
valid, if there were limits to arbitrage between spot and futures markets. Limits to arbitrage of course would 
undermine the argument that financial speculation is driving the spot price. 
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the short-run price elasticity of demand for gasoline is literally zero. Thus, it is essential that we 
pin down the value of this elasticity. We provide a theoretical model that shows that under 
reasonable assumptions about the oil refining industry, the short-run price elasticity of gasoline 
demand is about as high as the short-run price elasticity of oil demand. Hamilton (2009a) 
observed that existing estimates of the latter elasticity are so close to zero that the possibility of 
an elasticity of zero deserves further examination. These existing elasticity estimates, however, 
are based on dynamic reduced-form regressions that ignore the endogeneity of the real price of 
oil. They have no structural interpretation and suffer from downward bias. In section 5, we 
address this concern with the help of our structural VAR model. Not only does this model allow 
the construction of a direct estimate of the elasticity parameter based on exogenous shifts of the 
oil supply curve along the oil demand curve, but it also incorporates for the first time changes in 
oil inventories in computing the price elasticity of oil demand. Our posterior median estimate of 
the short-run price elasticity of oil demand of -0.26 is four times higher than standard estimates 
in the literature and there is little probability mass close to zero.3
 
 Thus, the limiting case of a zero 
price elasticity of demand discussed by Hamilton (2009a) is an unlikely explanation of 2003-08 
surge in the real price of oil. The concluding remarks are in section 6.  
2. VAR Methodology 
Our analysis is based on a dynamic simultaneous equation model in the form of a structural 
VAR. Let ty be a vector of endogenous variables including the percent change in global crude oil 
production, a measure of global real activity, the real price of crude oil, and the change in global 
crude oil inventories above the ground.4
2.1. Data 
  All data are monthly. The sample period is 1973.2-
2009.8. We remove seasonal variation by including seasonal dummies in the VAR model. 
Our measure of fluctuations in global real activity is the dry cargo shipping rate index developed 
in Kilian (2009a). This real activity index is a business cycle index and stationary by 
construction. It is designed to capture shifts in the global use of industrial commodities. For more 
                                                          
3 Even higher oil demand elasticity estimates have been obtained independently by other recent studies employing 
structural estimation methods. None of these studies account for changes in inventories, however. 
4 Unlike above-ground oil inventories that can be drawn down at short notice, oil below the ground (also known as 
reserves) is inaccessible in the short run and not available for consumption smoothing. Thus, it must be 
differentiated from oil inventories in the usual sense. We do not utilize data for reserves because no reliable time 
series data exist on the quantity of oil below the ground and because reserves data are not required for our 
identification. We discuss, however, how speculation based on below-ground inventories would be recorded within 
our model framework and how it may be detected in section 4.3. 
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details on the rationale, construction and interpretation of this index the reader is referred to the 
related literature. While there are other indices of global real activity available, none of these 
alternative proxies is as appropriate for our purpose of capturing shifts in the global demand for 
industrial commodities. Data on global crude oil production are available in the Monthly Energy 
Review of the Energy Information Administration (EIA). These data also include lease 
condensates, but exclude natural gas plant liquids. Oil production is expressed in percent changes 
in the model. The real price of oil is defined as the U.S. refiners’ acquisition cost for imported 
crude oil, as reported by the EIA, extrapolated from 1974.1 back to 1973.1 as in Barsky and 
Kilian (2002) and deflated by the U.S. consumer price index. We use the refiners’ acquisition 
cost for imported crude oil because that price is likely to be a better proxy for the price of oil in 
global markets than the U.S. price of domestic crude oil which was regulated during the 1970s 
and early 1980s. Following Kilian (2009a), the real price of oil is expressed in log-levels.5
Given the lack of data on crude oil inventories for other countries, we follow Hamilton 
(2009a) in using the data for total U.S. crude oil inventories provided by the EIA. These data are 
scaled by the ratio of OECD petroleum stocks over U.S. petroleum stocks, also obtained from the 
EIA. That scale factor ranges from about 2.23 to 2.59 in our sample.
 
6
                                                          
5 It is not clear a priori whether the real price of oil should be modeled in log-levels or log-differences. The level 
specification adopted in this paper has the advantage that the impulse response estimates are not only asymptotically 
valid under the maintained assumption of a stationary real price of oil, but robust to departures from that 
assumption, whereas incorrectly differencing the real price of oil would cause these estimates to be inconsistent. The 
potential cost of not imposing unit roots in estimation is a loss of asymptotic efficiency, which would be reflected in 
wider error bands. Since the impulse response estimates presented below are reasonably precisely estimated, this is 
not a concern in this study. It should be noted, however, that historical decompositions for the real price of oil rely 
on the assumption of covariance stationarity and would not be valid in the presence of unit roots. 
 We express the resulting 
proxy for global crude oil inventories in changes rather than percent changes. One reason is that 
the percent change in inventories does not appear to be covariance stationary, whereas the 
change in inventories does. The other reason is that the proper computation of the oil demand 
elasticity, as discussed below, requires an explicit expression for the change in global crude oil 
inventories in barrels. This computation is only possible if oil inventories are specified in 
changes rather than percent changes. Preliminary tests provided no evidence of cointegration 
between oil production and oil inventories. 
6 Petroleum stocks as measured by the EIA include crude oil (including strategic reserves) as well as unfinished oils, 
natural gas plant liquids, and refined products.  The EIA does not provide petroleum inventory data for non-OECD 
economies. We treat the OECD data as a proxy for global petroleum inventories. Consistent series for OECD 
petroleum stocks are not available prior to 1987.12. We therefore extrapolate the percent change in OECD 
inventories backwards at the rate of growth of U.S. petroleum inventories. For the period 1987.12-2009.8, the U.S. 




2.2. A Model of the Global Market for Crude Oil 
The reduced-form model allows for two years worth of lags. This approach is consistent with 
evidence in Hamilton and Herrera (2004) and Kilian (2009a) on the importance of allowing for 
long lags in the transmission of oil price shocks and in modeling business cycles in commodity 
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where tε  is the vector of orthogonal structural innovations and , 0,..., 24,iB i =  denotes the 
coefficient matrices. The seasonal dummies have been suppressed for notational convenience. 
The vector tε  consists of four structural shocks: The first shock corresponds to the classical 
notion of an oil supply shock as discussed in the literature (“flow supply shock”). This shock 
incorporates supply disruptions associated with exogenous political events in oil-producing 
countries as well as unexpected politically motivated supply decisions by OPEC members as 
well as other flow supply shocks. Second, we include a shock to the demand for crude oil and 
other industrial commodities that is associated with unexpected fluctuations in the global 
business cycle (“flow demand shock”).  The third shock captures shifts in the demand for above-
ground oil inventories arising from forward-looking behavior not otherwise captured by the 
model (“speculative demand shock”).7
Each of these shocks has unique characteristics. For example, an unexpected disruption 
of the flow of oil production (embodied in a shift to the left of the contemporaneous oil supply 
curve along the oil demand curve, conditional on all past data) raises the real price of crude oil 
and lowers global real activity within the same month. The impact effect on oil inventories is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, a negative flow supply shock will cause oil inventories to be drawn 
down in an effort to smooth consumption. On the other hand, the same shock may raise demand 
for inventories to the extent that a negative flow supply shock triggers a predictable increase in 
 Finally, we include a residual shock designed to capture 
idiosyncratic oil demand shocks not otherwise accounted for (such as weather shocks, changes in 
inventory technology or preferences, or politically motivated releases of the U.S. Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve).  
                                                          
7 An alternative and less common view is that speculation may also be conducted by oil producers who choose to 
leave oil below the ground in anticipation of rising prices. The latter form of “speculative supply shock” would be 
associated with a negative flow supply shock in our framework rather than the building of above-ground inventories. 
Both forms of speculation are permitted by our model, but only speculation by oil traders is explicitly identified. 
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the real price of oil. Which effect dominates is unclear ex ante, so we do not restrict the sign of 
the impact response of inventories.  
In contrast, a positive flow demand shock (embodied in a shift to the right of the 
contemporaneous oil demand curve along the oil supply curve, conditional on all past data) 
raises the real price of oil and stimulates global oil production within the same month. As in the 
case of a negative flow supply shock, the impact effect on inventories is ambiguous ex ante. 
Flow demand and flow supply shocks in turn differ from speculative demand shocks.  
Given that crude oil is storable, the real price of oil also depends on the demand for oil 
inventories. This means that we must allow the price of oil to jump in response to any news 
about future oil supply or future oil demand that is not already embodied in flow supply and flow 
demand shocks. For example, upward revisions to expected future demand for crude oil (or 
downward revisions to expected future production of crude oil), all else equal, will increase the 
demand for crude oil inventories in the current period, resulting in an instantaneous shift of the 
contemporaneous demand curve for oil along the oil supply curve and an increase in the real 
price of oil. Such shifts could arise, for example, because of the anticipation of political unrest in 
oil-producing countries in the Middle East, because of the anticipation of peak oil effects, or 
because of the anticipated depletion of oil reserves. Likewise, traders may anticipate a global 
recession in the wake of a financial crisis, may anticipate higher future oil production as new 
deep sea oil is discovered off the shores of Brazil, or may anticipate the resumption of oil 
production in Iraq, as the stability of that country improves.  
 Rather than being associated only with future oil supply conditions or only with future oil 
demand conditions, speculative demand shocks reflect the expected shortfall of future oil supply 
relative to future oil demand. A positive speculative demand shock will shift the demand for 
above-ground oil inventories, causing in equilibrium the level of inventories and the real price of 
oil to increase on impact. The accumulation of inventories is accomplished by a reduction in oil 
consumption (reflected in lower global real activity) and an increase in oil production, as the real 
price increases.8
                                                          
8 Although oil producers could conceivably react to the same news that triggers a positive speculative demand shock 
by lowering oil production in anticipation of predictable increases of the real price, there is no evidence that oil 
producers have responded systematically in this way. Instead, anecdotal evidence suggests that oil producers such as 
Saudi Arabia often have increased their production levels following positive speculative demand shocks, consistent 
with the view that the expected impact response should be weakly positive. Our analysis is based on the premise that 
these shocks are mutually uncorrelated, but allows multiple shocks to occur at the same time. 
 Both flow demand shocks and speculative demand shocks have an expectational 
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component. The feature that distinguishes flow demand shocks from speculative demand shocks 
is that positive flow demand shocks necessarily involve an increase in the demand for 
consumption in the current period, whereas speculative demand shocks do not.9
News about the level of future oil supplies and the level of future demand for crude oil 
are but one example of shocks to expectations in the global market for crude oil. An unexpected 
increase in the uncertainty about future oil supply shortfalls would have much the same effect. 
This point has been demonstrated formally in a general equilibrium model by Alquist and Kilian 
(2010). The main difference is that uncertainty shocks would not be associated with expected 
changes in future oil production or real activity. Finally, speculative demand shocks may also 
arise because traders’ perception of what other traders think evolves or simply because of 
changes in beliefs not related to expected fundamentals. One of the attractive features of the 
econometric model is that it does not require the user to specify how expectations are formed. 
 
 
2.3. Why Do We Not Include the Oil Futures Spread? 
The focus in this paper is on modeling the real price of oil in the spot market. We do not 
explicitly model the oil futures market. Indeed, conceptually the futures market is distinct from 
the spot market. As discussed in Alquist and Kilian (2010) and Hamilton (2009a,b), there is an 
arbitrage condition linking the oil futures market and the spot market for crude oil. To the extent 
that speculation drives up the price in the oil futures market, arbitrage will ensure that oil traders 
buy inventories in the spot market in response. Thus we can focus on quantifying speculation in 
the spot market with the help of the oil inventory data without loss of generality.10
                                                          
9 For a theoretical analysis of flow demand shocks and how their effect on the real price of oil may be amplified by 
index funds trading in oil futures markets also see Sockin and Xiong (2012). 
 In fact, the 
analysis in Alquist and Kilian implies that data on the oil futures spread are redundant in our 
structural VAR model, given that we have already included changes in above-ground oil 
inventories. The fact that the inclusion of oil inventory data makes oil futures prices redundant is 
particularly advantageous considering that oil futures markets were created only in the 1980s, 
and thus oil futures prices do not exist for a large part of our sample. Equally importantly, our 
model remains well specified even if the arbitrage between spot and futures markets were less 
than perfect at times, whereas a model including the oil futures spread would become invalid in 
10 This result breaks down only if demand for oil is completely price inelastic, a case that we discuss in more detail 
in section 5. 
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that case. Finally, inventory data allow us to impose identifying information about the price 
elasticity of oil demand, which could not be imposed when using the oil futures spread. 
 
2.4. How Accurate are the Oil Inventory Data? 
While our structural VAR specification has many advantages, it relies on the global crude oil 
inventory data being accurate. Two concerns regarding the reliability of these data stand out. 
First, much has been made of media reports that some speculators in 2007/08 leased oil tankers 
to store oil. Although the EIA does not provide data on the use of tankers for storage, leasing  
tankers is expensive and the extent to which tankers have been used for storage appears small 
and limited to the very end of our sample. Second, there has been concern about the expansion of 
strategic reserves in non-OECD countries such as China. Non-OECD strategic reserves are not 
included in our inventory data set. However, most of the new Chinese oil storage facilities had 
yet to be filled by the end of our sample, so our analysis is not likely to be affected much.  Thus 
there is reason to believe that our inventory data, while less than perfect, are still informative. 
There are several ways of testing this premise.  
First, if there were additional information in the oil futures spread that is not already 
contained in our inventory proxy, rendering our VAR model informationally misspecified, the oil 
futures spread should Granger cause the remaining model variables (see Giannone and Reichlin 
2006). We formally tested this proposition and were unable to reject the null of no Granger 
causality at conventional significance levels for maturities of 1, 3, 6, 9, and 12 months, consistent 
with the view that the inventory data are as accurate as the oil futures spread.11
 A second test is based on extraneous information about the time periods during which 
speculation is known to have taken place. For example, Yergin (1992) and other oil market 
historians have described a speculative frenzy in oil markets in the second half of 1979 with 
heavy inventory buying. This provides an opportunity to test whether our structural model 
estimates correctly identify this episode. Similarly, we have a strong presumption that 
speculation mattered in 1986, 1990 and 2002. In section 4, we will show that our inventory data 
in all these cases generates results consistent with conventional wisdom. 
  
Finally, Baumeister and Kilian (2012a) show that reduced-form VAR models based on 
our oil inventory proxy generate more accurate real-time out-of-sample forecasts of the real price 
                                                          
11 Similar results also hold for ex-ante real interest rates. 
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of oil than other methods even during 2009-2011, further strengthening our claim that the oil 
inventory proxy is reasonably accurate. 
 
3. Identification  
An important question is how to distinguish speculative demand shocks from flow demand and 
flow supply shocks in practice. Our structural VAR model is set-identified based on a 
combination of sign restrictions and bounds on the implied price elasticities of oil demand and 
oil supply.12
 
 Some of these restrictions are implied by economic theory, while others can be 
motivated based on extraneous information. We impose four sets of identifying restrictions, each 
of which is discussed in turn. 
3.1. Impact Sign Restrictions 
The sign restrictions on the impact responses of oil production, real activity, the real price of oil 
and crude oil inventories are summarized in Table III.1. These restrictions follow directly from 
the economic model outlined in section 2. Implicitly, these restrictions also identify the fourth 
innovation, which can be thought of as a conglomerate of idiosyncratic oil demand shocks. 
Given the difficulty of interpreting this residual shock economically, we do not report results for 
this fourth shock, but merely note that it is not an important determinant of the real price of oil. 
 Sign restrictions alone are typically too weak to be informative about the effects of oil 
demand and oil supply shocks. As demonstrated in Kilian and Murphy (2012) in the context of a 
simpler model, it is essential that we impose all credible identifying restrictions for identification 
for the estimates to be economically meaningful. One such set of restrictions relates to bounds on 
impact price elasticities of oil demand and oil supply. 
 
3.2. Bound on the Impact Price Elasticity of Oil Supply 
The price elasticity of oil supply depends on the slope of the oil supply curve. A vertical short-
run oil supply curve would imply a price elasticity of zero, for example. An estimate of the  
impact price elasticity of oil supply may be constructed from the dynamic simultaneous equation 
model (1) by evaluating the ratio of the impact responses of oil production and of the real price 
of oil to an unexpected increase in flow demand or in speculative demand.  There is a consensus 
in the literature that this short-run price elasticity of oil supply is close to zero, if not effectively 
                                                          
12 The use of sign restrictions in oil market VAR models was pioneered by Baumeister and Peersman (2012) and 






 This fact suggests the need for an upper bound on this elasticity in selecting the 
admissible models that allows for steep, but not quite vertical short-run oil supply curves (see 
Kilian and Murphy 2012). It is important to stress that this additional identifying restriction does 
not constrain the levels of the impact responses, but merely imposes a bound on their relative 
magnitude. In our baseline model, we impose a fairly stringent bound of 0.025 on the impact 
price elasticity of oil supply. Because any such bound is suggestive only, we also experimented 
with higher bounds. It can be shown that doubling this bound, while increasing the number of 
admissible models, has little effect on the shape of the posterior distribution of the impulse 
responses. Even for a bound of 0.1 the 68% quantiles of the posterior distribution of the impulse 
responses remain qualitatively similar to the baseline model. Moreover, the estimates of the 
posterior median price elasticity of oil demand reported in section 5 are remarkably robust to this 
change. 
3.3. Bound on the Impact Price Elasticity of Oil Demand 
A preliminary estimate of the impact price elasticity of oil demand may be constructed from the 
estimated model (1) by evaluating the ratio of the impact responses of oil production and of the 
real price of oil to an unexpected oil supply disruption. This oil demand elasticity in production 
corresponds to the standard definition of the oil demand elasticity used in the literature. It 
equates the production of oil with the consumption of oil.  In the presence of changes in oil 
inventories that definition is inappropriate. The relevant quantity measure is instead the sum of 
the flow of oil production and the depletion of oil inventories triggered by an oil supply shock. 
To our knowledge, this distinction - with the exception of Considine (1997) - has not been 
discussed in the literature nor has there been any attempt in the literature to estimate this oil 
demand elasticity in use. The reader is referred to Appendix III.A for a formal discussion of how 
this elasticity can be derived from the structural VAR model. 
A natural additional identifying assumption is that the impact elasticity of oil demand in 
use, ,Usetη   must be weakly negative on average over the sample.  In addition to bounding the 
                                                          
13 For example, Hamilton (2009b, p. 25) observes that “in the absence of significant excess production capacity, the 
short-run price elasticity of oil supply is very low.” In practice, it often will take years for significant production 
increases. Kilian (2009a) makes the case that even in the presence of spare capacity, the response of oil supply 
within the month to price signals will be negligible because changing oil production is costly. Kellogg (2011) using 
monthly well-level oil production data from Texas finds essentially no response of oil production to either the spot 
price or the oil futures price. 
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demand elasticity in use at zero from above, we also impose a lower bound.14
0.8 0.Usetη− ≤ ≤
 It is reasonable to 
presume that the impact price elasticity of oil demand is lower than the corresponding long-run 
price elasticity of oil demand (see, e.g., Sweeney 1984). A benchmark for that long-run elasticity 
is provided by studies of nonparametric gasoline demand functions based on U.S. household 
survey data such as Hausman and Newey (1995) which have consistently produced long-run 
price elasticity estimates near -0.8. Their estimate suggests a bound of 15
 
 
3.4. Dynamic Sign Restrictions  
Our final set of restrictions relates to the dynamic responses to a flow supply shock. We impose 
the additional restriction that the response of the real price of oil to a negative flow supply shock 
must be positive for at least twelve months, starting in the impact period. This restriction is 
necessary to rule out structural models in which unanticipated flow supply disruptions cause a 
decline in the real price of oil below its starting level. Such a decline would be at odds with 
conventional views of the effects of unanticipated oil supply disruptions. Because the positive 
response of the real price of oil tends to be accompanied by a persistently negative response of 
oil production, once we impose this additional dynamic sign restriction, it furthermore must be 
the case that global real activity responds negatively to oil supply shocks. This is the only way 
for the oil market to experience higher prices and lower quantities in practice, because in the data 
the decline of inventories triggered by an oil supply disruption is much smaller than the shortfall 
of oil production. This implies a joint set of sign restrictions such that the responses of oil 
production and global real activity to an unanticipated flow supply disruption are negative for the 
first twelve months, while the response of the real price of oil is positive. 
 In contrast, we do not impose any dynamic sign restrictions on the responses to oil 
demand shocks. In particular, we do not impose any dynamic sign restrictions on the responses 
of global real activity and oil production to speculative oil demand shocks. Given that this shock 
is a composite of expectations shocks related to shifts in uncertainty and to the anticipation of 
rising oil demand and/or falling oil supplies, it is not possible to determine the sign of these 
responses ex ante beyond the impact period. 
 
                                                          
14 Note that we do not need to restrict the oil demand elasticity in production. Our impact sign restrictions ensure 
that this elasticity is weakly negative on impact. 
15 In related work, Yatchew and No (2001) using more detailed Canadian data arrive at a long-run gasoline demand 
elasticity estimate of -0.9, very close to Hausman and Newey’s original estimate. 
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3.5. Implementation of the Identification Procedure 
Given the set of identifying restrictions and consistent estimates of the reduced-form VAR 
model, the construction of the set of admissible structural models follows the standard approach 
in the literature on VAR models identified based on sign restrictions (see, e.g., Canova and De 
Nicolo 2002; Uhlig 2005). Consider the reduced-form VAR model ( ) ,t tA L y e= where ty  is the 
N -dimensional vector of variables, ( )A L is a finite-order autoregressive lag polynomial, and te
is the vector of white noise reduced-form innovations with variance-covariance matrix .eΣ  Let 
tε  denote the corresponding structural VAR model innovations. The construction of structural 
impulse response functions requires an estimate of the N N× matrix 10B B
−≡  in .t te Bε=   Let 
e P P′Σ = Λ and 
0.5B P= Λ such that B satisfies .e BB′Σ =   Then B BD= also satisfies eBB′ = Σ  for 
any orthogonal N N× matrix .D  One can examine a wide range of possibilities for B by 
repeatedly drawing at random from the set D of orthogonal matrices .D  Following Rubio-
Ramirez, Waggoner and Zha (2010) we construct the set B of admissible models by drawing 
from the set D and discarding candidate solutions for B that do not satisfy a set of a priori 
restrictions on the implied impulse response functions. In practice, this procedure may be 
implemented conditional on the conventional maximum likelihood/least squares estimator of 
( )A L and eΣ in the reduced-form VAR model. This allows the resulting impulse response 
estimates to be given a frequentist interpretation. To summarize, the procedure consists of the 
following steps: 
1) Draw an N N×  matrix K of (0,1)NID random variables. Derive the QR  decomposition 
of K such that K Q R= ⋅  and .NQQ I′ =  
2) Let .D Q′=  Compute impulse responses using the orthogonalization .B BD=   If all 
implied impulse response functions satisfy the identifying restrictions, retain .D  
Otherwise discard .D  
3) Repeat the first two steps a large number of times, recording each D  that satisfies the 
restrictions and record the corresponding impulse response functions.   
The resulting set B corresponds to the set of all admissible structural VAR models.  
The estimation uncertainty underlying these structural impulse response estimates may be 
assessed by frequentist or Bayesian methods. We adopt the latter approach and follow the 
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standard approach in the literature of specifying a diffuse Gaussian-inverse Wishart prior 
distribution for the reduced-form parameters and a Haar distribution for the rotation matrix (see, 
e.g., Inoue and Kilian 2011). The posterior distribution of the structural impulse responses is 
obtained by applying our identification procedure to each draw of ( )A L and eΣ from their 
posterior distribution.  
 
4. Estimation Results 
The identifying restrictions described in section 3 do not yield point-identified structural impulse 
responses, but a range of models consistent with the identifying assumptions. For expository 
purposes, in the analysis below we focus on one model among the admissible structural models 
obtained conditional on the least squares estimate of the reduced-form. The results shown are for 
the model that yields an impact price elasticity of oil demand in use closest to the posterior 
median of this elasticity among the candidate models that satisfy all identifying restrictions. We 
also conducted the same analysis with every other admissible structural model and verified that 
our main results are robust to the choice of admissible model. The only difference is that some 
admissible models assign even more explanatory power to flow demand shocks than the 
benchmark model at the expense of speculative demand shocks.  
 
4.1. Responses to Oil Supply and Oil Demand Shocks 
Figure III.1 plots the responses of each variable in this benchmark model to the three oil supply 
and oil demand shocks along with the corresponding pointwise 68% posterior error bands. All 
shocks have been normalized such that they imply an increase in the real price of oil. In 
particular, the flow supply shock refers to an unanticipated oil supply disruption. Figure III.1 
illustrates that the role of storage differs depending on the nature of the shock. A flow supply 
disruption causes inventories to be drawn down in an effort to smooth production of refined 
products. A positive flow demand shock causes almost no change in oil inventories on impact, 
followed by a temporary drawdown of oil inventories. After one year, oil inventories reach a 
level in excess of their starting level. A positive speculative demand shock causes a persistent 
increase in oil inventories.  
 A negative flow supply shock is also associated with a reduction in global real activity 
and a persistent drop in oil production, but much of the initial drop is reversed within the first 
half year. The real price of oil rises only temporarily. It peaks after three months. After one year, 
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the real price of oil falls below its starting value, as global real activity drops further. A positive 
shock to the flow demand for crude oil, in contrast, is associated with a persistent increase in 
global real activity. It causes a persistent hump-shaped increase in the real price of oil with a 
peak after one year. Oil production also rises somewhat, but only temporarily. Finally, a positive 
speculative demand shock is associated with an immediate jump in the real price of oil. The real 
price response overshoots, before declining gradually. The effects on global real activity and 
global oil production are largely negative, but small. These estimates imply a larger role for flow 
supply shocks than the structural VAR model in Kilian (2009a,b), for example, illustrating the 
importance of explicitly modeling speculative demand shocks and oil inventories.  
 
4.2. What Drives Fluctuations in Oil Inventories and in the Real Price of Oil? 
It can be shown that in the short run, 29% of the variation in crude oil inventories is driven by 
speculative demand shocks, followed by oil supply shocks with 26%.  Flow demand shocks have 
a negligible impact with 2%. At long horizons, in contrast, the explanatory power of speculative 
demand shocks declines to 27% and that of flow supply shocks to 24%, while the explanatory 
power of flow demand shocks increases to 15%. This evidence suggests that, on average, 
fluctuations in oil inventories mainly reflect speculative trading as well as production smoothing 
by refiners in response to oil supply shocks. This contrasts with a much larger role of flow 
demand shocks in explaining the variability of the real price of oil. For example, in the long run, 
87% of the variation in the real price of oil can be attributed to flow demand shocks, compared 
with 9% due to speculative demand shocks and 3% due to flow supply shocks.  
Impulse responses and forecast error variance decompositions are useful in studying 
average behavior. To understand the historical evolution of the real price of oil, especially 
following major exogenous events in oil markets, it is more useful to compute the cumulative 
effect of each shock on the real price of oil and on the change in oil inventories. Figure III.2 
allows us to assess the quantitative importance of speculative demand shocks as opposed to other 
demand and supply shocks at each point in time since the late 1970s.16
4.3. Did Speculators Cause the Oil Price Shock of 2003-2008? 
 
A common view in the literature is that speculators caused part or all of the run-up in the real 
price of oil between 2003 and mid-2008. Especially the sharp increase in the real price of oil in 
                                                          
16 We do not include the contribution of the residual demand shock because that shock makes no large systematic 
contribution to the evolution of the real price of oil. 
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2007/08 has been attributed to speculation. The standard interpretation is (a) that there was an 
influx of financial investors into the oil futures market, (b) that this influx drove up oil futures 
prices, and (c) that the increase in oil futures prices was viewed by spot market participants as a 
signal of an expected increase in the price of oil, shifting inventory demand and hence causing 
the real spot price to increase. 
 This explanation implies that speculative demand shocks in the structural model should 
explain the bulk of the surge in the real price of oil after 2003. Figure 2 shows that there is no 
evidence to support this view. There has been no systematic upward movement in the real price 
of oil after 2003 associated with speculative demand shocks. This result has far-reaching 
implications. First, in the policy debate, it is common to distinguish between normal speculation 
in oil markets that reflects expected fundamentals and purely financial speculation that is viewed 
as excessive. While there is no operational definition of “excessive speculation”, as discussed in 
Fattouh et al. (2012), the evidence in Figure III.2 suggests that the distinction between normal 
speculation and speculation that is excessive is moot, for if there is no speculation at all, there 
cannot be excessive speculation under any definition.  
 Second, this result tells us that an exogenous influx of financial speculators cannot have 
driven up the oil futures price, because – under the standard assumption of arbitrage between the 
futures and spot markets for oil maintained by proponents of the financial speculation hypothesis 
– the absence of speculation in the spot market also rules out an exogenous influx of speculators 
in oil futures markets.17
 A competing view of speculation is that OPEC in anticipation of even higher oil prices 
held back its production after 2001, using oil below ground effectively as inventories (see, e.g.,  
  
Hamilton 2009a, p. 239). One way of testing this hypothesis is through the lens of our structural 
model. In our model, OPEC holding back oil production in anticipation of rising oil prices would 
be observationally equivalent to a negative flow supply shock. Figure III.2 provides no 
indication that negative flow supply shocks were an important determinant of the real price of oil 
between 2003 and mid-2008. What evidence there is of a small supply-side driven increase in the 
                                                          
17 Our analysis of the spot market would remain valid if this arbitrage were impeded or broke down completely, but 
the oil futures price would become disconnected from the spot price. In the limiting case of no arbitrage we would 
be unable to infer from our model whether there is speculation in oil futures markets, although we could still infer 
whether there is speculation taking place in the spot market. Clearly, a situation in which arbitrage breaks down is 
not consistent with the scenario envisioned by researchers who attribute rising spot prices to speculation by financial 
investors, because in that case speculation-driven increases in the oil futures price could not possibly be transmitted 
to the spot price of oil. 
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real price of oil is dwarfed by the price increases associated with flow demand shocks. Hence, 
we can reject the speculative supply shock hypothesis. 
An alternative explanation of the evolution of the real price of oil is the peak oil 
hypothesis, which predicted that around 2006 world oil production should have peaked. If so, 
one would have expected to see a sequence of negative flow supply shocks drive up the real 
price of oil after 2005, but we already showed that flow supply shocks have very limited 
explanatory power.  The peak oil hypothesis could also affect the real price of oil if traders 
rightly or wrongly believed in this hypothesis and stocked up on oil in anticipation of a shortage 
of oil. That explanation would be observationally equivalent to the financial speculation 
hypothesis, however, which we already rejected on the basis of the results in Figure III.2. Hence, 
peak oil may be safely ruled out as an explanation of the surge in the real price of oil after 2003, 
along with financial speculation and speculation by oil producers. 
Instead our model provides a different explanation. It supports the substantive conclusion 
in Kilian (2009a,b) that the surge in the real price of oil between 2003 and mid-2008 was mainly 
caused by shifts in the flow demand for crude oil associated with the global business cycle. It is 
important to stress that this result does not arise by construction. Indeed, the identification of our 
model is quite different from that in Kilian (2009a), and, as we will show below, the two models 
may produce substantively different empirical results. Our model shows that the run-up in the 
real price of oil occurred because of the cumulative effects of many positive flow demand shocks 
over the course of several years. It may seem unlikely ex ante that a model would generate many 
more positive than negative demand shocks between 2003 and mid-2008, but Kilian and Hicks 
(2012) show that this feature is consistent with the errors in professional real GDP forecasts 
during this period. Even professional forecasters persistently underestimated global growth 
during 2003-08, especially growth in emerging Asia, lending credence to our model results. 
This situation only changed with the financial crisis of late 2008. The V-shaped dip in the 
real price of oil in 2008/09 coincided with a similar dip in the global real activity measure and is 
largely driven by flow demand shocks. A similar, if much less pronounced, dip had followed the 
Asian crisis in 1997. Whereas the recovery from the all-time low in the real price of oil in 1999-
2000 resulted from a combination of coordinated OPEC oil supply cuts, a gradual increase in 
flow demand (often associated with the U.S. productivity boom) and increased speculative 
demand perhaps in anticipation of increased future real activity and/or further oil supply 
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reductions, the resurgence of the real price of oil starting in early 2009 reflected primarily 
increased flow demand (see Figure III.2). 
We conclude that economic fundamentals on the demand side of the oil market are 
capable of explaining the evolution of the real price of oil during the last decade. No non-
standard explanations are required. This finding is important because it implies that further 
regulation of oil markets would have done nothing to stem the increase in the real price of oil. 
Indeed it shows that there is no basis for the premise that such regulation is required to lower the 
real price of oil. Our structural model also implies that even dramatic increases in U.S. oil 
production would not lower the real price of oil substantially at the global level, while a full 
recovery of the global economy would raise the real price of oil by as much as 50 dollars in real 
terms (see Baumeister and Kilian 2012b). 
 
4.4. The Inventory Puzzle of 1990 
Although speculative motives played no important role after 2003, there are other oil price shock 
episodes when they did, suggesting that our model has the ability to detect speculative demand 
shocks when they exist. One particularly interesting example is the oil price spike associated 
with the Persian Gulf War of 1990/91. In related work, Kilian (2009a) presented evidence based 
on a model without oil inventories that the 1990 oil price increase was driven mainly by a shift in 
speculative demand (reflecting concerns about future oil supplies from neighboring Saudi 
Arabia) rather than the physical reduction in oil supplies associated with the war. As noted by 
Hamilton (2009a), this result is puzzling upon reflection because oil inventories moved little and, 
if anything, slightly declined following the invasion of Kuwait. This observation prompted 
Hamilton to reject the hypothesis that shifts in speculative demand were behind the sharp 
increase in the real price of oil in mid-1990 and its fall after late 1990. Given the consensus that 
flow demand did not move sharply in mid-1990, Hamilton suggested that perhaps this price 
increase must be attributed to flow supply shocks after all. The inventory data, however, seem 
just as inconsistent with this alternative hypothesis. Inventories declined in August of 1990, but 
only by one third of a standard deviation of the change in inventories. Given one of the largest 
unexpected oil supply disruptions in history, one would have expected a much larger decline in 
oil inventories given the impulse response estimates in Figure III.1. Moreover, there is general 
agreement that flow supply shocks cannot explain the collapse of the real price of oil in late 
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1990. In light of this evidence, neither the supply shock explanation nor the speculative demand 
shock explanation by itself seems compelling. 
Our econometric model resolves this inventory puzzle. The explanation is that the 
invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990 represented two shocks that occurred simultaneously. On 
the one hand it involved an unexpected flow supply disruption and on the other an unexpected 
increase in speculative demand. Whereas the flow supply shock caused a decline in oil 
inventories, increased speculative demand in August caused an increase in oil inventories, with 
the net effect being a modest decline in oil inventories.  At the same time, the observed large 
increase in the real price of oil was caused by both shocks working in the same direction.  
The historical decomposition in Figure III.3 contrasts the price and inventory movements 
caused by each shock during 1990/91. It shows that about one third of the price increase from 
July to August of 1990 was caused by speculative demand shocks and two thirds by flow supply 
shocks.  This result is in sharp contrast to the estimates in Kilian (2009a) who found no evidence 
of oil supply shocks contributing to this increase, illustrating again that the inclusion of 
inventories in the structural model matters.   
Figure III.3 also highlights that the decline in the real price of oil starting in November of 
1990, when the threat of Saudi oil fields being captured by Iraq had been removed by the 
presence of U.S. troops, was almost entirely caused by a reduction in speculative demand rather 
than increased oil supplies. The latter observation is consistent with evidence in Kilian (2008a) 
that it is difficult to reconcile the sharp decline in the real price of oil starting in late 1990 with 
data on oil production. The evidence of a sharp decline in speculative demand in late 1990 in 
turn raises the obvious question of when and why speculative demand had surged in the first 
place. The bottom panel of Figure III.2 reveals there was in fact a substantial increase in 
speculative demand already in the months leading up to the invasion. This result is consistent 
with a sharp increase in oil inventories in the months leading up to the invasion. One 
interpretation is that the invasion was anticipated by informed oil traders or, more likely, that 
traders responded to evidence of increased political tension in the Middle East.18
                                                          
18 In this regard, Gause (2002) notes a shift in Iraqi foreign policy toward a more aggressive stance in early 1990. 
 The reason that 
this increase in the speculative component of the real price of oil went unnoticed by the general 
public was a simultaneous substantial unexpected increase in oil production with offsetting 
effects on the real price of oil in early 1990, as shown in the top panel of Figure III.2. In fact, that 
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expansion of oil production served as the motivation for Iraq’s increasing hostility to 
neighboring countries such as Kuwait which it accused of undermining the price of oil, making it 
more difficult for Iraq to service its foreign debt. Taken in conjunction our evidence implies a 
much larger role for speculative demand in 1990/91 than the data for the month of August alone 
would suggest. 
 
4.5. What Caused the 1979 and 1980 Oil Price Shocks? 
Speculative demand also played an important role in 1979. The traditional interpretation of this 
episode is that this oil price increase was caused by flow supply disruptions associated with the 
Iranian Revolution of late 1978 and early 1979. Much of the observed increase in the real price 
of oil, however, only occurred later in 1979 after Iranian oil production had resumed. Barsky and 
Kilian (2002) therefore attribute the price increase starting in May of 1979 and extending into 
1980 in part to increased flow demand for oil and in part to a substantial increase in speculative 
demand for oil, consistent with anecdotal evidence from oil industry sources and with the 
perception of a noticeable increase in the risk of an oil supply disruption in the Persian Gulf in 
1979, coupled with expectations of strong flow demand.19
 This hypothesis is testable in our model. Figure III.2 shows that not only was there a 
  
dramatic and persistent increase in the real price of oil driven by positive flow demand shocks in 
1979 and 1980 (not unlike the persistent price increase after 2003), but that increase was 
reinforced after May of 1979 by a sharp increase in speculative demand, exactly as described by 
Yergin (1992). Whereas flow demand pressures on the real price of oil gradually receded starting 
in 1981, speculative demand pressures on average remained relatively high until the collapse of 
OPEC in late 1985.  In contrast, there is little evidence of flow supply shocks being responsible 
for the oil price surge of 1979, consistent with the fact that overall global oil production 
increased in 1979, reflecting additional oil production outside of Iran.  Only in late 1980 and 
early 1981 is there a moderate spike in the real price of oil driven by flow supply shocks, in part 
associated with the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War (see Figure III.2).  
                                                          
19 For example, Terzian (1985, p. 260) writes that in 1979 “spot deals became more and more infrequent. The 
independent refineries, with no access to direct supply from producers, began to look desperately for oil on the so-
called ‘free market’. But from the beginning of November, most of the big oil companies invoked force majeure and 
reduced their oil deliveries to third parties by 10% to 30%, when they did not cut them off altogether. Everybody 
was anxious to hang on to as much of their own oil as possible, until the situation had become clearer. The shortage 
was purely psychological, or ‘precautionary’ as one dealer put it.” Also see Yergin (1992, p. 687).  
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 It is useful to explore the price and inventory dynamics in 1979 in more detail. The 
historical decomposition in Figure III.4 confirms that negative flow supply shocks caused a 
temporary drop in oil inventories in December of 1978 and January of 1979, but for the next half 
year positive flow supply shocks increased oil inventories. This result is also consistent with the 
fact that global oil production starting in April of 1979 exceeded its level prior to the Iranian 
Revolution. At the same time, after March of 1979, repeated speculative demand shocks caused a 
persistent accumulation of inventories, while driving up the real price of oil. The inventory 
accumulation continued into 1980.Thus, there is no indication that flow supply shocks played an 
important role in the oil price surge of 1979. 
 It was not until September of 1980 when the Iran-Iraq War broke out that the oil market 
experienced another major disruption of flow supply. This event is once again associated with 
declining oil inventories initially and subsequently rising inventories driven by unexpected flow 
supply increases, reflecting in part the growing importance of new non-OPEC oil producers.  
As Figure III.5 shows, the increase in the real price of oil in response to this flow supply 
disruption was slightly larger than the price response to the 1979 supply disruption. There is also 
evidence of a small resurgence of speculative demand following the outbreak of the war, 
reflected in rising inventories and a higher real price of oil. 
 
4.6. The Collapse of OPEC in 1986 
In late 1985, Saudi Arabia decided that it would no longer attempt to prop up the price of oil by 
reducing its oil production, creating a major positive shock to the flow supply of oil. The same 
event also markedly changed market perceptions about OPEC’s market power. Figure III.6 
shows that, as expected, the positive flow supply shock in early 1986 drove down the real price 
of oil, while oil inventories rose in response. Simultaneously, a drop in speculative demand 
reinforced the decline in the real price of oil, while lowering inventory holdings. This pattern is 
similar to the pattern in Figure III.3, except in reverse. Although OPEC attempted to reunite and 
control production in 1987, amidst increased speculation, these attempts proved unsuccessful in 
the long run. 
 
4.7. The Venezuelan Crisis and Iraq War of 2002/03 
Figure III.7 focuses on the flow supply shock of 2002/2003 when within months first 
Venezuelan oil production slowed considerably at the end of 2002 and then Iraqi oil production 
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ceased altogether in early 2003. The combined cutback in oil production was of a magnitude 
similar to the oil supply disruptions of the 1970s (see Kilian 2008a).  Figure III.7 shows that this 
event reflected a combination of negative flow supply shocks and positive speculative demand 
shocks. 
The Venezuelan oil supply crisis of late 2002 was associated with declining oil 
inventories, consistent with an unexpected oil supply disruption, but this period was also 
coincided with an increase in speculative demand in anticipation of the 2003 Iraq War that 
dampened the decline in inventories, while reinforcing the increase in the real price of oil. The 
military conflict in Iraq lasted from late March 2003 until the end of April 2003. Despite the 
additional loss of Iraqi output in early 2003, global oil production unexpectedly increased. The 
production shortfalls in Iraq and Venezuela were more than offset at the global level by 
increased oil production elsewhere. These positive flow supply shocks lowered the real price of 
oil starting in early 2003 and resulted in positive inventory accumulation. At the same time, as 
early as March 2003, lower speculative demand caused the real price of oil to drop and oil 
inventories to fall. Again the effect of the two shocks on inventories was offsetting, whereas the 
effect on the price worked in the same direction. This last example again underscores that 
geopolitical events in the Middle East matter not merely because of the disruptions of the flow 
supply of oil they may create, but also because of their effect on speculative demand. 
 
5. Implications of the Model for the Short-Run Price Elasticity of Oil Demand 
The short-run price elasticity of oil demand has important implications for theoretical models of 
speculative demand. For example, it is a key parameter in the theoretical models of speculation 
discussed in Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008) and Hamilton (2009a). All else equal, 
standard models of speculation imply that oil inventories must increase to enable the real price of 
oil to increase. Recently, Hamilton (2009a) observed that speculation in oil futures markets may 
drive up the real price of oil without any increase in oil inventories if refiners are able to pass on 
fully to gasoline consumers an exogenous increase in the real price of oil driven by speculation. 
This result requires the demand for gasoline to be completely price-inelastic. As shown in 
Appendix III.B, the short-run price elasticity of gasoline demand is approximately of the same 
magnitude as the short-run price elasticity of oil demand in use. Whether the limiting case 
discussed in Hamilton (2009a) is empirically relevant thus depends on the magnitude of the 
short-run price elasticity of oil demand. 
121 
 
While there is little doubt that the price elasticity of oil supply is near zero in the short  
run, the literature does not offer much direct evidence on the magnitude of the short-run price 
elasticity of oil demand. It is widely believed that this elasticity is close to zero, making it 
difficult to rule out the limiting case described by Hamilton. Although there is no shortage of 
elasticity estimates in the literature that seem to confirm this impression, these estimates suffer 
from two limitations.  
First, much of the existing literature has attempted to estimate the oil demand elasticity 
from dynamic reduced-form models that do not distinguish between oil demand and oil supply 
shocks (see, e.g., Dahl 1993; Cooper 2003). This is not possible because the identification of the 
demand elasticity requires an exogenous shift of the contemporaneous oil supply curve along the 
contemporaneous oil demand curve within the context of a structural model. Reduced-form 
estimates of the oil demand elasticity fail to account for the endogeneity of the price of crude oil 
and hence are biased toward zero. This fact helps explain the low elasticity estimates typically 
reported in the literature.20
Second, typical estimates of the oil demand elasticity in the literature have been based on 
models that equate the percent change in quantity with the percent change in the production of 
crude oil, ignoring the existence of oil inventories. In this paper, we refer to this conventional 
elasticity measure as the oil demand elasticity in production, denoted by 
  
, Pr .O oductionη  A more 
appropriate definition of the price elasticity of oil demand for policy questions is the elasticity in 
use. The latter demand elasticity is based on the change in the use of oil, defined as the sum of 
the change in oil production and of the depletion of oil inventories, which more accurately 
captures the response of oil consumers. 
 
5.1. The Short-Run Price Elasticity of Oil Demand in Production 
Our structural model of the oil market may be used to obtain direct estimates of the short-run 
price elasticity of oil demand in production and in use, allowing us to the empirical relevance of 
models relying on a zero price elasticity of oil demand. The elasticity in production can be 
estimated from model (1) as the ratio of the impact response of oil production to a flow supply 
shock relative to the impact response of the real price of oil. Our posterior median estimate of 
this elasticity, as shown in the first column of the upper panel of Table III.2, is -0.44. This 
                                                          
20 Producers of these estimates sometimes acknowledge the need for instrumental variable estimation methods, but, 
having acknowledged this point, tend to revert to using OLS, given the absence of suitable instruments.  
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estimate is seven times higher than typical conjectures in the recent literature. It is also much 
higher in magnitude than conventional reduced-form regression estimates of this elasticity. For 
example, surveys by Dahl (1993) and Cooper (2003) report estimates between -0.05 and -0.07. 
The difference in results can be attributed to the difference between estimating a structural and a 
reduced-form model.21
 
 The first column in the upper panel of Table III.2 also shows the 68% 
posterior credible set for this elasticity. The model assigns substantial probability mass to values 
between -0.80 and -0.23 and very little probability mass to values close to zero. 
5.2. The Short-Run Price Elasticity of Oil Demand in Use 
The posterior median estimate of , PrO oductionη  in the first column of Table III.2, while instructive 
when compared to conventional estimates, is misleading in that it ignores the role of inventories. 
Our model also permits the estimation of the price elasticity of oil demand in use, allowing us to 
assess the role of changes in inventories (see Appendix III.A). By construction, allowing for 
inventory responses will tend to lower the magnitude of the price elasticity of oil demand.  The 
second column in the upper panel of Table III.2 shows that posterior median estimate of ,O Useη  is 
only -0.26 compared with the estimate of -0.44 for the demand elasticity in oil production. While 
this large reduction in the magnitude of the elasticity highlights the importance of accounting for 
changes in oil inventories, the revised median estimate is still four times larger than conventional 
elasticity estimates. Indeed, this result illustrates that relatively high short-run price elasticities of 
oil demand are fully compatible with the view that economic fundamentals are responsible for 
the surge in the real price of oil after 2003.22 Moreover, the second column of Table III.2 again 
shows that there is little probability mass on elasticity values close to zero, casting doubt on 
models of speculation that do not involve a change in oil inventories.23
                                                          
21 One way of demonstrating this point is to note that fitting the conventional reduced-form log-level specification 
used in some of the earlier literature to our data would yield an elasticity estimate of only -0.02 in line with the 
existing consensus.  Another way of putting these results into perspective is to observe that other recent studies 
relying on alternative structural models have obtained similarly large oil demand elasticity estimates ranging from -
0.35 to -0.41 (see, e.g., Serletis et al. 2010; Baumeister and Peersman 2012; Bodenstein and Guerrieri 2011). 
  
22 The lower panels of Table 2 show that these estimates are quite robust to relaxing the upper bound on the impact 
price elasticity of oil supply. Relaxing this bound to 0.050 or even to 0.100 raises the median oil demand elasticity in 
use slightly without affecting the substance of the conclusions. 
23 It is worth noting that our estimate of the price elasticity of gasoline demand is larger than some estimates in the 
literature. For example, Hughes, Knittel and Sperling (2008) report an average elasticity estimate of -0.18 based on 
U.S. data for 1975-80 and for 2001-06, similar to estimates in Dahl and Sterner (1991).  On the other hand, Burger 
and Kaffine (2009) report estimates as high as -0.29. Our estimate also is smaller than the instrumental variable 
regression estimate of the gasoline tax elasticity of gasoline demand of -0.47 reported in Davis and Kilian (2011) 




Standard structural VAR models of the market for crude oil implicitly equate oil production with 
oil consumption and ignore the role of oil inventories. Traditionally these models have focused 
on shocks to the flow supply of oil and the flow demand for oil. In this paper we augmented the 
structural model to include shocks to inventory demand reflecting shifts in expectations about 
future oil supply and future oil demand that cannot be captured by flow demand or flow supply 
shocks. Such speculative demand shocks must be represented as shifts of the contemporaneous 
oil demand curve rather than the contemporaneous oil supply curve, even if the shift in 
expectations is about a cut in future oil supplies rather than an increase in future oil demand. The 
reason is that traders in anticipation of the expected oil shortage will buy and store crude oil now 
with the expectation of selling later at a profit. We proposed a dynamic simultaneous equation 
model including crude oil inventories that allows the simultaneous identification of all three 
types of shocks conditional on past data.  
The inclusion of oil inventories matters. For example, our structural model implies a 
larger role for flow supply shocks in explaining fluctuations in the real price of oil than previous 
estimates. The added explanatory power of flow supply shocks for the real price of oil, especially 
in 1990, comes at the expense of the explanatory power of speculative demand shocks. We 
showed that, nevertheless, the largest and most persistent fluctuations in the real price of oil 
since the 1970s have been associated primarily with business cycle fluctuations affecting the 
demand for crude oil. Of particular interest for recent policy debates is the sustained increase in 
the real price of oil from 2003 until mid-2008. In the context of a model that nests all leading 
explanations of how this oil price surge came about, we were able to provide direct evidence 
against the popular view that this increase was driven by speculators. This conclusion holds even 
for the 2007/08 period. Shifts in speculative demand played a more important role during several 
earlier oil price shock episodes, however, notably in 1979, 1986, 1990, and 2002. We showed 
that, without accounting for shifts in the speculative demand for oil, it is not possible to 
understand the evolution of the real price of oil during these episodes.  
Our analysis also suggests that there is no evidence that peak oil or that deliberate 
production cutbacks by oil producers had much bearing on the recent oil price fluctuations. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
have declined in magnitude in very recent years and at what time (see, e.g., Hughes, Knittel, and Sperling 2008). It 
would take a substantial decline, however, to make the limiting case of a zero elasticity discussed in Hamilton 
(2009a) empirically relevant. 
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Rather our results support recent findings in the literature that the sustained run-up in the real 
price of oil between 2003 and mid-2008 was caused primarily by shifts in the global flow 
demand for oil. Likewise, the collapse of the real price of oil in late 2008 and its partial recovery 
since early 2009 have been primarily driven by increased flow demand. The model implies that 
the real price of oil is expected to rise further as the global economy recovers from the financial 
crisis, creating a policy dilemma, unless energy consumption can be reduced or new energy 
sources can be found. By contrast, additional regulation of oil derivatives markets is not likely to 
lower the real price of oil nor can increased domestic oil production in the U.S. be expected to 
have much of an effect on the real price of oil (also see Baumeister and Kilian 2012b). 
Our model also reconciles some seemingly puzzling observations related to earlier oil 
price surges. For example, it has been noted that, following the outbreak of the Persian Gulf War 
in August 1990, oil inventories did not increase as one would have expected in response to a 
positive speculative demand shock. At the same time, the absence of a sharp decline in oil 
inventories in August of 1990 is inconsistent with the view that the price increase reflected a 
negative oil supply shock. We demonstrated that this inventory puzzle can be resolved with the 
help of a structural oil market model. Our analysis showed that the price and inventory data can 
be explained only based on a combination of these two shocks. Because the implied inventory 
responses are of opposite sign, the net effect in inventories is close to zero, where the sharp price 
increase reflects the fact that the implied price responses are of the same sign. Similar 
relationships were shown to hold during other key historical episodes. These examples illustrate 
that it is essential to rely on structural models rather than reduced-form evidence in interpreting 
the price and quantity data. 
The use of a structural regression model also is important for the construction of the 
short-run price elasticity of oil demand. For example, Hamilton (2009a,b) suggested that 1978-
81 is one episode where one might clearly and without a regression model attribute cumulative 
changes in the price of oil to exogenous oil supply shifts only, allowing one to construct a 
demand elasticity estimate from the ratio of cumulative changes in quantities and prices for that 
period. The structural model we have analyzed suggests otherwise. We showed that oil demand 
shocks were the main cause of the observed oil price increase in 1978-81. Oil supply shocks 
played a small role only, violating the premise of Hamilton’s calculations. 
We also observed that traditional estimates of the short-run price elasticity of oil demand  
125 
 
are not credible. One problem is that conventional estimates of this elasticity from dynamic 
reduced-form regressions, as in Dahl (1993) and Cooper (2003), have ignored the endogeneity of 
the real price of oil, causing the elasticity estimate to be downward biased. Moreover, existing 
estimates, including the structural estimates recently provided by Baumeister and Peersman 
(2012), have ignored the role of inventories in smoothing oil consumption in response to oil 
supply shocks. We provided a model that allows the estimation of both the traditional oil demand 
elasticity in production and of the more relevant oil demand elasticity in use which incorporates 
changes in oil inventories. Our short-run elasticity estimates are substantially higher than 
standard estimates cited in the literature, casting doubt on models of speculative trading based on 








Note: All structural shocks have been normalized to imply an increase in the real price of oil. 




Table III.2: Posterior Distribution of the Short-Run Price Elasticity of Demand for Crude 
Oil 
  , PrO oductionη  ,O Useη  
0.025Supplytη ≤  16
th Percentile -0.80 -0.54 
 50th Percentile -0.44 -0.26 
 84th Percentile -0.23 -0.09 
0.050Supplytη ≤  16
th Percentile -0.80 -0.57 
 50th Percentile -0.45 -0.27 
 84th Percentile -0.29 -0.09 
0.100Supplytη ≤  16
th Percentile -0.76 -0.61 
 50th Percentile -0.47 -0.30 
 84th Percentile -0.24 -0.10 
 
Note: , PrO oductionη refers to the impact price elasticity of oil demand in production and ,O Useη to the 
average impact price elasticity of oil demand in use. The latter definition accounts for the role of 
inventories in smoothing oil consumption. Supplyη  refers to the impact price elasticity of oil 
supply.






Oil production - + + 
Real activity - + - 
Real price of oil + + + 


































































































































































































Note:  Solid lines indicate the impulse response estimates for the model with an impact price elasticity of oil demand in use closest to 
the posterior median of that elasticity among the admissible structural models obtained conditional on the least-squares estimate of the 
reduced-from VAR model. Dashed lines indicate the corresponding pointwise 68% posterior error bands. Oil production refers to the 
cumulative percent change in oil production and inventories to cumulative changes in inventories. 
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Cumulative Effect of Flow Supply Shock on Real Price of Crude Oil






Cumulative Effect of Flow Demand Shock on Real Price of Crude Oil






Cumulative Effect of Speculative Demand Shock on Real Price of Crude Oil




























Note:  Based on benchmark estimate as in Figure III.1. The vertical bars indicate major exogenous events in oil markets, notably the 
outbreak of the Iranian Revolution in 1978.9 and of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980.9, the collapse of OPEC in 1985.12, the outbreak of the 
Persian Gulf War in 1990.8, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997.7, and the Venezuelan crisis in 2002.11, which was followed by the 
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Figure III.7: Historical Decompositions for Venezuelan Crisis and Iraq War in 2002/03 
 
 











Appendix III.A: Construction of the Price Elasticity of Oil Demand in Use 
 
In this appendix we show how the oil demand elasticity in use can be approximated with the help 
of our structural model of the oil market. The amount of oil used in period t , denoted by ,tU  
equals the quantity of oil produced in that period ( )tQ  minus the oil that is added to the stock of 
inventories ( )tS∆ :  
.t t tU Q S= −∆   
The change in oil used over time therefore equals the change in oil produced minus the change in 



















where ∆ represents changes, %∆  indicates percent changes in response to an oil supply shock in 
period ,t  and tP  denotes the real price of oil. Denote by 11B the impact response of the percent 
change in oil production to an oil supply shock, where ijB  refers to the ij th element of .B  Then 
the implied change in oil production is 1 11 1 1 11(1 /100) /100.t t t tQ Q B Q Q B− − −∆ = × + − = ×   
Moreover, 2 1 41 41,t t tS S S S B S B−∆ = ∆ −∆ = ∆ + −∆ =   where the change in oil inventories in 
response to the oil supply shock equals the impact response 41B  and, prior to the shock, the 
change in crude oil inventories is equal to its mean ,S∆  which is observable. Finally, the impact 
percent change in the real price of oil in response to an oil supply shock is 31.B  Hence, the 























Note that by construction Usetη depends on 1tQ −  and hence will be time-varying even though the 
oil demand elasticity in production is not. We therefore report the average oil demand elasticity 
in use over the sample period throughout this paper, denoted by , .O Useη   
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Appendix III.B: Linking the Short-Run Price Elasticities of Gasoline and Oil Demand 
 
In this appendix we derive an explicit relationship between consumers’ demand for gasoline and 
refiners’ demand for crude oil in a model in which refiners are allowed to, but not required to 
have market power in the gasoline market. Refiners are treated as price-takers in the crude oil 
market. Our analysis is strictly short-term, as is appropriate in constructing impact price 
elasticities. In the interest of tractability, we abstract from the fact that gasoline is only one of 
several refined products jointly produced from crude oil. We postulate that gasoline is produced 
according to a Leontief production function over capital, labor, and oil, ( )min , , .G K L Oα=  If 
capital is fixed in the short run and refiners’ labor input can be varied on the intensive margin, 
which seems plausible in practice, refiners produce gasoline in fixed proportion to the quantity of 
oil consumed, ,G Oα=  and pay a marginal cost equal to the price of oil, ,OP  plus the marginal 
cost of labor, .OMC P c= +  GP  denotes the price of gasoline. 
Consumers demand 1( ) ,G GG P XP P
σ σ− −=  where X is the expenditure on gasoline, P  is 
the consumer price index, and the price elasticity of demand for gasoline, ,Gη equals .σ−  The 
inverse demand function is 1/( )GP G G
σω −= where 1 .X P σω −≡  In the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, 
each of J identical refinery firms will choose its own quantity of gasoline output, , 1,..., ,jg j J=  
given the outputs of other firms, to maximize profits ( )( )j G j O jP G g c P gπ = − +  with respect to 
,jg  where .jjG g=∑  The first-order condition is ( )1/ ( 1)/ / 0,j OG g G c Pσ σ σω ω σ− − −− − + =  








J P c JP G





= =   − + 
  














=   + 
 
Log-linearization yields , ( ),O Use G O OP P cη η≈ +  where  
,O Useη denotes the price elasticity of 
demand for crude oil in use. The marginal cost estimates in Considine (1997) suggest that 0,c ≈  
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